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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of microfinance institutions (MFIs) is to provide financial services to the poor 
and non-bankable population. Microbanking in Africa however remains a difficult business. 
Although MFIs may be flourishing in commercial terms, few are profitable. Many MFIs in Africa 
face major constraints in their pursuit of effectively delivering microfinance services profitably. 
While MFIs in other regions have consistently reported positive profits, those operating in Africa 
continue to post negative profits. What explains this disparity?  
 
This thesis seeks to contribute to the current state of knowledge and research on microfinance 
profitability by investigating the potential determinants of MFIs profitability with a focus on 
Africa. Further empirical work is carried out to examine: (i) profit persistence and the speed of 
convergence; (ii) impact of financing choice on microfinance profitability; and (iii) the impact of 
institutional environment of the host economy where MFI is located on profitability. This thesis 
is pioneering in using two-step System-Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimators in 
studies of determinants of microfinance profitability which enables us to control for possible 
endogeneity. The analytical framework uses an unbalanced panel dataset comprising of 210 MFIs 
across 32 countries operating from 1997 to 2008. We tested the robustness of our models with 
different specifications which confirmed the general result.  
 
Our main estimations show that MFI profitability is non-negligibly driven by MFI specific 
factors and the institutional environment of the host country. Specifically, average profitability is 
higher in MFIs that are efficient, well-capitalized and with scale advantages. A key result is that 
macroeconomic environment is not significant in explaining microfinance profitability. 
 
We find that a proportionally higher deposit as a percentage of total assets is associated with 
improved profitability. However, the magnitude of this effect is very sensitive to MFI age. 
Voluntary deposit mobilization may therefore help MFIs achieve independence from donors and 
investors, since it provides MFIs with inexpensive and sustainable source of funds for making 
loans. Consistent with the agency costs hypothesis, our results show that highly leveraged MFIs 
are more profitable. This may benefit MFIs if higher debt to equity ratio were to increase 
profitability by a greater margin than the cost of the debt. This calls for the development of 
vi
 
appropriate regulatory policies that enable MFIs to have access to long-term debt to improve their 
profitability.  
 
Institutional environment of the host economy also plays a major role in MFIs profitability. The 
study reveals that young MFIs suffer more from political instability and weak enhancement of the 
rule of law, which is consistent with accumulation of information capital and relationship 
lending. The quality of contract enforcement and overall political stability in the country could 
therefore affect the extent of moral hazard that MFIs face when making loans. Results also 
indicate that corruption makes it harder for MFIs to realize profits, irrespective of MFI age. 
Corruption may therefore reduce the probability that MFI will invest in a country. This evidence 
may help guide the sequencing of institutional reforms to promote microfinance development.  
 
Finally, we find evidence of a moderate persistence in profitability. Microfinance industry in 
Africa is therefore not competitive. This finding is consistent with literature that considers 
persistence of profitability as a signal of barriers to competition reflecting either impediments to 
market competition or informational asymmetry.  
 
The evidence gathered in this thesis is important for forming credit market policy that may help 
deepen the quality and quantity of access to finance particularly by the poor. This research work 
therefore bridges some knowledge gaps in microfinance profitability by presenting important 
findings that confirm some theoretical postulations. Questions for further research are discussed 
in the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
Lack of access to credit is a major obstacle to growth in Africa, where a large majority of 
households do not have adequate collateral to secure a loan1. These households rely on both 
informal-sector and moneylenders where they borrow at usurious interest rates, or are simply 
denied access to credit and therefore investment. Microfinance institutions (henceforth MFIs) 
expand the frontier of financial intermediation by providing credit to those who are excluded 
from formal financial markets.  
Microfinance is high on the public policy agenda. It has achieved tremendous success in 
improving the livelihoods of the poor2, through the provision of financial services. Such 
initiatives are widely sponsored by a variety of organizations including; the World Bank, United 
Nations, national governments and many charitable non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Their aim is to help the poor cope with risk and take advantage of small income generating 
opportunities, by employing profit-making banking practices amongst low income communities 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2009; Ahlin and Jiang, 2008; Arun and Hulme, 2008; Swain and Varghese 
2009; Imai et al. 2010). By alleviating financing constraints, microfinance is able to promote 
small scale investments from otherwise unrealized market activities while yielding a return on 
their investment (Hartarska and Nadolnyak 2008b; Hilson and Ackah-Baidoo 2010). Levels of 
success however vary across MFIs and depending on some factors, some fail and cease to exist 
while others grow to reach millions of borrowers. 
                                                 
1 Illustrations on this point abound (see, e.g., Demirgüc-Kunt, et al 2007; Beck, et al 2007). 
2 According to the Micro credit Summit Campaign, the world’s core poor are those who live in the bottom half or those living below their nation’s 
poverty line or any of the 1 billion people living on less than US$ 1 a day. 
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Spurred by an accord reached at the Microcredit Summit in February 1997, to reach 100 
million of the world’s poorest households with credit by the end of 2005; there is arguably more 
widespread support for microfinance today than any other single tool for fighting global poverty 
(Daley-Harris, 2009; Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). This heralded and much celebrated 
success has been reflected in outreach. For example, between December 1997 and December 
2010 the number of MFIs reporting to the microcredit summit campaign rose from 618 to 3,652. 
The number of persons who received credit from these institutions rose from 13.5 million to 205 
million during the same period (see Table 1.1). Assuming a family of five persons per household, 
the 137.5 million poorest clients reached by the end of 2010 affected some 687.7 million family 
members (Maes and Reed, 2012). 
Table 1.1: Outreach figures as of December 31, 2010 
Number of MFIs reporting (1997–2010) 3,652 
Number of MFIs reporting in 2011 only (data from 12/31/10) 609 
Percent poorest clients represented by MFIs reporting in 2011 56.5% 
Total number of clients (as of 12/31/10) 205,314,502 
Total number of women (as of 12/31/10) 153,306,542 
Total number of poorest clients (as of 12/31/10) 137,547,441 
Total number of poorest women (as of 12/31/10) 113,138,652 
Source: (Maes and Reed, 2012). 
Through innovative lending technology, MFIs are generating high loan repayment rates on 
non-collateralized loans in diverse environments that often exceed 95 percent (Cull, Demirgüc-
Kunt and Morduch 2007). Translating high repayment rates into profits remains a challenge to 
most MFIs. Although micro-banking is dominated by NGOs and socially-oriented investors, 
experts believe only one percent of all NGO-sponsored MFIs are profitable and predict that no 
more than five percent would ever be (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). This argument is 
however anecdotal and largely based on general consensus than on supporting data and research.  
In 1995, the donor community arrived at a consensus that all MFIs should in principle 
become profitable after seven to ten years of start-up support (Balkenhol, 2007). But given the 
2
 
diversity of their objectives, ranging from very pronounced poverty focus to commercialization3, 
the question is whether this is being realized. At the heart of the debate are important 
disagreements over the nature and scope of potential trade-offs between pursuits of profitability 
and outreach (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). This conflict cannot be resolved by lending 
technology as two pioneers of joint liability contract namely Grameen Bank and BancoSol have 
now switched to individual-based models (Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch 2007).  
Profitability of MFIs particularly across African economies is less understood partly due to 
inadequate data (Honohan 2004b). But why is it important for MFIs to be profitable? Profitability 
is an appropriate mechanism for achieving long term viability and sustainability of the 
microfinance industry. At the micro level, profitability is a prerequisite to a competitive 
microfinance industry and the cheapest source of capital, without which no firm would attract 
external capital (Gitman, 2007:65). MFIs profits are also an important source of equity, if profits 
are reinvested and this may promote financial stability. Moreover, market sources of funding are 
accessible only to MFIs that have demonstrated that they can turn a profit. By minimizing the 
probability of financial crisis, impressive profits are vital in reassuring MFI’s stakeholders, 
including investors, borrowers, suppliers and regulators. At the macrolevel, a profitable 
microfinance industry is better placed to overcome negative shocks and contribute meaningfully 
to the stability of the overall financial system.  
Our motivation for this piece of research emanates from the negative average profit levels 
amongst Africa4 MFIs which are in sharp contrast with other regions (see Table 1.2). What 
explains this disparity? Are there constraints unique to Africa that hinders MFIs profitability? 
                                                 
3 Commercialization explicitly strives to provide the services intended by charging the real costs of providing microfinance services including 
margin to cover loan losses with a focus of narrowing the persistent demand-supply gap for sustainable microfinance products and services. 
Impliedly, MFIs will earn ample profits, and expand as rapidly as profits allow and therefore attract private investors. This is anchored on the 
premise that commercial businesses can be part of the solution to eliminating poverty. 
4 Globally MFIs are classified into five main geographic regions: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) http://www.themix.org/ 
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Despite strong theoretical underpinnings, these questions highlight an important research gap, 
which deserves an empirical scrutiny. They therefore provide the intellectual framework for the 
empirical analysis reported in this thesis. This enables us to infer the extent to which both internal 
and external factors explain MFI profitability. Although Galema, Lensink and Spierdijk (2011), 
finds that investing in microfinance may be attractive to investors seeking a better risk–return 
profile, their analysis suggests that investing in MFIs from Africa to a portfolio of international 
assets is not beneficial for a mean-variance investor. It might also be the case that firms located in 
economies with less developed financial markets will not only take different quantities of 
investment, but will also take different kinds of investment that are perhaps safer, short-term and 
potentially less profitable (Almeida, et al. 2011) 
Table 1.2: Overall financial performance (Real values percentage) 
Region Return on Assets Return on Equity Profit Margin 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Africa -1.2 -0.8 -0.6 -0.7 -4.9 -1.5 0.5 -2.3 -3.9 -2.0 -0.7 -3.7 
Asia 0.9 1.2 0.6 1.3 4.4 6.8 5.0 9.6 5.2 7.4 7.1 8.0 
ECA 1.4 1.7 1.1 0.3 4.4 6.3 6.2 2.8 8.9 11.7 10.0 4.0 
LAC 1.5 2.3 2.1 1.8 5.9 8.9 9.3 7.3 7.8 10.3 10.8 6.9 
MENA 2.6 2.4 2.0 2.4 5.8 4.9 7.9 3.5 8.9 9.6 8.1 6.8 
Source: The Micro banking Bulletin http://www.themix.org/publications/microbanking-bulletin (various issues) 
Africa=Sub-Saharan Africa; Asia=South and East Asia; ECA=Eastern Europe and Central Asia; LAC=Latin 
America and the Caribbean; MENA=Middle East and North Africa 
 
We are also motivated by the increased investments from commercial players5. An 
important factor attributed to the rapid growth of MFIs in recent years has been the large 
investment flows. Historically, MFIs were largely funded through donations/grants and 
government subsidies. In recent years, new sources of funds have emerged that are often 
described as having a focus on profitability (Ghosh and Tassel, 2011). Between 2004 and 2006, 
foreign capital investment in both debt and equity tripled to $4 billion and by 2007, investment 
had reached $5.4 billion (Reillie and Forster 2008). Foreign capital investments in microfinance 
                                                 
5 A number of conventional banks have begun providing microfinance, since MFIs have demonstrated that it can be a successful and profitable 
venture. Comportamos in Mexico, Equity and KREP banks in Kenya are three examples of commercial banks that are involved in advancing loans 
to the poor. 
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passed the $10 billion mark in December 2008. At the end of 2009, total assets of the top 10 
microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs) reached $3.6 billion (CGAP 2009a). Could this rapid 
growth in these investments be driving microfinance profitability? 
While a large body of research on financial institutions profitability has been undertaken in 
the conventional banking industry (see for example Flamini, et al 2009; García-Herrero, et al 
2009; Marcucci and Quagliariello 2008; Athanasoglou et al 2008), rigorous empirical evidence 
on microfinance remains limited, largely due to lack of reliable data. This has led to diverging 
opinions among scholars and microfinance practitioners. Well-known MFIs are therefore 
emulated, replicated and funded, even though rigorous evaluation on potential determinants of 
MFI profitability is rare. Recent developments in theoretical literature on transaction costs, 
asymmetric information, contracts and banking illustrate the challenges that MFIs must overcome 
to improve on performance (Becchetti and Conzo 2011; Behr et al 2011; Berger, et al 2011; 
Garmaise and Natividad, 2010; Gangopadhyay and Lensink 2009). We build on these insightful 
contributions to uncover factors that explain MFIs profitability across Africa. 
 
1.2 Aims and objectives  
Broadly, this thesis seeks to uncover the determinants of microfinance profitability. To achieve 
this objective, we used an unbalanced panel dataset of MFIs whose time dimension covered 
twelve years of operation across 32 African countries. We aim at disseminating the findings in 
order to enhance our understanding of the determinants of MFIs profitability, by contributing 
towards the existing literature and drawing policy prescriptions. Consistent with this goal, we 
specifically; 
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• Undertake and present a comprehensive theoretical and empirical literature survey that 
explores the current state of knowledge and research in the microfinance industry, with the 
aim of identifying emerging gaps and formulating questions that need further research.  
• Conduct an empirical investigation to discern the potential determinants of microfinance 
profitability with a focus on Africa economies.  
• Carry out an empirical scrutiny to uncover persistence of microfinance profits and the speed 
of convergence.  
• Draw some policy implications and prescriptions on the basis of evidence adduced from 
both the survey of the literature and the subsequent four empirical chapters. 
• Identify promising research ideas  which ought to be addressed by future research 
 
1.3 Contribution of the thesis 
This thesis is the first study of its kind in the microfinance industry that has used comprehensive 
estimation techniques based on traditional and new performance indicators in uncovering 
determinants of microfinance profitability. Specifically;  
• Any MFI evaluation that does not take into account factors beyond MFI management (firm 
specific), if found to robustly and non-negligibly predict MFI profitability is incomplete. 
Taking into account the context can make the evaluation of MFI profitability more accurate.  
• At the policy level, examining factors that influence MFI profitability is important for 
forming credit market policy that may help deepen the quality and quantity of access to 
finance particularly by the poor.  
• The existence of profit persistence if confirmed may imply that shocks to profitability persist 
indefinitely and that competitive pressures never erode differences in profitability. If this is 
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confirmed, it would imply some serious reconsideration of microfinance development policy 
in Africa.  
• This thesis is pioneering in using dynamic system GMM two-step estimation techniques, in 
studies of determinants of microfinance profitability. This enables us to tackle endogeneity 
problem that has largely been ignored by the existing literature. It is an unexplored dimension 
in microfinance literature.  
• We draw policy conclusions in every empirical chapter while paying close attention to 
identified contradictions or inconsistencies, as a result of making comparisons with previous 
empirical studies. The identified policy implications and prescriptions are further synthesized 
and summarized in the last chapter of this thesis.  
 
1.4 Data and methodology 
This thesis used a dataset that was assembled from four different sources the principal being the 
MIX Market database6. The rest of the data sources are World Development Indicators (WDI), 
World Governance Indicators, (WDI) and the Heritage Foundation. Detailed description and 
measurement of variables of interest are discussed in the relevant empirical chapters.  
The MIX Market and Micro Banking Bulletin databases are produced by the Microfinance 
Information Exchange (MIX) covering approximately 2,000 MFIs around the world. This dataset 
which includes a number of standard financial performance indicators, alongside simplified 
financial statements is publicly available online at www.mixmarket.org. These data are provided 
by the MFIs themselves and is supported by audited financial statements or rating reports, which 
are established by a third party before publication. This is the source of our MFI-
                                                 
6 The Mix Market is a global microfinance platform which provides information about microfinance in diverse ways to various stakeholders. Its 
aim is to promote investment and information flows within the world of microfinance and donors, as well as to improve reporting standards in the 
microfinance industry. 
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specific/institutional level data. Previous studies that have used Mix Market dataset include; Cull, 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch (2011), Ahlin et al (2011), Arun and Annim (2010), Ayayi and 
Sene (2010) and Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch (2007). 
World Development Indicators consists of the primary World Bank collection of 
development indicators that includes data from 209 countries spanning from 1960 to 2010. WDI 
is the most accurate development data, with national, regional and global coverage. It is the 
source of our country level macroeconomic indicators and is publicly available 
at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. Previous studies that 
have used this dataset include Ahlin et al (2011), Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch (2011) and 
Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch (2009b) 
The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) reports aggregate and 
individual governance indicators for 213 economies over the period 1996–2010 for six 
dimensions of governance that include; voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. The 
indicators are a combination of the views of a large number of expert surveys, enterprises, 
citizens in both industrial and developing countries. The underlying data sources for the 
aggregate indicators are drawn from a variety of think tanks, international organizations, non-
governmental organizations and survey institutes. This is the source of our country level 
institutional environment proxies that is publicly available at; 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. Previous studies that have used this data 
include Demetriades and Fielding (2011), Ahlin et al (2011), Cull et al (2011), Arun and Annim 
(2010), Lensink et al (2008).  
Our complementary business environment measures are from Heritage Foundation which is 
publicly available at http://www.heritage.org/index/. The core component of Heritage Foundation 
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data is the Economic Freedom Index which covers 10 freedoms. This ranges from property rights 
to entrepreneurship and evaluate the economic success of 183 countries. From this index we draw 
three measures of business environment. Business Freedom (BF) measures the ability to start, 
operate and close a business and represents the overall burden of regulation as well as the 
efficiency of government in the regulatory process. Property rights (PR) is a composite Index 
ranging from 10 (Private property is rarely protected) to 100 (Private property is guaranteed by 
the government). Freedom from Corruption is a quantitative measure that is derived from 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). It is the focal measure of 
corruption levels across 179 countries. Previous studies that have used this dataset include 
Mersland and Strøm (2009), Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007).  
Although participation to Mix Market is open to all MFIs and aim to boost the number of 
reporting MFIs, it is incumbent upon each MFI to decide whether to participate. MFIs may 
choose to report some indicators and conceal others and some years discretionary. Specific or 
individual MFIs data are confidential and can only be used with the permission of the respective 
MFIs. 
Analyses based on MIX Market data are therefore vulnerable to self-selection bias. MFIs 
reporting to this source are likely to be different from those not reporting at all. This bias is likely 
to be large in magnitude, though it is difficult to measure and overcome. Take for instance, 
Microbanking Bulletin (2010) which shows that 57% percent of the MFIs surveyed by the 
bulletin were financially sustainable though with a financial revenue/assets ratio of 27% and 10.8 
% return on equity. The sample surveyed is however not statistically meaningful since thousands 
of MFIs were not surveyed (Bauchet and Morduch 2010). To illustrate further on self-selection 
bias, Cull et al. (2009a) investigate the trade-offs between commercialization of microfinance and 
social outreach. They utilize MIX Market dataset comprising of 346 institutions. While the data 
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are of high quality and adjusted to comply with international accounting standards, they concede 
that the data are skewed towards MFIs that stress more on profitability. 
Comparable MFI level data includes that used by for example Mersland, Randøy and 
Øystein (2011), Mersland and Strøm (2009; 2008). This dataset contains information from risk 
assessment reports constructed using rating reports made public at the www.ratingfund.org. The 
data also suffers from sample selection bias since only rated MFIs enter. Another set of data but 
which is less detailed is that provided by the microcredit summit campaign which covered 3,652 
MFIs in its 2011 database, about twice as much as Mix Market. 
Data for modelling determinants of MFIs profitability are considered proprietary and are 
hard to obtain. Our proxies are crude quantity-based indicators of profitability computed and 
standardised by the Mix Market team. We would have preferred to compute return on assets as 
net profit before tax as a percentage of total assets, or even net profit before tax as a percentage of 
total assets plus staff expenses as percentage of total assets to test the expense preference theory 
consistent with Molyneux and Thornton (1992). We were limited by data availability on this 
front. To the extent that tax regimes or rates differ across Africa, the indicators might be subject 
to measurement error. This is likely to bias the outcome of our analysis.  
One of the estimation problems we had to contend with was poor quality of the data. For 
example, despite the breadth of data available through MIX datasets, some variables such as 
portfolio at risk among the MFIs reporting to MIX and the Heritage Foundation dataset shows 
little variability. We however acknowledge that cross-country data cannot be made perfectly 
homogeneous. Thus, given these data constraints, we cannot control for potential survivorship 
bias but nevertheless account for the implications of this bias in the discussion of the results. All 
the empirical findings should be viewed in that light and the reader will have to interpret our 
results with all the caveats in mind.  
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Despite these shortcomings, we view this data compilation effort and the subsequent 
empirical analysis as a useful and important first step towards developing more accurate 
indicators of determinants of microfinance profitability. 
At the time of writing this thesis, available data were limited to 210 MFIs as some of the 
disclosures by MFIs were missing. As more comprehensive disclosures become available, similar 
research can be undertaken to find out if degrees of freedom affected our result. In addition, the 
hypotheses tested in the empirical chapters can be re-tested.  
The methodology presented in this thesis is purely empirical. Microfinance industry is quite 
diverse in terms of the charter that established the organizations, with MFIs organized as banks, 
credit unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or non-bank financial institutions. This 
diversity makes it difficult to choose appropriate conceptual framework thereby complicating any 
empirical analysis. The use of cross-country data provides a unique opportunity for this analysis.  
Studies on firm performance employ various measures to test the predictions of different 
exogenous factors. Some of the measures of performance that have been used over the years 
include financial ratios (Mehran, 1995), stock market return and their volatility (Cole and 
Mehran, 1998) and also Tobin’s q (Zhou, 2001). For the purpose of this study we use return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as proxies of MFI performance. The Microfinance 
Financial Reporting Standards recommends the use of ROA and ROE as measures of profitability 
rather than financial self-sustenance (FSS) and operational self-sustenance (OSS). It is a financial 
metric that is well established and understood across the finance spectrum.  
We acknowledge that ROA may be biased due to off balance-sheet items. It can however 
be argued that such activities may be negligible in Africa MFIs. ROE on the other hand 
disregards the risks associated with high leverage and financial leverage is often determined by 
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regulation. Thus ROA is more appropriate in Africa microfinance industry since MFI equity is 
abnormally low (Lafourcade, et al 2006).  
We used unbalanced panel data econometrics methodology to shed light on certain 
important relationships that could help us to better understand the determinants of microfinance 
profitability. Our panel is unbalanced since not all MFIs have information for every year—some 
MFIs may have closed as others enter the market. In order to investigate on the determinants of 
profitability, we started from a basic linear econometric specification. Further empirical work 
was carried out to examine: (i) profit persistence and the speed of convergence; (ii) impact of 
financing choice on microfinance profitability; and (iii) impact of institutional environment on 
microfinance profitability is carried out. This was achieved by use of dynamic two-step System-
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator which is an unexplored dimension in 
microfinance literature. We additionally test the robustness of our models with different 
specifications. Detailed methodology is contained in the respective empirical chapters. 
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1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured into seven chapters. The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 
two reviews comprehensively microfinance literature with a view of identifying the main 
theoretical and empirical strands in order to isolate what has been done from what needs to be 
done. The literature is organized along a thematic structure covering different tenets in 
microfinance that touch on MFIs performance.  
Chapter three presents empirical evidence on what explains the negative average profit 
margins of MFIs in Africa. Due to limited literature on what influences MFIs profitability, this 
chapter borrows heavily from determinants of profits in the conventional banking industry. A 
background to the Africa economies and in particular the microfinance landscape is documented 
in Appendix A. Using a unique dataset of unbalanced panel data of 210 MFIs across 31 Africa 
economies, we specify an empirical framework to investigate the effect of MFI-specific, country 
level institutions development and macroeconomic determinants on MFIs profitability.  On the 
basis of empirical findings, we draw policy conclusions and PRIs. 
Chapter four builds on the econometric framework developed in the previous chapter to 
investigate persistence of microfinance profits. Using the same dataset, we specify a dynamic 
econometric model to investigate persistence of MFIs profitability while controlling for MFI-
specific, institutions development, macroeconomic context and industry-specific factors. We 
interpret the results while at the same time making comparisons and references to previous 
empirical studies. All our estimations are robust to alternative specifications and analytical 
methods.  
Using the same econometric framework and estimation technique to the previous chapter, 
chapter five investigates the impact of financing choices on microfinance profitability. The 
motivation for this chapter stems from the recent trends towards commercialization where 
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microfinance has become attractive to foreign capital investment while at the same time 
mobilizing deposits from the public. We estimate a dynamic panel data model using system 
GMM estimator while controlling for profit persistence, other MFI specific and country level 
factors. This enables us to probe further the determinants of MFIs profitability arrived at in the 
previous chapters, while drawing policy conclusions and recommendations.  
 In chapter six, we use the empirical strategy developed in the previous chapter, to examine 
the role of host country institutional environment on influencing microfinance profitability. The 
motivation here emanates from the consistent negative profit margins across Africa as reported in 
the Microbanking Bulletin (2010), contrary to other regions. We therefore estimate a dynamic 
panel data model using system GMM estimator while controlling for profit persistence, MFI 
specific and other country level variables. This enables us to probe further on the determinants of 
MFIs profitability arrived at in all the previous chapters. We also draw policy conclusions and 
suggest ideas for further research. 
The final chapter concludes this thesis by summarizing the main findings, policy 
implications and prescriptions while identifying ideas of extending this piece of research work. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
COMPREHENSIVE AND CRITICAL SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 Background  
Microfinance literature, like the institutions themselves, is still nascent. Most results are from 
theoretical models that rely on abstractions from reality but they nevertheless pose an important 
challenge. Why does reality look so different? In spite of the euphoric attitude among donors and 
policy-makers about the impact of microfinance, what explains MFIs profitability is a poorly 
understood phenomenon. While this may be explained by the relative youthfulness of the 
programs and the research agenda, taking a step towards a focused literature survey is the goal of 
this chapter. A vast literature already surveyed by Morduch (1999b), Hartarska and Holtmann 
(2006) and Hermes and Lensink (2007), are relevant as a departing point. We build on this 
insightful contribution by reviewing recent research in microfinance so as to isolate the leading 
theoretical and empirical issues.  
 
2.1.2 Motivation of the review 
A large theoretical literature has established conditions under which for instance symmetric 
group loans do better than individual loans (Vigenina and Kritikos 2004; Rai et al 2004; 
Gangopadhyay et al 2005; Karlan 2005; Chowdry 2005; Bond and Rai 2008; Carpena et al 2010; 
Giné et al 2010), which group characteristics lead to higher repayment (Cassar et al 2007; Ahlin 
and Townsend 2007b; Karlan 2007), or which contracts are optimal (Ahlin and Townsend 2007a; 
Daripa 2008; Madajewicz 2011). Through these innovative contracts MFIs are generating high 
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loan repayment rates in diverse environments but which have not translated into profits (Cull, 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch 2007). 
Although these studies do provide invaluable information on innovations in lending 
technology and organization design, empirical work on MFIs performance over time is scarce 
largely due to significant data limitations. For instance, evidence on what explains microfinance 
profitability remains scant and economic theory on lending technology which focuses almost 
exclusively on joint liability contracts; has largely ignored microfinance profitability. What 
explains this apparent paradox? Is the theory too stylized to capture the reality of microfinance 
performance particularly in the developing world where most MFIs conglomerate? Does the 
experience vary across countries? Why are some MFIs more profitable in some regions than 
others? What general lessons can we draw from the experience of the last three decades?  
 
2.1.3 Objectives of the review 
The purpose of this chapter is to synthesize and distil scholarly and policy lessons emerging from 
the reviewed studies, in a broader array of topics. This will aid in prompting new promising 
research ideas. Consistent with this goal, we explored the current state of knowledge and research 
in the microfinance industry both at theoretical and empirical fronts. To achieve this objective, 
we; (a) took stock of existing knowledge in microfinance, (b) examined both theoretical and 
analytical approaches used in microfinance with the aim of identifying the appropriateness of the 
chosen methodologies, (c) identified contradictions and inconsistencies, both within single 
articles and as a result of making comparisons between articles from different authors while 
simultaneously identifying conflicting interpretations of findings, (d) Identified the main strands 
of theoretical and empirical literature so as to distinguish what has been done from what needs to 
be done, (e) identified promising research ideas with the aim of laying ground for future research. 
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To this end we presented a large amount of both theoretical and empirical evidence in parallel 
from both developing and developed economies.  
 
2.1.4 Methodology/approach 
The review focused on gathering both theoretical and empirical evidence to support various 
themes in microfinance. We reviewed recent innovations on microfinance performance. We 
related the innovations to theoretical propositions, drawing links to new work in financial 
intermediation and to randomized control trials where necessary. To achieve the objective of the 
literature review, we proceeded as follows. We used a broad search strategy by conducting an 
initial search in 2006/07 and repeated the entire search in 2011 for an update and validation. The 
survey of peer-reviewed Journals was not restricted by date. For inclusion, articles must have 
clearly defined research methodology that culminated to objective evidence, as well as a focus on 
one or more MFIs offering some form of microfinance regardless of the lending technology.   
We searched several electronic databases that included but not limited to; EBSCO, EconLit, 
ScienceDirect, Wiley InterScience, Emerald, Springer, Applied Social Sciences Index and 
Abstracts (ASSIA) among others. After searching for available literature on the internet, we were 
able to determine several key words and terms (Microfinance or microcredit or micro-finance or 
micro-credit or village bank, microbank) that helped define our initial search. Using these search 
criteria, we identified 600 articles in the electronic databases which included duplicates across 
databases.  We examined the titles of all of the articles identified and selected 400 articles for 
further review. After removing duplicates, the survey narrowed down to 300 abstracts of peer 
reviewed articles with 200 of these articles selected for full-text review. We carefully reviewed 
these articles for information about the study design, outcomes and limitations. We developed a 
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summary table which helped in identifying the source/author, idea behind the article, 
methodology used as well as conclusions.  
The criterion for selecting studies was based on their potential to provide information 
relevant to the study theme and the rigorousness of the methodology (that included accuracy and 
validity of the measurements) of the study design. This involved carefully reading the title and 
abstract, methodology and conclusion of each article and subsequently developing a review 
matrix based on the same format. This review has been organized around and related directly to 
the theme of the thesis contrasting similar ideas/agreements with competing views, clearly 
identifying areas of controversy/disagreements, inconsistencies, discriminating or synthesizing 
results into a summary of what is known and unknown/uncertain, point of departure and 
convergence, logical structure, emerging gaps and formulating questions that need further 
scrutiny. 
From a methodological point, we do not discuss the well documented theories at length but 
rather summarized the main arguments within the literature. We also do not cover some topics, 
such as microfinance products which have substantial literature on their own (see for instance 
Brau and Woller 2004 for a comprehensive review). We concentrate on studies that involve direct 
description and analysis of the main tenets of microfinance performance especially regression 
studies geared towards understanding the temporal and the cross-sectional differences of MFIs 
operating in different countries. Additionally, we do not dwell much on research based on case 
studies. In reviewing the empirical evidence, we summarize the main results and seek to evaluate 
their policy implications for the industry.  
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2.1.5 Limitations of the review 
Although we undertook to explore vast theoretical and empirical research on microfinance, this 
chapter is not devoid of any limitations. Three important limitations warrant our mention here. 
First, owing to time constraints we could not survey all issues under the auspices of microfinance 
but nevertheless covered most of them. We therefore do not provide an exhaustive account of 
everything published on microfinance but rather a focus on a particular theme and discuss all the 
significant scholarly work important to that end. Second, while the evidence that we discuss in 
this chapter is subject to several measurement problems, theory has moved ahead of evidence and 
therefore most of the articles reviewed are theoretical propositions with no direct empirical 
measure. Third, at the time of writing this thesis, the Journal articles available were limited up to 
and including November 2011 time period. More articles may have been made available after the 
completion of this thesis and therefore, the conclusion arrived at in this chapter can be re-
evaluated.  
 
2.1.6 Structure of the review 
The main focus of this review is MFIs financial performance. We begin by a survey of studies 
touching on financial sustainability which is a tangible parameter that can be measured and 
monitored continually. In section three, we review and discuss various aspects of microfinance 
profitability. The final section of this chapter provides a summary and conclusion based on the 
entire literature survey. 
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2.2 Microfinance performance  
2.2.1 The broader context  
Microfinance performance has attracted significant interest in recent years, both from policy 
makers and in the academia. MFIs face unique challenges because they must achieve a double 
bottom line—that of providing financial services to the poor (outreach) and covering their costs 
(sustainability). MFIs are therefore a hybrid but some are also similar to banks because they are 
regulated or supervised and because they mobilize deposits. This organizational diversity makes 
any empirical analysis of their performance difficult (Cull, 2009a). In this chapter, we do not 
survey the extent to which MFIs contribute to social performance and neither we do we review 
studies on cost-benefit analysis of funds invested by donors or governments which has largely 
been addressed by Hermes and Lensink (2011). The main focus of this chapter is MFIs financial 
performance. Recent academic interest on microfinance performance has not been matched by a 
surge in empirical research. The subject thus remains under-studied.  
 
2.2.2 Financial sustainability 
A vast and growing literature posits that for MFIs to achieve full potential they must become 
financially sustainable (see e.g. Brau and Woller, 2004 for a comprehensive review). Financial 
sustainability also known as financial self sustenance (FSS) and operational self sustenance 
(OSS) in this context, is measured as the ability of MFIs to continue operations indefinitely using 
own resources without seeking donations, grants, or subsidized loans from outside individuals, 
NGOs, or governments. It should however be noted that sustainability does not imply 
profitability (Morduch 2005).  
The importance of being financially self sufficient can best be illustrated by referring to 
pioneer institutions. Hollis and Sweetman (1998) for example compare six micro credit 
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organizations of 19th-century Europe, to identify institutional designs that were a prerequisite to 
financial sustainability. They established that organizations that relied on charitable funding were 
more fragile and tended to lose their focus more quickly than those that obtained funds from 
depositors. Hollis and Sweetman (2001) further show that these MFIs were financially 
sustainable for more than a century because they adapted to their economic and financial 
environment. Moreover, the literature survey by Hermes and Lensink (2007) in particular points 
to the need for further research on the mechanisms that explain MFIs financial outcomes. Most of 
the existing literature on MFIs performance has nevertheless been constrained by inadequate and 
unreliable data at the firm level and therefore has resorted to a number of indicators as proxies. 
It’s for this reason that Morduch, (1999b) calls for more quantitative empirical research into MFI 
performance. 
In the existing empirical literature, factors explaining MFI financial sustainability may be 
categorized into MFI-specific and those external to MFI management (Crabb, 2008). External 
factors are macroeconomic environment, industry specific such as regulatory conditions, 
concentration and charter that established the MFIs. Several studies have examined the 
determinants of MFIs financial sustainability. Using a dataset of 124 MFIs across 49 countries, 
Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch (2007) examine financial performance and outreach in a large 
comparative study. They use pooled regression to estimate the model 
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Where FSS represents financial self-sufficiency ratio. They find that the impact of various 
MFI-specific factors on performance depends on an institution’s lending methodology. Although 
they pioneered the use of cross-country, cross-MFI data in statistical tests and provide a new 
dimension to the existing literature on MFIs performance, their pooled regression model omits 
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fixed effects, and omitting fixed effects risks omitted variables bias. Rather than estimate 
different intercepts for each unit and/or time point, pooled regression estimates just a single 
intercept (Baltagi, 2008). The omitted country-specific intercepts may be correlated with the 
independent variables (Greene, 2008) and the disturbances may be correlated within groups. This 
study also fails to control for endogeneity. It is possible that previous levels of FSS may be 
explaining the current levels. 
Using data on 217 MFIs across 101 countries distributed by region and type of MFIs over 
the period 1998-2006, Ayayi and Sene (2010) estimated a pooled regression model;  
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Where FSS represents financial self-sufficiency. Their results show that the quality of the loan 
portfolio is the main determining factor of MFI financial sustainability. They further show that 
outreach, the age of MFIs and the percentage of women among the clientele do not significantly 
influence the MFIs' financial sustainability. Consistent with Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch 
(2007) this study suffers from the same methodological weaknesses, thus their results may not be 
convincing. 
Ahlin et al. (2011) also estimated a pooled regression model;   
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Where is a year-t operational self-sufficiency (OSS) of MFI i located in country j; is a set 
of MFI-specific control variables at time t; and is a set of macroeconomic variables 
describing country j at time t. Their pooled regression model omits fixed effects, and omitting 
fixed effects risks omitted variables bias. They too fail to expunge endogeneity.  
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While Ahlin et al (2011) shows that macroeconomic-context matters for MFI operational 
sustainability, Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch (2007) concludes that MFIs can still expand 
outreach without compromising financially sustainability. Both studies nevertheless fail to 
circumvent methodological weaknesses. 
Bogan (2009) investigates the impact of existing sources of funding on the efficiency and 
OSS of MFIs. He finds causal evidence to the effect that an increased use of grants by MFIs 
decreases OSS. Crabb (2008) models OSS as a function of both firm level and environmental 
factors. Using MIX dataset from 2000 to 2004 to estimate a fixed-effects panel data model, Crabb 
finds that portfolio at risk and outreach breadth are significant, with the expected signs. Further 
evidence on OSS is presented by de Crombrugghe, et al (2008) who use regression analysis to 
study the determinants of self-sustainability of a sample of MFIs in India. They investigate three 
aspects of sustainability: cost coverage by revenue, repayment of loans and cost-control and 
conclude that MFIs can cover costs on small and partly uncollateralized loans without necessarily 
increasing loan size or raising monitoring cost. The use of OSS can however be misleading as it 
lumps together genuine operating net revenue with transfers. 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) further examine the determinants of MFIs OSS and find 
positive significant impact from MFI size and capital ratios. Using OSS Makame and Murinde 
(2007) estimate a linear random effects model where average loan is treated as a proxy for 
outreach depth and regressed against sustainability exogenous variables proxied by operational 
efficiency and profitability (measured as return on assets and return on capital employed). We do 
not find both Crabb (2008) and Makame (2007) OLS empirical results as convincing, since their 
empirical specification includes return on asset and outreach as exogenous variables without 
controlling for endogeneity. To the extent that there is likely to be persistence in the MFI 
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financial outcome variables, endogeneity remains an issue as with previous empirical studies that 
have employed panel econometrics. 
Using Sustainability Dependency Index (SDI), Sustainability Dependency Ratio (SDR) and 
Efficiency and Subsidy Intensity Index (ESII) techniques to investigate financial sustainability, of 
Bangladesh Unemployed Rehabilitation Organization (BURO), microfinance institution, Hasan, 
et al (2009) finds BURO achieved sustainability from 2001 to 2005, but then the trend was 
reversed between 2006 and 2007. Although computation based on SDI to determine financial 
sustainability is useful, it nevertheless has some drawbacks. First, the underlying assumption is 
that a rise in interest rates translates to higher profitability. This, however, need not be the case 
since higher interest rates could lead to a decline in profitability due to adverse selection and 
moral hazard effects (Morduch, 1999a; Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch 2007).  
While financial self-sufficiency (FSS) and operational self-sustenance (OSS) of 
microfinance institutions are increasingly well researched, little is known about MFIs 
profitability. MFI could in principle cover operating expenses and not post any profit. Given the 
increased investments from commercial players, research focused on MFI’s profitability may 
help a growing number of investment funds that target their money towards MFI’s, with the aim 
of earning returns from the investments. Studies whose main focal point is OSS and FSS do not 
fill this void. Indeed, Cull et al. (2009a) and Guérin, et al (2011), show that profit-maximizing 
investors would have limited interest in most of the institutions that are focusing on social 
mission. 
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2.2.3 Profitability 
Although there is a vast literature evaluating MFI success and failure, studies on microfinance 
profitability are scant. Much of the applied economics literature in this area addresses the social 
worth of MFIs (see for instance Navajas et al., 2000; Navajas et al., 2003; Bruett, 2005), 
measuring the impact of village-level microfinance institutions (Kaboski and Townsend, 2005), 
the impact of microcredit on the poor (Mohindra, et al 2008; Mondal 2009; Brau, Hiatt and 
Woodworth 2009; Roodman and Morduch 2010), costs and benefits of subsidies (Morduch, 
2009a; Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010), correlations for MFIs and commercial banks (Krauss 
and Ingo, 2009), microfinance and mission drift (Hishigsuren, 2007; Copestake 2007; 
Armendáriz and Szafarz 2011), impact analysis (Hartarska and Nadolnyak 2008b), efficiency of 
MFIs (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al, 2007), competition between MFIs and conventional banks (Cull et al 
2009b), women and repayment in microfinance (D’Espallier  et al 2011), microfinance 
commercialization (Galema and Lensink 2009), microfinance plus (Lensink, and Mersland, 
2009), which microfinance institutions are becoming more cost-effective with time (Caudill, 
Gropper and Hartarska 2009), and social efficiency in microfinance institutions (Gutiérrez-Nieto 
et al, 2009).  
There are also other closely related studies but whose main focus is on firm level specifics 
such as management techniques, organizational structure and contract design. These include 
Coleman and Osei (2008) on the role of governance on outreach and profitability of microfinance 
institutions; Mersland and Strøm (2009), Arun and Annim (2010) on MFI performance and 
governance; Hartarska (2009), on the impact of outside control in MFI performance; Hartarska 
(2005) on the relation between managers’ experience and compensation schemes on MFI-
performance; Mersland and Strøm (2008) on MFI ownership structure and performance; Cull, 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch (2007), Mersland and Strøm, (2010), Makame and Murinde, 
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(2007) on micro-institutional determinants of MFI outreach-sustainability trade off; Cull, et al 
(2009c) on the performance, regulation-competition and financing trade off and D’Espallier et al 
(2010) on gender bias and microfinance performance.  
There are also a few studies that focus on the determinants of MFI success which are 
external to the control of the MFI management. Ahlin et al. (2011), for example examine 
implications of the surrounding macroeconomic context on MFIs operational self-sufficiency and 
growth of loan portfolio. Similar studies on this front include Vanroose (2008); Gonzalez (2007); 
Honohan (2004), who have investigated the relationship between MFIs’ performance and 
changes in the macro-environment. Mersland, Randøy and Strøm, (2011) examine the impact of 
internationalization on microfinance institutions’ performance. Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 
(2008a) investigate the impact of credit rating in facilitating microfinance institutions raise funds. 
These studies address factors that may explain financial sustainability where the depedent 
variable is either FFS or OSS. What is clearly lacking from all these studies is a focus on MFI 
profitability.  
 
2.2.3.1 Profitability and outreach of microfinance institutions 
The pioneering theoretical work by Copestake (2007) and Ghosh and Tassel (2008), shows that 
wealthier clients cost less thus pursuit of outreach should decrease MFI profitability. Empirical 
evidence adduced so far shows mixed results (for a recent review see Hermes and Lensink 2011). 
Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch (2007) empirically investigate whether there is a trade-off 
between the depth of outreach and profitability of MFIs. Their results show that MFIs that mainly 
provide individual loans perform better in terms of profitability, but the fraction of poor 
borrowers and female borrowers in the loan portfolio is lower than for institutions that mainly 
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provide group loans. They stress on the importance of institutional design in determining the 
existence and size of such a trade-off.  
The most comprehensive study of sustainability-outreach trade-off is by Hermes, Lensink, 
and Meesters (2011). Using data for 435 MFIs for the period 1997-2007, they focus on the 
relationship between cost efficiency as a proxy for sustainability of MFIs and the depth of 
outreach measured by the average loan balance and percentage of women borrowers. They 
conclude that outreach is negatively related to sustainability of MFIs. The results remain robustly 
significant even after taking into account a long list of control variables. This is consistent with 
Cull et al (2009a) and Hoque, et al (2011), who shows evidence of such trade off from recent 
commercialization trend in microfinance. Although Olivares-Polanco (2005) use less rigorous 
techniques and/or smaller datasets, their study also confirms the existence of this trade-off. These 
findings are however inconsistent with Ayayi and Sene (2010) who after estimating a pooled 
regression model, show that outreach and the percentage of women among the clientele do not 
significantly influence the MFIs' financial sustainability. Their findings confirm Cull, Demirgüc-
Kunt and Morduch (2007) who shows that MFIs can expand outreach without compromising 
financially sustainability. Though there is no convergence among these studies, we can deduce 
that varying outreach has implications on MFI financial outcomes. It is important however to 
point that the evidence adduced here mostly relate to MFIs sustainability and not profitability. 
Could outreach therefore explain MFIs profitability?  
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2.2.3.2 Profitability and microfinance mechanisms  
Type of lending contract 
MFIs employ a diversity of approaches, such as group lending and individual non-collateralized 
loans with gradual increase in loan size conditional on repayment (dynamic incentives). 
However, not all have the same impact on MFI profitable. Table 2.1 provides comparative data 
for 487 programs surveyed in the Micro-Banking Bulletin (2010). Relative to MFIs using group 
lending methodologies, those using standard loan contracts tend to (a) serve better off clients as 
reflected by the average loan size; (b) be more financially stable as proxied by the percentage of 
their financial costs covered (117 % relative to 105% for group lending MFIs); (c) serve a small 
percentage of female clients and (d) charge lower interest rates and fees as shown in the real 
portfolio yield. MFIs employing group lending and village bank models have considerably higher 
operating expenses relative to loan size. Whereas MFIs using standard loan contract devote 14% 
of each dollar lent to operational costs, solidarity group lenders devote 23% and village banks 
24%. Therefore group lenders and village banks tend to serve poorer clients and face higher 
operating costs relative to loan size. Intuitively therefore one would expect individual type of 
lenders to be more profitable. Thus one question that warrants empirical scrutiny is whether the 
type of loan contract influences profitability of microfinance institutions. 
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Table 2.1: Comparison of financial indicators by lending methodology (2008 MFI Benchmarks Values) 
 Individual Solidarity 
groups 
Individual/Solidarity Village banks 
1 borrower Groups of 3-9 
borrowers 
A hybrid of both 
individual and solidarity  
10 or more borrowers per 
group 
Observations  181 42 252 50 
Scale  
Number of borrowers 10,600 20,695 14,693 33,357 
Average loan size 1,633 152 449 223 
Outreach  
Average loan size/GNI 
per capita (%) 
49.9 12.8 26.7 12.3 
Fraction female (%) 46 96.8 66.7 86 
Financial performance 
Return on assets (%) 1.2 -6.2 0.5 0.5 
Return on equity (%) 5.4 -14 2.8 2.4 
Operational self 
sufficiency ratio (%) 
117.3 110.5 114.6 114.5 
Financial self 
sufficiency ratio (%) 
107.6 85 104.6 102.3 
Profit margin (%) 6.8 -17.7 4.4 2.3 
Portfolio yield (real, 
%) 
16.0 -17.8 18.9 21.9 
Portfolio at risk>90 
days 
1.8 0.8 1.6 0.8 
Efficiency  
Operating 
expenses/loan portfolio 
14.2 27.2 22.5 22.7 
Cost per borrower 
(US$) 
229 40 114 92 
Number of 
borrowers/total staff 
89 150 114 140 
Number of 
borrowers/loan officer 
240 254 257 298 
Source: Microbanking Bulletin 2010, Issue 20; http://www.mixmarket.org/ 
Theoretical literature advocates for collateral as a mechanism that mitigates adverse 
selection (Bergera, et al 2011). Although Berger, Frame and Ioannidou (2011), finds that 
observably riskier borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral, adverse selection occurs 
because while borrowers know whether their project is of high or low quality, the MFIs 
management do not. MFI is therefore unable to distinguish between risky and safe borrowers in 
its pool of loan applicants; if it could, it would charge a high interest rate to the risky borrower 
and a lower to the safe borrower. This adverse selection therefore is likely to influence MFIs 
performance. 
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Gangopadhyay and Lensink (2009), build on previous work on joint liability borrowing to 
show that unlike standard debt contract, group lending can mitigate this adverse selection. They 
conclude that by harnessing local information, joint liability lending can improve efficiency and 
microfinance performance compared to standard debt contracts in the presence of asymmetric 
information about borrower types. Along the same vein, Bhole and Ogden (2010) show why 
group lending is feasible for a greater range of opportunity cost of capital than any other form of 
lending technology. Madajewicz (2011) further demonstrates that borrowers are able to monitor 
each other when liability is joint, while MFIs monitors borrowers on standard debt contract. Joint 
liability therefore offers poorer borrowers larger loans with less monitoring effort than would 
have been exerted by the lender. Less monitoring on the part of the MFI and larger loan sizes is 
likely to enhance MFI performance. Along the same vein, Becchetti and Conzo (2011) and Jeon 
and Menicucci (2010) shows that group lending dominates individual lending either by providing 
more insurance or by saving audit costs. All these merits of group lending therefore have 
implications on MFIs profitability.  
A rebuttal of joint liability is offered by Armendáriz and Morduch (2010) who is quick to 
point out that group lending technology may not be optimal. They argue that monitoring raises 
the effort cost for the types who would otherwise adopt low effort, reducing the underlying 
externality problem. Eijkel, Hermes and Lensink (2011) show that monitoring efforts differ 
between group members due to free-riding with implications on default rates. This may lead to 
lower MFIs profitability. 
In spite of these theoretical underpinnings on the relative importance of the type of loan 
contract on enhancing repayment rates, the basic empirical question of whether it matters for MFI 
profitability has remained unanswered. The pioneering study by Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Morduch (2007) provides the first empirical evidence on this front. Using firm level data on 124 
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MFIs across 49 countries, they explore the patterns of profitability, loan repayment, and cost 
reduction. They find that institutional design matter substantially. Specifically, MFIs that do not 
use group-lending methodology to overcome incentive problems experience weaker portfolio 
quality and lower profitability rates when interest rates are raised substantially. They conclude 
that in order for the MFIs that employ the standard individual loan contract, to achieve 
profitability, they would have to invest more heavily in staff costs which is consistent with the 
economics of information but contrary to the conventional wisdom that profitability is largely a 
function of minimizing cost. Other studies that have used cross-country data and which 
corroborates Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch (2007) includes Vigenina and Kritikos (2004). 
On the contrary, Mersland and Strøm, (2009) find that individual loan is never a significant 
variable in all their regressions which is an indication that financial performance may be achieved 
with the optimal mix of both individual and group lending. A limitation with these studies is that 
they fail to control for endogeneity. 
Recent approach to overcome endogeneity problem has been the use of field experiments 
which allows for several lending contracts to be tested simultaneously. Feigenberg, et al (2010) 
provides the first experimental evidence in this context and finds that group lending is successful 
in achieving low rates of default without collateral not only because it harnesses existing social 
capital, but also because it builds new social capital among participants. This finding is consistent 
with Giné et al (2010), Berhane, et al (2009), Cassar et al (2007) and Abbink et al (2006). On the 
contrary, and using data from a World Bank survey carried out in Bangladesh during the period 
1991-1992, Pellegrina (2011) compare the impact of microfinance programs and other types of 
credit contracts on household investment in productive activities. She shows that joint liability 
contract may be less conducive to building up fixed assets due to short regular repayment 
schedules. Group lending technology may therefore push borrowers more towards short-term 
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investments with subsequent low returns. Using field experiments, Hisaki (2006) established that 
joint liability contracts cause serious free-riding problems, inducing strategic default and 
lowering repayment rates. Joint liability may also induce the borrower's suicide ex post through 
the stigma associated with default as evidenced in Japan (Chen, Choi and Sawada 2010). The 
issue of whether type of lending contract is significant in explaining microfinance performance 
therefore remains contestable.  
 
Repayments schedule  
Theory suggests that a more flexible repayment schedule would potentially improve repayment 
capacity by allowing MFIs to make use of superior monitoring capability of the informal lender 
in constraining strategic behaviour by the borrower (Jain 1999; Armendáriz and Morduch 2010). 
Frequent repayment schedules may also help borrowers who have difficulty in holding on to 
income. On the contrary Jain and Mansuri (2003) shows that although group meetings help in 
eliciting information on problematic borrowers or projects from their group members, there are 
transactions costs of making the repayments at weekly meetings of the members at each 
collection point. These costs are likely to affect MFI performance. Moreover, an optimal lending 
contract must provide additional repayment incentives to counter borrower run (Bond and Rai 
2009). 
Does the use of regularly scheduled repayments have an impact of MFI performance 
through increased default rates? Here the evidence on repayment frequency remains mixed. 
Pellegrina (2011) shows that using loan contracts with regular repayments may discourage 
borrowers from investing in projects requiring longer gestation. The evidence adduced by Field 
and Pande (2008) finds no difference in repayment. One has however to be cautious with the 
interpretation of their results since they are preliminary, based on small-sized loans and on new 
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short-term borrowers. McIntosh (2008) extends the Field and Pande result with a study of a 
Ugandan MFI in which the bank offered its village banks a choice between weekly or bi-weekly 
repayment. He as well finds no drop in repayment. On the contrary Feigenberg, et al (2010), 
show that relative to clients who met on a monthly basis during their first loan, those who met 
weekly are three and a half times less likely to default on their subsequent loan.  Empirical 
evidence therefore remains contestable. 
 
Dynamic incentives 
The seminal theoretical work on repayment incentives through refinancing in the context of 
microfinance was first attributed to Besley and Coate, (1995). In a departure from his earlier 
work, Chowdhury (2007) allows for endogenous group-formation by using an explicitly dynamic 
framework where sequential financing and contingent renewal are used concurrently. He posits 
that dynamic incentive is important critical since, in its absence, the borrowers may collude 
among themselves. This is not consistent with Chowdhury (2005) where he had postulated that 
sequential financing enhances the incentive for peer monitoring and may, even in the absence of 
joint liability, solve the moral hazard problem. Consistent theoretical predictions to Chowdhury 
(2007), had been advanced in previous studies by Aniket (2004), who extends the time horizon 
further to analyze sequential group loans and shows that, by temporally separating the decision 
on peer monitoring and investment, sequential financing makes collusion impossible. Tedeschi 
(2006) improves on contracts used by MFIs by endogenizing the default penalty, while 
constraining the MFI to maintain sustainable lending operations. In a similar vein, Jain and 
Mansuri, (2003) postulate that when a borrower has continual credit needs, access to future loans 
can provide a strong reason to avoid default on a current loan but who also contend that unless 
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there is a substantial uncertainty about end date or graduation from one program to the next, 
dynamic incentives have limited scope on repayments. 
Non-contestable evidence on dynamic incentive components of the contract structure are 
more difficult to show, as most lenders only vary contract terms endogenously, for selected 
clients (Karlan and Zinman 2009). Relevant studies that have examined dynamic incentives 
include Giné et al (2010) and Fischer (2010). Both studies found evidence that dynamic 
incentives have large impact on reducing moral hazard problems with implications on higher MFI 
performance.  
 
2.2.5.3 Profitability and microfinance regulation 
The need for regulation of economic activities is justified in the economic literature as a policy 
instrument to minimize the effects of market failures (Majone, 1996). While developing a 
technical guide for microfinance investors, Forster et al (2009) concede that client protection is a 
key tenet of microfinance. There is therefore a need for sector-specific regulations along with 
prudential reforms which enables MFIs to mobilise deposits (Arun 2005). Prudential regulation 
and supervision of MFIs has become increasingly important since several of the largest MFIs 
now mobilize public deposits and particularly from the relatively poor households (Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak, 2007). Protection of these deposits is therefore a policy relevant issue. That 
notwithstanding MFIs regulation raise costs of lending for MFIs and the question is whether this 
affects profitability (Cull, et al 2009c). Although Seibel (2003) and Guinnane (2002) draw 
attention to how financial history justifies the need for appropriate legal frameworks in order to 
support the development of pro-poor financial systems, recent empirical evidence shows mixed 
results.  
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Using data from 245 of the world’s largest MFIs, Cull et al (2011) test whether MFIs are 
able to maintain profitability in the face of the additional costs of complying with supervision. 
Using OLS estimations, they show that profitability declines with supervision. Upon controlling 
for the non-random assignment of supervision via treatment effects and instrumental variables 
regressions, they confirm that supervision is not significantly associated with profitability. 
Consistent with this finding, Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) investigates whether there is a 
difference in performance by the legal status of MFIs and concludes that the performance of 
commercial MFIs is better than that of NGOs but only when portfolio quality is used as the proxy 
of measuring performance. Glass, McKillop and Rasaratnam (2010), shows that 68% of Irish 
credit unions do not incur an extra opportunity cost in meeting regulatory guidance on bad debt, 
which perhaps explains their good performance. Thus MFI supervision has no impact on 
performance. To the extent that other variables included in the regression may partially account 
for credit risk, this explains the failure of legal status to significantly affect MFI returns. This 
counter intuitive finding confirm Mersland and Strøm (2009), who establish that regulation does 
not have a significant impact on financial performance and similarly Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2007) who after controlling for the endogeneity of regulation, find that regulation has no impact 
on financial performance. This finding is inconsistent with Hartarska (2005). These studies 
underscore the importance of taking into account the trade-offs and for further empirical scrutiny. 
 
2.2.3.4 Profitability and microfinance competition  
Most of this work has focused on interactions between lenders and borrowers, or among the 
lenders themselves. Competition weakens long-term relationship between the financial 
intermediary and the client (Petersen and Rajan 1995). To reinforce this argument, Villas-Boas 
and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) and Navajas et al. (2003) predict that with intense competition most 
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MFIs would focus on the most profitable customers. Competition exacerbates asymmetric 
information problems over borrower indebtedness (McIntosh and Wydick 2005). With 
asymmetric information between competing MFIs, every loan contract therefore yields a lower 
profit margin to the borrower than under the full information benchmark. This has implications 
on MFIs profitability as well. With regard to repayment rates, Marquez (2002) observes that 
competition lowers the screening ability of the incumbent institution, thus increasing the share of 
low quality borrowers among clients. A rise in default rates leads to lower repayment and the 
resultant profitability.  
Empirical literature on the link between microfinance competition and profitability is scant. 
Using financial data for socially-motivated MFIs between 2003 and 2006 in developing 
countries, Hisako (2009) examines the empirical relationship between competition and financial 
self-sufficiency (FSS). He concludes that competition has no impact on financial self-sufficiency. 
On the contrary Mersland and Strøm (2009), finds higher competition to lower portfolio yield 
among MFIs which lowers profitability. Cull et al (2009b) examine whether the presence of 
conventional banks affects the profitability and outreach of MFIs. Their results on profitability is 
however insignificant. One of the shortcomings of Cull et al (2009b) is that they use country-
level indicators of competition, rather than measures that would reflect firm level competition 
amongst the MFIs. These findings therefore remain inconclusive. 
Mcintosh, De Janvry and Sadoulet (2005) estimate a panel fixed-effects regression and 
linear probability model. They show that more intense competition leads to multiple borrowing 
and a decline in repayment rates. Although they do not explicitly examine the impact of 
competition on MFI performance, their study indirectly finds negative impact of increased 
competition on repayment performance which is consistent with McIntosh and Wydick (2005) 
theoretical underpinnings. This too has implications on profitability. Vogelgesang (2003) 
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examines how competition affects loan repayment performance of Caja Los Andes. Her 
estimation results indicate that competition is related to multiple loan taking and higher levels of 
borrower indebtedness. We argue that this level of default has negative implications on MFIs 
profitability. Again, the evidence here remains contestable 
 
2.2.3.5 Profitability and governance of micro finance institutions 
 
Both policy makers and practitioners of microfinance are increasingly stressing on the need for 
improved corporate governance to enhance MFIs’ survival and growth. Indeed, CSFI (2008) 
report identifies corporate governance as a principal risk facing microfinance. This control 
mechanism is important because managers and funders are likely to have divergent priorities and 
missions. MFI managers may for instance focus on fulfilling the objectives of the MFI but they 
may additionally have preferences for non-pecuniary rewards which subsequently lead to the so 
called agency problem in the corporate governance literature.  
MFIs board has several major stakeholders represented who include donors, equity 
investors, management and employees and creditors. Some MFIs have included clients on their 
boards (Mitchell et al., 1997; Campion, 1998). The board controls the managerial power thereby 
reducing organizational inefficiencies (Andrés-Alonso, et al 2009). Donors or their 
representatives in the board of directors and other governance bodies can lead to a better control 
of the opportunistic behaviour of the manager (Hartarska 2005). But the relative power balance or 
otherwise of these various stakeholders affects MFIs performance (Mersland 2009a). Hence, the 
traditional board governance may be less effective in not-for-profit MFIs. Donors on the other 
hand may prefer outreach to sustainability, while private investors prefer profitability. These two 
stakeholders may put their representatives on the board and influence the direction of manager’s 
effort. 
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Empirical evidence on the impact of corporate governance on MFIs performance is scant 
and consistency in findings within and across studies is rare. Hartarska (2009) uses a database of 
108 MFIs operating in over 30 countries and analyzes their performance by adopting an empirical 
approach usually employed in cross-country banking research on the impact of market forces and 
regulation on performance. MFI performance is measured by sustainability and modelled as a 
function of regulatory status, external audit and microfinance rating while at the same time 
controlling for MFI and country-specific characteristics. The author finds that some rating 
agencies may play a disciplining role which subsequently affects performance.  
To explore the effect of traditional governance mechanisms such as board composition and 
size, managerial incentives, ownership type, and regulation, Mersland and Strøm (2009) use a 
global dataset including 278 rated MFIs from 60 countries examine the relationship between firm 
performance and corporate governance in microfinance institutions (MFI) using a self-
constructed global dataset; Mersland and Strøm (2008) investigates whether the transformation of 
non-government organisations type of MFIs is superior to shareholder owned MFIs in 
performance; Coleman and Osei, (2008) utilizes a panel of 52 MFIs and examine how selected 
governance indicators impact on performance measures of outreach and profitability in 
microfinance institutions (MFIs); Hartarska (2005) uses different datasets spanning 46 to 144 
observations from East European MFIs. Although these studies conclude that governance 
matters, they have difficulties in identifying significant governance influence. They call for better 
data and the study of alternative governance mechanisms in order to better understand the effect 
of corporate governance in the microfinance sector. Another drawback in these studies is that 
they do not in their analysis adequately take into account the fact that most MFIs do not intend to 
be shareholder owned, have multiple goals, and do not have an inherent profit motive. 
Additionally, MFIs differ from regular corporate entities in that they encounter horizontal agency 
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problems between themselves and their clients while at the same time donor-funded MFIs face 
agency costs in their relationships with donors (Adams and Mehran, 2003). Further research is 
therefore necessary to reconcile the reported evidence. 
 
2.2.3.6 Profitability and financing choice 
 
While there is a vast literature on the optimal capital structure of corporate firms, the application 
of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem and other corporate finance theorems to 
microfinance institutions is not straight-forward. Modigliani and Miller theorem posits that 
financing decisions do not matter in a world without taxes, transaction costs, or other market 
imperfections. They argue that a firm cannot change the total value of its securities by splitting its 
cash flows into different streams and therefore value is determined by its real assets. Thus, capital 
structure does not matter as long as the firm’s decisions are endogenously determined.  
There have been no systematic empirical studies for a large group of MFIs that provide 
robust evidence of how variations in funding affect MFIs profitability. Much of the existing 
empirical work places the evolution of MFI funding sources within the realm of institutional life 
cycle theory7 of MFI development (Helms, 2006). Using data on outreach and default rate as the 
dependent variables, Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) investigate the impact of capital structure on 
the performance of microfinance institutions by estimating a random and fixed effects linear 
model. Here no attempt has been made to control for reverse causality from performance to 
capital structure (endogeneity) or to employ a variant of other capital structure measures such as 
gearing, deposits and portfolio-asset ratio that may explain performance 
                                                 
7 According to this framework of analysis, most MFIs start out as NGOs with a social mission, funding operations with grants and concessional 
loans from donors and international financial institutions that effectively serve as the primary sources of risk capital for the microfinance sector. 
Thus, literature on microfinance devotes considerable attention to this process of “NGO transformation” as a life cycle model outlining the 
evolution of a microfinance institution with different stages of funding  
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MFIs have two broad funding options beyond debt which include deposits (if regulation 
allows) and equity (commercialization). Several key trends have emerged; the tendency towards 
increased leveraging of capital8, the rise in mobilizing public deposits as more MFIs get 
regulated and a shift away from subsidized donor funds towards commercial funding9 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010; Hartarska and Nadolnyak 2008a). These changes mark a 
general shift towards capital structures typical of traditional banks.  
                                                
Commercially-funded MFIs respond to the profit incentive, working to increase revenues 
while minimizing expenses so that they can have revenues sufficient to cover all operating 
expenses including cost of capital (Cull et al, 2009a). MFIs with access to donor funds may not 
respond to these pressures to operate efficiently or may deliberately choose outreach over 
profitability by serving poorer or rural clients with higher delivery costs (Armendáriz and 
Morduch, 2010). A higher cost of external funds may force the MFI to raise the interest rate it 
charges its borrowers, with implications on profitability. Cheap external funding may however 
attract an inefficient MFI, which relies on the implicit subsidy to cover its high operating costs 
(Ghosh and Tassel 2011). Studies that would provide empirical evidence on this policy relevant 
issue are however lacking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 For example, non-profit foundations now have an average leverage of 4.5 times the value of their equity compared to about 1.3 times their 
equity (see Farrington and Abrams  2002) 
9 Commercialized microfinance institutions have a profile distinct from others, earning higher profits by making larger loans at lower cost per 
dollar lent (Cull, et al, 2009b). 
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2.2.3.7 Profitability and country institutional context 
This section aims at addressing microfinance profitability and institutional context by drawing on 
insights from institutional theory (e.g., North, 1990).  Pande and Urdy (2005) contest the notion 
of “agency” embodied in North’s definition of institutions by arguing that institutions are often 
not “designed” and even when they are, their operation may be different to what was originally 
intended. Along the same vein, Casson, Giusta and Kambhampati (2010) contends that North’s 
“moral and ethical behavioural norms” are often embodied in informal institutions like religion 
and caste that determine the quality and sustainability of formal institutions like schools, labour 
markets, and the rules and regulations governing economic activity. Practices and rules as well as 
the public agencies and moral environment which sustain trust are determined at least in part, if 
not largely, by the cultural endowment of societies as they have developed over their particular 
histories (Platteau, 1994). 
Existing literature on institutions is limited in two ways: first, institutions are seen in very 
broad terms as relating to certain political or economic rules of behaviour (e.g., protection against 
expropriation risk or government anti-diversion policies (Acemoglu et al., 2001) or country’s 
openness (Hall and Jones, 1999) or bureaucratic efficiency (Mauro, 1995). Second, it’s more 
aligned towards the effect of institutions on growth. Thus, most of the existing studies are 
concerned with the impact on GDP per capita (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Aghion et al., 2005) or output per worker 
(Clague, et al, 1999; Hall and Jones, 1999).  
Evidence so far shows that the present and anticipated institutional context influences risks 
and returns associated with investment in a specific location (Xu, 2010). Thus, good governance 
is a prerequisite to secure property rights, enforcement of contracts and for the provision of 
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adequate public goods and the control of public “bads.” Without this assurance, citizenry lose the 
incentive to save and invest (Dixit, 2009).  
Although a well functioning government is known to influence the performance of the 
financial sector, there is little evidence linking well-functioning institutions to financial 
intermediaries’ outcomes. Kauffman et al (2009) for example, show that if citizen’ perceptions 
regarding the inefficiency of both the commercial and criminal justice system are corrupt; they 
are unlikely to seek their services.  
Most of the existing empirical literature on institutions development focuses on the impact 
of economic growth by referring to three different environmental aspects: physical endowments, 
culture and institutions which are often interrelated and difficult to disentangle10. The empirical 
evidence is unequivocal that institutions matter for growth. Williamson, (2009) shows that formal 
institutions are only successful when embedded in informal constraints. Berggren, (2008) 
demonstrates that secure property rights, rule of law and light regulatory burden particularly that 
geared towards contracting appear to robustly promote growth and prosperity. Jerzmanowski 
(2006), evidence points towards favourable and sustained growth regimes emanating from sound 
economic institutions. Rodrik (2005; 2008), William (2008), Williamson, (2000), Hausmann et al 
(2005), Acemoglu, et al (2001), finds a positive and significant effect of institutions on growth 
accelerations. Acemoglu (2006), demonstrate that distortionary policies, economic crises, and 
slow economic growth are due to the weakness of political institutions. Gwartney et al (2006), 
shows that countries with high quality institutions are able to attract more private investment. 
Glaeser et al (2004), Rodrik, et al (2004), Durnev et al. (2003), find that property rights, 
shareholder rights, stock market transparency and capital account openness contribute to efficient 
                                                 
10 The impact of culture, religion and endowments has been extensively documented in literature. Examples include empirical studies of the 
relationship between endowments and economic development , between culture and a country’s legal system (Acemoglu et al., 2001) and between 
culture and governance (La Porta et al., 1998) 
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capital allocation and economic growth. These studies show that good institutions matter in 
fostering economic growth and financial development. What is clearly lacking from the literature 
is the impact of country-specific institutions on microfinance profitability. 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) examine the determinants of MFIs operational self 
sufficiency and find no significant impact from per capita income or any measures of economic 
freedom and property rights. Consistent findings are also documented by Hartarska (2009) who 
examine the effects of external governance mechanisms on MFIs' performance, and conclude that 
regulatory involvement and financial statement transparency do not impact on performance, 
while some but not all rating agencies may play a disciplining role. This evidence is also 
confirmed by Arun and Annim (2010) who investigate the effect of external governance structure 
and functioning on the outreach and financial objectives of MFIs. Contrary to corporate 
governance studies, external governance indicators fail to cause changes in the profitability of 
MFIs. On the contrary Ahlin et al (2011) do not find MFI operational self-sufficiency (OSS) to be 
significantly influenced by governance measures. Similar inconsistent findings were arrived at by 
Cull et al (2009b) who controls for the same governance indicators for the period 1996-2006. 
Additionally Crabb (2008) models OSS as a function of both firm level and environmental 
context and shows that MFIs operate primarily in countries with a relatively low degree of overall 
economic freedom and that government intervention in the economy can reduce their 
sustainability. These estimation results therefore remain inconclusive.  
One major shortcoming with these previous studies is that they do not attempt to control for 
endogeneity. Moreover these studies focus on Operational Self Sufficiency but which can be 
misleading since it lumps together genuine operating net revenue with transfers. It is for this 
reason that Microfinance Financial Reporting Standards recommends the use of ROA and ROE 
as measures of profitability rather than financial self-sustenance (FSS) and operational self-
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sustenance (OSS). Table 2.2 attempts to reconcile the seemingly inconclusive findings on MFI 
profitability by summarizing the main findings emerging from the reviewed section on 
microfinance performance. 
Table 2.2: Summary of empirical studies and direction of impact. 
Variable  Return on assets Operational self 
sustainability  
Financial self sustainability 
Size  Arun and Annim (2010),   
Insignificant 
Mersland and Strøm  
(2009). 
+ 
Cull, et al (2011). 
Insignificant  
Cull, et al (2011). 
Insignificant 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2007). 
+ 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
+ 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
+ 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, Morduch 
(2007). 
+ 
Mersland and Strøm (2009). 
+ 
Hartarska, (2005). 
Insignificant 
 
Hartarska (2009) 
+ 
  
Coleman and Osei (2008) 
+ 
  
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
+ 
  
Hartarska, (2005). 
Insignificant 
  
Efficiency 
Arun and Annim (2010),   
- 
 
D’Espallier et al (2010) 
_ 
 
Cull, et al (2011). 
_ 
Cull, et al (2011). 
_ 
 Cull, et al (2011). 
_ 
D’Espallier et al (2010) 
_ 
 
  
Cull, et al (2009b). 
_ 
  
Age (yrs) 
Arun and Annim (2010),   
+ 
Ahlin et al (2011) 
+ 
 
D’Espallier et al (2010) 
Insignificant 
 
D’Espallier et al (2010) 
Insignificant 
 
Cull, et al (2011). 
Insignificant 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
_ 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Insignificant 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant  
Cull, et al (2011). 
Insignificant 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2007). 
+ 
 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Hartarska, (2005). 
Insignificant 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, Morduch 
(2007). 
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+ + 
Hartarska, (2005). 
Insignificant 
Mersland and Strøm 
(2009). 
- 
 
Mersland and Strøm (2009). 
Insignificant 
  
Hartarska (2009) 
+ 
  
   
Coleman and Osei (2008) 
- 
 
  
Competition  
Mersland and Strøm (2009). 
Insignificant 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2007). 
Insignificant  
 
 Mersland and Strøm 
(2009). 
Insignificant 
 
Capital  
Hartarska (2009) 
Insignificant 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2007). 
+ 
 
Portfolio at  risk  
Arun and Annim (2010),   
- 
 
Mersland and Strøm 
(2009). 
+ 
 
Mersland and Strøm (2009). 
Insignificant 
  
Hartarska (2009) 
Insignificant 
  
Village banking 
lending  contract  
 
Cull, et al (2011). 
Insignificant 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Insignificant 
Cull, et al (2011). 
+ 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
 Cull, et al (2009b). 
+ 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Insignificant 
 Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, Morduch 
(2007). 
Insignificant 
Solidarity group 
lending 
Cull, et al (2011). 
Insignificant 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Insignificant 
Cull, et al (2011). 
Insignificant 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
 Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Insignificant 
 Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, Morduch 
(2007). 
Insignificant 
Individual loan 
contracts 
Mersland and Strøm (2009). 
Insignificant 
Mersland and Strøm 
(2009). 
Insignificant 
 
Regulated  Arun and Annim (2010),   
+ 
 
Mersland and Strøm 
(2009). 
Insignificant 
Cull, et al (2011). 
Insignificant 
Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) 
Insignificant  
Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2007). 
Insignificant 
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Mersland and Strøm (2009). 
Insignificant 
  
Outreach  depth  
(Average loan 
size)11 
Arun and Annim (2010),   
- 
 
Ahlin et al (2011) 
+ 
 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Insignificant 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Insignificant 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, Morduch 
(2007). 
Insignificant 
Portfolio to assets 
ratio 
 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
+ 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Insignificant 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, Morduch 
(2007). 
+ 
Coleman and Osei (2008) 
+ 
  
For-profit legal 
status 
Tchakoute-Tchuigoua  (2011) 
Insignificant  
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Insignificant 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, Morduch 
(2007). 
Insignificant 
Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) 
+ 
  
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Insignificant 
  
Board size  
 
Mersland and Strøm (2009). 
Insignificant 
Mersland and Strøm 
(2009). 
Insignificant 
 
Coleman and Osei (2008) 
+ 
  
Board 
independence 
Coleman and Osei (2008) 
+ 
  
Property rights   Arun and Annim (2010),   
Insignificant  
Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2007). 
Insignificant 
 
Voice and 
Accountability  
 
Arun and Annim (2010) 
- 
 
  
Enforcement  of 
Contract  
Arun and Annim (2010) 
+ 
  
Credit 
Information 
Arun and Annim (2010) 
Insignificant  
  
Economic 
freedom  
 Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2007). 
Insignificant 
 
Informal sector 
size  
Hartarska (2009) 
Insignificant 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2007). 
+ 
 
Private 
credit/GDP  
 Ahlin et al (2011) 
Insignificant  
 
Inflation 
 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant  
Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2007). 
+ 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant  
Hartarska, (2005). 
Insignificant 
Hartarska, (2005). 
- 
 
GDP Cull, et al (2009b). 
+  
Ahlin et al (2011) 
Insignificant 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
+ 
                                                 
11 Average Loan Balance per Borrower/GNI per Capita 
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 Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2007). 
Insignificant  
 
Rural population 
(%, 1990) 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
 Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant  
Rural   population 
growth (%) 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
 Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
KKM12 index Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
 Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia  
region  
 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
+ 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
+ 
 Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, Morduch 
(2007). 
Insignificant 
Africa  
 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
 Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
+ 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
+ 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, Morduch 
(2007). 
Insignificant 
South Asia  
 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
_ 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Insignificant 
Cull, et al (2009c). 
_ 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Insignificant 
 Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, Morduch 
(2007). 
Insignificant 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Insignificant 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Insignificant 
 Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, Morduch 
(2007). 
Insignificant 
Middle-East  and 
North Africa 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
Insignificant 
Cull, et al (2009b). 
Insignificant 
Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Morduch (2007). 
+ 
 Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, Morduch 
(2007). 
Insignificant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 KKM is the Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi index of institutional development 
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2.2.4 Conclusion 
The main purpose of this chapter was to survey existing theoretical and empirical literature with a 
focus on microfinance performance. Microfinance literature has a strong focus on the 
peculiarities of microfinance which differ significantly with those of traditional banking 
(Armendáriz and Morduch 2010). These peculiarities include but are not limited to the type of 
lending technologies employed to overcome incentive problems in lending to informal business 
and poor households (e.g. Stiglitz 1990), and second  microfinance has a social mission of 
alleviating poverty on borrowers (Banerjee et al 2009). It is against this backdrop that there has 
been a long debate on the question of whether MFIs can be financially sustainable (Morduch, 
1999b; Hermes and Lensink 2007; Balkenhol, 2007).  
Empirical studies have explored the determinants of MFIs sustainability, including the type 
of loan contracts used, the institutional ownership, institutions' age, loan size, gender of clients, 
governance, regulation and capital structure of institutions, as well as country level 
macroeconomic and institutional context (Cull, Demirgüç- Kunt and Morduch 2007; Bogan 
2009; Mersland and Strom 2009; Ayayi and Sene 2010; Cull, et al 2011; Ahlin et al 2011). To 
some extent, MFIs can achieve sustainability while serving the poor (Hermes and Lensink 2011). 
However, and as elucidated in Hermes and Lensink, (2007), the question on the determinants of 
MFI profitability remain unanswered. MFIs could in principle be financially sustainable but not 
profitable. This question is therefore very relevant given the increased investments from 
commercial players that target their money towards MFIs, with the aim of earning returns from 
the investments. Profit-maximizing investors would have limited interest in most of the 
institutions that focus on social mission (Cull et al 2009a; Guérin, et al 2011). Moreover, 
measures of sustainability differ between studies and are sometimes rather ad hoc, making 
comparisons difficult. 
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Although literature on the impact of outreach on financial performance is not extensive and 
is largely anecdotal, there is a strong evidence of a trade-off. Empirical evidence adduced so far 
shows that outreach does compromise financial sustainability (Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Morduch 2007; Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters 2011). This evidence is relevant for policy 
makers, since putting emphasis on poverty reduction comes at a price, which may be a reduction 
on the scope for financial sustainability. This trade-off is relevant for commercial investors, 
especially those who aim for socially responsible investments. It is however important to note 
that the evidence adduced here mostly relate to financial sustainability and not MFI profitability. 
Thus the question on whether outreach explains MFIs profitability remains un-answered, which 
calls for further empirical research with theoretical and empirically sound underpinnings.  
Our literature survey points to unresolved issues on the impact of regulation on 
microfinance profitability. Although Seibel (2003) and Guinnane (2002) draw attention to how 
financial history justifies the need for appropriate legal frameworks in order to support the 
development of pro-poor financial systems, recent empirical evidence shows mixed results. 
Contrary to the arguments offered by proponents of regulating MFIs (see for example Arun 
2005), the innovation provided by (Cull et al., 2011; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua 2010; Mersland and 
Strøm (2009), shows that regulation is not significantly associated with MFI profitability. This 
finding is inconsistent with Hartarska (2005). The policy implication is that MFIs’ transformation 
into regulated financial institutions may not lead to profitability. But to the extent that other 
variables included in the regression may partially account for credit risk, this explains the failure 
of legal status to significantly affect MFI returns. These studies underscore the importance of 
taking into account the trade-offs and for further empirical scrutiny. 
Our literature survey shows that evidence on the link between microfinance competition 
and profitability is scant and mixed. The finding by Hisako (2009) is unequivocal that 
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competition does not worsen financial self-sufficiency which confirms Mcintosh, De Janvry and 
Sadoulet (2005). This is consistent with McIntosh and Wydick (2005) theoretical underpinnings. 
Mersland and Strøm (2009), on the contrary finds higher competition to lower portfolio yield 
among MFIs which lowers profitability. Although, Cull et al (2009b) findings on profitability are 
insignificant, their study focus on country-level indicators of competition, rather than measures 
that would reflect firm level competition amongst the MFIs. Though these findings remain 
inconclusive, their focus is also on OSS rather than profitability. 
Turning to the impact of governance on MFI profitability; empirical evidence on MFIs 
performance is scant and consistency in findings within and across studies is rare. The innovation 
by Hartarska (2009) who adopt an empirical approach usually employed in cross-country banking 
research finds that some rating agencies may play a disciplining role which subsequently affects 
performance. Although Mersland and Strøm (2008; 2009), Coleman and Osei, (2008), Hartarska 
(2005) conclude that governance matters on MFIs performance, they have difficulties in 
identifying significant governance influence. Another drawback in these studies is that they do 
not in their analysis adequately take into account the fact that most MFIs do not intend to be 
shareholder owned, have multiple goals, and do not have an inherent profit motive. Additionally, 
MFIs differ from regular corporate entities in that they encounter horizontal agency problems 
between themselves and their clients while at the same time donor-funded MFIs face agency 
costs in their relationships with donors (Adams and Mehran, 2003). Further research is therefore 
necessary to reconcile the reported evidence and with a focus on profitability rather than 
sustainability. 
While there is a vast literature on the optimal capital structure of corporate firms, the 
application of the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem and other corporate finance theorems to 
microfinance institutions is not straight-forward. There have been no systematic empirical studies 
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for a large group of MFIs that would provide robust evidence of how variations in funding affect 
MFIs profitability. MFIs with access to donor funds may not operate efficiently or may 
deliberately choose outreach over profitability (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). Cheap external 
funding may attract an inefficient MFI, which relies on the implicit subsidy to cover its high 
operating costs (Ghosh and Tassel 2011) and this has implications on profitability as well. 
Studies that would provide empirical evidence on this policy relevant issue are however lacking. 
Theoretical contributions on contract design in combination with randomized control trials 
continue to be important tools to determine the ingredients of microfinance’s performance. In 
spite of these theoretical underpinnings on the importance of the type of loan contract, the basic 
empirical question of whether it matters for MFI profitability has remained unanswered. The 
innovation provided by Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch (2007) shows that institutional design 
matter substantially. Specifically, MFIs that do not use group-lending methodology to overcome 
incentive problems experience weaker portfolio quality and lower profitability rates. On the 
contrary, Mersland and Strøm, (2009) find that individual loan contract is never a significant 
variable in all their regressions. We do not find estimation results from these studies as 
convincing since they do not control for endogeneity. Studies that have used field experiments to 
circumvent endogeneity report mixed findings. Though Feigenberg, et al (2010), Giné et al 
(2010), Berhane, et al (2009),  finds joint liability contract to improve on MFI performance, 
inconsistent findings are documented by Pellegrina (2011), Chen, Choi and Sawada (2010). 
These studies do not therefore provide answers to the policy relevant question of whether the type 
of debt contract influences profitability of microfinance institutions. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
WHAT EXPLAINS THE LOW PROFITABILITY OF MICROFINANCE 
INSTITUTIONS IN AFRICA13? 
3.1 Introduction 
In spite of many MFIs realizing high loan repayment rates, few are profitable to date. In Table 
1.2 (see chapter one), we reported that MFIs in Africa have on average consistently reported 
negative profits compared to other regions. For a poverty intervention as widespread as 
microfinance, with over five billion dollars invested each year (CGAP 2009a; Forster and Reillie, 
2008) and an estimated 205 million clients worldwide (Maes and Reed, 2012), there is 
surprisingly little rigorous evidence of the determinants of microfinance profitability. This is due 
to inadequate and unreliable data (Honohan 2004b).  
 This study has two goals. One is to clearly identify, on the basis of empirical evidence and 
in a single static equation framework, significant determinants of MFIs’ profitability. To achieve 
this objective, we used an unbalanced panel dataset of Africa MFIs over the period 1997-2007. 
This chapter draws from economic theory to assess the role of determinants of profitability and 
then evaluates a corpus of relevant evidence. We primarily use several exogenous variables to 
control for a wide array of MFI specific, institutional and country level differences that might 
confound the inferences which we draw upon.  
The second goal is to investigate whether MFIs seek to maximize profits or whether they 
are pursuing additional objectives as well. Managerial objectives may vary systemically with for 
example MFI size. Of relevance also is the need for risk management in the microfinance sector 
                                                 
13 A previous version of this chapter was presented at the 8th Infiniti Conference on International Finance, June 14-15, 2010, Trinity College, 
Dublin; West Midlands Regional Doctoral Colloquium (Aston and Birmingham Business Schools) held on 17th June 2010; 6th Portuguese 
Finance Network to be held at the Azores, July 1-3, 2010, and EBES 2010 Conference-Athens, Greece October 28-30, 2010. I acknowledge the 
inputs of the conference participants. 
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which is inherent in the nature of their business. The standard profit analysis assumes explicitly 
or implicitly, that firms face market-priced risk which does not vary with production decisions. 
This simplification undermines the model's usefulness when applied to an industry such as 
microfinance where risk and risk-related phenomena including moral hazard plays an important 
role in the intermediation process.   
Much of the applied economics literature in this area addresses the social worth of 
microfinance organizations (e.g., Bruett, 2005; Navajas et al., 2003; Navajas et al., 2000), 
measuring for example; the impact of village-level microfinance institutions (Menkhoff and 
Rungruxsirivorn 2011; Kaboski and Townsend, 2005), the impact of microcredit on the poor 
(Karlan and Zinman 2010; Brau, Roodman and Morduch 2010; Hiatt and Woodworth 2009; 
Kaboski and Townsend 2010; Dupas and Robinson 2009; Mohindra, et al 2008), costs and 
benefits of subsidies (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010), correlations for MFIs and commercial 
banks (Krauss and Ingo, 2009), microfinance and mission drift (Armendáriz and Szafarz 2011; 
Hishigsuren, 2007; Copestake 2007), impact analysis (Hartarska and Nadolnyak 2008b), 
efficiency of MFIs (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al, 2010, 2009, 2007; Caudill, Gropper and Hartarska 
2009), competition between MFIs and traditional banks (Cull et al 2009b, c), women and 
repayment in microfinance (D’Espallier et al 2011), microfinance commercialization 
(Montgomery and Weiss 2011; Galema and Lensink 2009), microfinance plus (Lensink, and 
Mersland, 2009), outreach-sustainability trade off (Hermes and Lensink 2011; Cull, Demirgüc-
Kunt and Morduch (2007) and studies that examine the relationship between MFI performance 
and corporate governance (Mersland and Strøm, 2009). There has however, been limited up-to-
date scholarly research detailing factors that explain microfinance profitability.  
It is against this background that this study raises several key research questions: (1) 
Documented evidence shows that self sufficient MFIs have more clients, assets, mobilize 
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deposits and have diversified credit lines (Aschcroft, 2008; Balkenhol, 2007). Could it be that 
failure to become profitable is due to lack of scale economies? (2) MFIs are subject to 
significantly higher transaction costs than conventional retail banks both in absolute and relative 
terms. These expenses include cost of funds for on-lending, the loan loss, and administrative14 
costs (Cull et al 2009a). What evidence exists to the effect that efficient management of expenses 
affect MFI investment and hence profitability? (3) Theory suggests that increased exposure to 
credit risk is normally associated with decreased bank profitability (see e.g. Cooper et al., 2003). 
Does this also hold true for the microfinance industry? (4) Does age of the MFI or learning 
effects matter in explaining MFIs profitability? (5) Well-capitalized banks are regarded to be less 
risky. Is this also true for the MFIs? (6) Literature shows that funding constraints have hindered 
the expansion of microfinance activities. Does gearing ratio have an important implication on 
MFIs profitability? (7) To what extent are discrepancies in MFIs’ profitability due to variations in 
macroeconomic environment which is not under the control of MFI management? (8) Do 
ingredients of growth such as better institutions make microfinance more profitable? The joint 
analysis of these eight issues is important if we want to provide answers to more articulated 
questions on microfinance performance. 
         This study makes four main contributions to policy and existing literature. (1) It is timely, 
in view of the current emphasis on the role of finance in economic growth. (2) Understanding 
determinants of MFI’s profitability may help a growing number of investment funds that target 
their money towards MFI’s, with the aim of earning returns from the investments. (3) Any 
microfinance evaluation that does not take into account external factors, if they are found to 
robustly and non-negligibly predict MFI profitability would be incomplete. (4) At the policy 
                                                 
14 This includes identifying and screening clients, processing loan applications, disbursing payments, collecting repayments, and following up on 
non-repayment 
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level, examining factors that impact on MFI profits is important for forming credit market policy 
that may help deepen the quantity and quality of access to finance by the poor.  
Although vast similar studies on firm-specific and macroeconomic determinants of 
conventional banking performance have been conducted in; Japan (Liu and Wilson 2010), Italy 
(Marcucci and Quagliariello 2008), Greece (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Kosmidou 2008; Spathis 
et al. 2002), China (Hsiu-Ling et al 2007), European Union (Pasiourasa and Kosmidou 2007; 
Carbo, 2007; Goddard, et al. 2004b; Molyneux and Thornton 1992), United Kingdom (Kosmidou 
et al., 2006),  Cross country (Laeven and Majoni 2003; Bikker and Hu 2002; Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Huizingha 1999), South Eastern European Region (Athanasoglou et al., 2006), Nigeria (Beck et 
al., 2005), Malaysia (Guru, et al., 2002) and the United States of America (Angbazo, 1997; 
Neeley and Wheelock 1997; Berger, 1995; Boyd and Runkle 1993), their empirical results are 
difficult to generalize in microfinance. It is therefore far from a fore-drawn conclusion that what 
holds true for the traditional banking sector will also hold for MFI’s. Thus, we lack sufficient 
empirical analyses in this field. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background of 
the existing literature, relating banking profitability to its determinants as well as distinguishing 
between single and cross-country studies while, drawing on both theoretical and empirical work. 
Section 3 describes conceptual framework and the model specification. In Section 4, we provide 
detailed description of data, which include measurements of our variable of interest. Section 5 
discusses econometric methodology. Section 6 presents the empirical results and findings. 
Conclusions and some policy suggestions are offered in the final section by pointing out some 
unresolved issues, undiscovered territory and the future of microfinance in Africa. 
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3.2. Review of the background literature 
Owing to limited literature on microfinance performance, this sub-section borrows heavily from 
the banking literature, since MFIs offer banking services to the poor. Existing literature defines 
profitability of a financial intermediary as the return on assets (ROA) or the return on equity 
(ROE). This is measured and/or expressed as a function of internal and external factors. Internal 
factors are those influenced by management decisions or within the control of firm management. 
Such factors include firm size, capital adequacy, credit risk provisioning, and efficiency in the 
management of operating expenses. The external determinants include macroeconomic and 
industry-specific factors which reflect the economic, legal and business orientation within the 
context where the financial institution operates. A number of explanatory variables have been 
proposed for both categories depending on the nature and purpose of each study.  
There is no convergence on the empirical evidence on firm size. Significant predictions of 
theories are not supported, and interesting regularities in the data are not predicted, thus anecdotal 
explanations abound. Sufian and Habibullah (2009) examine the determinants of the profitability 
of the Chinese banking sector during the post-reform period of 2000-2005 and conclude that the 
impacts on bank profitability depend on the bank types. During the period under study, they find 
size to lower city commercial banks profitability. Along the same vein Hsiu-Ling et al (2007) 
investigate the main determinants of the bank profitability in China. They find that the more 
assets a bank has, the worse will be its return on assets (ROA). Both studies render support for 
the diseconomies of scale. Consistent with this finding, Pasiourasa and Kosmidou (2007), find 
diseconomies for larger banks which apply to both domestic and foreign banks. The negative 
coefficient indicates that in both cases, larger (smaller) banks tend to earn lower (higher) profits 
and gives credence to previous studies which include (Kosmidou et al., 2006; Bikker and Hu 
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2002; Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizingha 1999; Boyd and Runkle 1993) that found either economies 
of scale and scope for smaller banks or diseconomies for larger financial institutions.  
Contrasting findings confirming economies of scale are evident. Using a self-constructed 
global dataset on MFIs collected from third-party rating agencies, Mersland and Strøm, (2009) 
examine the relationship between MFI performance and corporate governance while controlling 
for MFI size. Using random effects panel data estimations they find that financial performance 
improves with firm size. These findings are consistent with Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Morduch 
(2007). In the banking industry Kosmidou (2008) use total assets of the bank to control for size 
and similarly find a positive impact on profitability which confirms Athanasoglou et al (2006), 
Beck et al. (2005), Naceur and Goaied (2001), Spathis et al. (2002), Altunbas et al. (2001), 
Berger and Humphrey, (1997), who similarly find large banks to be more profitable, consistent 
with the predictions of modern intermediation theory.  
There has been an extensive literature on efficiency in the management of operating 
expenses and firm performance. Sufian and Habibullah (2009) investigate the determinants of the 
profitability of the Chinese banking sector and find inefficiency in operating expenses 
management to impact negatively on bank profits. This confirms Athanasoglou, et al (2008) who 
applies a GMM technique to a panel of Greek banks covering the period 1985-2001 and similarly 
finds operating expenses to significantly impact negatively on bank profitability. They are 
however quick to point out that the negative effect means that there is a lack of competence in 
expenses management since banks pass part of increased cost to customers. Consistent findings 
have been documented by Kosmidou (2008) who examine the determinants of performance of 
Greek banks during the period of EU financial integration (1990-2002), Pasiourasa and 
Kosmidou (2007), Athanasoglou et al (2006) and Kosmidou, et al (2005). Previous evidence on 
the same include Guru et al. (2002) Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992). Similar 
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estimation results have been reported in microfinance literature. Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt, and 
Morduch (2007) conclude that the impact of costs on profitability of MFIs depends on an 
institution’s lending methodology. Contrasting findings are evident. Hollis and Sweetman, (2007) 
investigate the impact of capital structure on non-interest operating costs using data on Irish loan 
funds15. They find that higher net income is associated with higher salaries and other non-interest 
costs. Indeed, higher capital-deposit ratios led to higher operational costs even after controlling 
for net income. These findings suggest that depositors could assist in controlling operational costs 
in MFIs.  
The issue of whether firm’s age matter has generated large amounts of empirical research. 
In the banking industry and contrary to theoretical predictions, Hsiu-Ling et al (2007) establish 
that the longer a bank has been in existence, the worse the return on assets (ROA). Similarly, 
Beck et al (2005) shows that older institutions perform worse which imply that the new entrants 
into the market are better able to pursue new profit opportunities. Moreover, newer institutions 
appear to enjoy more autonomy in their decision-making, and are more willing to innovate. 
Inconsistent findings in microfinance have been documented by Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt, and 
Morduch (2007) who concludes that an institution’s age is significant and positively linked to 
financial performance. Clearly the evidence remains inconclusive and contestable. 
Both theoretical and empirical studies show that capital adequacy is important in 
determining bank profitability. Sufian and Habibullah (2009), find capital to have a positive 
impact on bank profitability in China. This confirms Athanasoglou, et al. (2008, 2006) and 
Kosmidou (2008) who also finds a positive and significant effect of capital on bank profitability, 
reflecting the sound financial condition of banks. Boubakri, et al. (2005) examine the post-
privatization performance of 81 banks from 22 developing countries and establish a similar 
                                                 
15 Rather than being financed by equity-holders these community based organizations were financed by deposits and capital which comprised of 
donations and accumulated profits and which created problems of managerial moral hazard. 
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result. Consistent previous findings include Goddard, et al. (2004b), Naceur and Goaied (2001), 
Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Berger, (1995) and Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, (1999).  
Empirical evidence on the impact of quality of loan portfolio on profitability is mixed.  
Mersland and Strøm (2009) do not find credit risk to be a significant determinant of performance. 
On the contrary, Athanasoglou, et al. (2008) finds credit risk to be negatively and significantly 
related to bank profitability which confirms previous findings by Athanasoglou et al (2006). 
Additionally, Kasimodio (2008) evidence a negative and statistically significant impact of loan 
loss reserves to loans on profitability, which implies that financial institutions can reduce the 
variability of reported income by making higher provisions than necessary when credit quality 
and net income are high, during favourable economic conditions. This finding lends support to 
Boubakri, et al (2005), who using the past due loans to total loans ratio, and a measure of interest 
rate risk that is equal to short term assets minus short term liabilities over total assets arrives at 
the same conclusion. Few studies evidence a positive relationship between credit risk and 
performance. Sufian and Habibullah (2009) findings suggest that credit risk has positive impacts 
on the state owned commercial banks and joint stock commercial profits which is consistent with 
Anghazo (1997). Evidence from microfinance is lacking. 
Financial institutions performance is sensitive to prevailing macroeconomic conditions. 
Using a panel of Italian banks, Marcucci and Quagliariello (2008) finds that loan loss provisions 
and bad debts increase during economic growth slump. Laeven and Majoni (2003) provide 
similar evidence in a cross-country comparison. Athanasoglou, et al. (2008), similarly find a 
positive impact on bank profitability in the Greek banking industry which confirms Athanasoglou 
et al (2006) and Beck and Hesse (2006). Kasimodiou (2008) find growth of GDP to have a 
significant and positive impact on profitability, consistent with Kosmidou et al. (2005), while 
inflation has a significant negative impact. Athanasoglou, et al. (2008), find inflation and cyclical 
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output to affect the performance of the banking sector negatively, while Hsiu-Ling et al (2007) 
conclude that per capita GDP has a positive impact. Pasiourasa and Kosmidou (2007) find 
inflation to be positively related to domestic banks, implying that during the period of their study 
the levels of inflation were anticipated by domestic banks16. The results about the impact of per 
capita incomes on domestic banks profitability are consistent with those of Kosmidou et al. 
(2005), Kosmidou (2008). Other similar previous findings include Neeley and Wheelock (1997) 
who explore the profitability of a sample of commercial banks in the US over the 1980-1995 
periods.  
Empirical evidence suggests that better institutional environment will have a positive 
impact on net interest margins (see for example William and Levine, 2003). MFIs operating in 
countries with better protection of property rights are also able to reach more borrowers 
(Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007). Existing empirical studies on corruption shows a negative 
impact on performance. In Uganda, for instance, bribes increase companies’ operating cost by 
about 8 per cent (Ng, 2006). Gelos and Wei (2006), show that endemic corruption is associated 
with lower investment from international funds. They also find that during financial crises, 
international funds flee corrupt economies by a greater amount than their transparent 
counterparts. 
Even though these studies show that it’s possible to conduct a meaningful analysis of MFI 
profitability, there is no single study that provides definitive proof for any claim in microfinance 
profitability. Moreover some issues are not dealt with sufficiently. First, a vast amount of the 
literature has examined determinants of profitability at the bank level. Second, in most of the 
literature, the econometric methodology is not adequately described. To conclude therefore, our 
                                                 
16 This gave the banks the opportunity to adjust the interest rates accordingly and consequently earn higher profits. With regard to foreign banks, 
inflation triggered a higher increase in costs than revenues as the negative relationship between inflation and foreign banks profits shows. These 
mixed results can be attributed to different levels of country-specific macroeconomic conditions and expectations concerning inflation rate 
between domestic and foreign banks. 
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review of banking literature shows that there is only limited empirical evidence on some of the 
issues under consideration and scant in microfinance. The few studies available within the realm 
of microfinance remain anecdotal and contestable.  
Our study aims at going beyond the existing empirical analyses in two important ways. 
First, while focusing on Africa, we use a substantially larger dataset, containing information for a 
large number of MFIs over a longer period of time than any of the previous studies in this field. 
Secondly, we incorporate variables that capture issues that have not been examined before. In 
particular, we factor in credit risk and factors external to MFIs management. In order to do this, 
we formulate a profit function and apply static analysis to determine the impact of various 
exogenous variables on MFI profitability. 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of empirical findings and direction of impact. 
 Banks (dependent variable ROA) 
Banks 
specific 
 
Size  Flamini et 
al (2009) 
+ 
Sufian and 
Habibullah 
(2009) 
- 
Athanasoglou, 
et al (2008)-
Insignificant 
Kosmidou 
(2008)  
+ 
Hsiu-Ling et al 
(2007) 
- 
Pasiourasa and 
Kosmidou 
(2007) 
- 
Kosmidou et 
al., (2006) 
- 
Athanasoglou et 
al (2006)  
+ 
Efficiency 
Flamini et 
al (2009) 
- 
Sufian and 
Habibullah 
(2009) 
- 
Athanasoglou, 
et al (2008) 
- 
Kosmidou 
(2008)  
- 
Pasiourasa and 
Kosmidou 
(2007) 
- 
Athanasoglou 
et al (2006)  
- 
Kosmidou, et 
al (2005) 
- 
Guru et al. 
(2002) 
- 
Age (yrs) 
Hsiu-Ling 
et al (2007)  
- 
Beck et al 
(2005) - 
      
Labour 
Productivity  
Athanasogl
ou, et al. 
(2008)  
+ 
       
Capital  
Flamini et 
al (2009) 
+ 
Sufian and 
Habibullah 
(2009) 
+ 
Athanasoglou, 
et al (2008) 
+ 
Kosmidou 
(2008)  
+ 
Athanasoglou 
et al (2006)  
+ 
Boubakri, et 
al. (2005) 
+ 
Naceur and 
Goaied (2001)  
+ 
Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 
(1999) 
+ 
Credit risk  
Flamini et 
al (2009) 
+ 
Sufian and 
Habibullah 
(2009) 
- 
Athanasoglou, 
et al (2008)-
Insignificant 
Kosmidou 
(2008)  
+ 
Athanasoglou 
et al (2006)  
+ 
Boubakri, et al 
(2005) 
- 
Anghazo 
(1997)  
+ 
 
Activity 
mix17  
Flamini et 
al (2009) 
+ 
       
Industry 
specific 
 
Concentratio
n 
Flamini et 
al (2009) 
Insignifican
t 
Athanasoglou, 
et al. (2008)  
Insignificant 
      
Charter 
/ownership 
Athanasogl
ou, et al. 
(2008)  
Insignifican
t 
       
Macroeco
nomic 
environm
ent  
Inflation  Flamini et 
al (2009) 
+ 
Kasimodiou 
(2008) 
 - 
 
Athanasoglou, 
et al. (2008) 
 - 
Athanasoglou 
et al (2006) 
- 
Pasiourasa and 
Kosmidou 
(2007) + 
   
Per Capita 
 Income  
Flamini et 
al (2009) 
Insignifican
t 
Sufian and 
Habibullah 
(2009) 
+ 
Marcucci and 
Quagliariello 
(2008) 
+ 
Kasimodiou 
(2008) 
+ 
Hsiu-Ling et al 
(2007) 
+ 
Pasiourasa and 
Kosmidou 
(2007) + 
Kosmidou et 
al. (2005) 
+ 
Laeven and 
Majoni (2003). 
+ 
                                                 
17 The ratio of net interest revenues over other operating income. 
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Business 
cycle 
Flamini et 
al (2009) 
+ 
Athanasoglou, 
et al. (2008)  
+ 
      
MFIs
MFI 
specific 
Size  Cull et al 
(2011) 
Insignifican
t 
Mersland and 
Strøm, (2009) 
+ 
Cull et al 
(2007) 
 + 
     
Efficiency 
Cull et al 
(2011) 
Negative  
Cull et al. 
(2007) 
Negative 
      
Age (yrs) 
Cull et al 
(2011) 
Insignifican
t 
Cull et al 
(2007) 
+ 
Mersland and 
Strøm, (2009), 
Insignificant 
     
Credit risk  
Mersland 
and Strøm, 
(2009), 
Insignifican
t 
       
Lending  
methodology 
 
Cull et al 
(2011) 
Insignifican
t 
Mersland and 
Strøm, (2009), 
Insignificant 
Cull et al 
(2007) 
Insignifiant 
     
Regulated  Cull et al 
(2011) 
Negative  
Mersland and 
Strøm, (2009), 
Insignificant 
      
Outreach  
(Average 
loan size)18 
Cull et al 
(2007) 
Insignifiant 
       
                                                 
18 Average Loan Balance per Borrower/GNI per Capita 
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3.3. Modelling profitability: an application to microfinance 
3.3.1 Conceptual framework  
Microfinance sector is very diverse in terms of industrial organizational, with MFIs organized as 
credit cooperatives/unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), banks and non-bank 
financial institutions. This diversity makes it difficult to choose appropriate conceptual 
framework thereby complicating the analysis. For example, the overall equation linking labour 
and capital inputs into profits still proves difficult to master (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch 
2007).  
 
3.3.1.1 Design of the model  
Microfinance industry is characterized by a different production function to that of conventional 
profit seeking retail banks or any other corporate entity. MFI is a unique type of a financial 
institution with risk and return characteristics different from that of traditional banks. While retail 
profit seeking banks loans are characterized by large sizes, large markets, long maturities, 
microfinance receivables are uncollateralized and with a short term maturity. Moreover, MFIs 
also have a double bottom line mission of reducing poverty while at the same time maximizing 
firm value. It is therefore plausible that there are additional factors that impact on MFI 
profitability in addition to bank level specifics such as measures of outreach.  
To empirically ascertain significant determinants of microfinance profitability in Africa, a 
multivariate linear regression model has been predicted. While we have not specified any test to 
support using the linear function, it is evident that the linear functional form is widely used in the 
literature and produces good results; see for example Mersland and Strøm, (2009), Marcucci and 
Quagliariello (2008), Athanasoglou et al (2006; 2008), Kasimodiou (2008), Kosmidou et al. 
(2005), Hsiu-Ling et al (2007), Pasiourasa and Kosmidou (2007), Goddard et al. (2004a) 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000), Bourke (1989), and Molyneux and Thornton (1992), who 
use linear models to estimate the impact of various factors that may impact on financial 
institution profitability. 
 
3.3.1.2 Functional form of the equation 
In an effort to develop an empirical model, we recognize that it is important to follow the 
principle of parsimony and try to find the simplest model that best fits our data. Inorder to design 
an appropriate regression model, it is imperative that we begin with a base specification which 
rely on theory and then add or drop variables based on adjusted R2 and t-statistics. To frame our 
empirical analysis, the subsequent regression analysis starts from the following basic linear 
equation19:   
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Where is the profitability of MFI i located in country c, at time t, with i=1, . . .,N,    t=1, . . 
.,T; c=1,…,C,; α is the regression constant, is a vector of MFI-specific characteristics (j) of 
MFI i in country c during the period t which vary across time and MFIs;  is a vector of 
macroeconomic variables (m) in country c during the period t;  is a vector of institutional 
development indicators (n) in country c during the period t and
ictΠ
j
ictΧ
m
ctΧ
n
ctΧ
itc itci μυε += is the disturbance, 
with iυ  the unobserved MFI-specific effect/heterogeneity across MFIs, which could be very large 
given the  differences in corporate governance and itcμ the idiosyncratic error. This is a one-way 
error component regression model20, where  and independent of .  )2υσ,0(IIN~υi ),0( 2μσIIN~μ it
                                                 
19 This linearity assumption is however not binding. Bourke (1989), for instance suggests that any functional form of bank profitability is 
qualitatively analogous to the linear. 
20 The work horse for unbalanced panel data applications is the one-way error component regression model (see Baltagi and Song 2006) 
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Due to the significant differences that exist across Africa microfinance industry, we test for 
potential cross-country effects. Additionally, it is possible that, within the eleven years time 
frame of our analysis, certain developments might have taken place and therefore time effects 
may be present in the error component of the model. We contend that failure to account for these 
two effects is likely to bias our estimates. We test for country and time effects by including time 
and country specific dummies, respectively, in equation (3.1). The econometric model is 
therefore expanded as follows, 
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Where D denotes the country-specific dummy variables and μγυε ++= is the disturbance; 
tγ is the unobservable time effects, iυ is the unobserved complete set of individual MFI-specific 
effect and which controls for all cross-sectional (or ‘between MFIs’), and ictμ is the idiosyncratic 
error. We test for country and time hypotheses separately as well as jointly, by 
H0: 2γ = 3γ =……= Tγ =0 and present the results in Table 2 of Appendix B. The Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) tests show that for Africa microfinance industry, both country and time specific 
dummy variables are insignificant. We experimented with many country dummies and it turned 
out that none was significant. We therefore neither included year-specific dummy variables nor 
country specific dummies. Hence, we proceeded with the estimation of the following 
specification, 
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In our analysis it is important to delineate various concepts both at MFI-specific, 
institutional and at macroeconomic levels. It is not easy to design a single model that completely 
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describes MFI performance. We therefore test different specifications of the baseline model in 
order to avoid the risk of mis-specifying the functional form of the relationship.  
 
3.3.1.3 MFI-specific determinants 
These can be classified into either intangible or tangible. Intangible MFI-specific factors are hard 
to account for. A good example is the quality of managerial decisions which is closely related to 
corporate governance. For the purpose of this chapter, we consider tangible factors.  
We use the variable size to capture economies or diseconomies of scale in the market. 
Seminal work on modern intermediation theory focusing on the role of financial intermediaries 
when borrowers and lenders are asymmetrically informed include Diamond (1984), 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Williamson (1986) and 
subsequently Allen (1990). This body of theory predicts economies of scale in the financial 
intermediation process. If larger MFIs have a greater control of the domestic market, and operate 
in a non-competitive environment, lending rates may remain high while deposit rates for larger 
institutions remain lower because they are perceived to be safer. Thus larger MFIs may enjoy 
higher profits. This implies therefore that, large size may result in economies of scale that will 
reduce the cost of gathering and processing information. Put differently, a large financial 
institution can contract with a large number of borrowers which results in diversification which 
hitherto reduces the ex ante expected cost of overcoming information asymmetries21. This results 
in cost savings which are realized whether or not failure actually occurs22. Empirical evidence is 
 
21 In many of these models it is assumed that borrowers, but not lenders, costlessly observe investment return realizations. Uncertainty about 
return realizations is undesirable and bad (failure) realizations trigger costly information production. However, if a large number of investments 
are made by a single financial intermediary, pooled risk is reduced or eliminated, and so is the frequency of costly failure states. 
22 Modern intermediation theory therefore makes two related predictions about size of the financial intermediary-large financial institutions are 
less likely to fail and are more cost efficient than small firms. The counter argument is that size could have a negative impact when banks become 
extremely large-due to bureaucratic and other reasons exhibiting a non linear relationship between size and performance. 
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mixed (see Table 3.1). We therefore predict an indeterminate relationship between size and 
profitability of a microfinance institution. 
Age is introduced in the model to capture learning effects. A vast amount of research 
considers older firms to be more experienced and can therefore enjoy higher performance (see for 
example Lumpkin, et al, 2001). Rebuttals suggests that older firms are prone to inertia, are more 
bureaucratic and are less receptive to entrepreneurial orientation; thus, they are unlikely to have 
the flexibility to make rapid adjustments to changing circumstances which cause poor 
performance and decline (Dunne and Hughes 1994; Boeker 1997; Szulanski 1996; Park, and Luo 
2001).  
An excessively high capital-assets ratio (CAP) could signify that MFI is operating over-
cautiously and ignoring profitable investment opportunities. On the contrary, the cost of 
insurance against bankruptcy may be high for a MFI with a low capital-assets ratio, suggesting a 
positive relationship between the capital-assets ratio and performance (Berger, 1995). First, 
capital can be considered a cushion to raise the share of risky assets, such as loans. Even if 
regulatory capital represents a binding restriction on MFIs, and is perceived as a cost, we 
nevertheless expect a positive relationship since MFIs may pass some of the regulatory cost to 
their clients. Second, any firm with sufficient capital borrows less to support a given level of 
assets. Empirical evidence supporting this argument includes García-Herrero et al. (2009), 
Kosmidou (2008), Athanasoglou, et al. (2008), Athanasoglou et al (2006), Boubakri, et al. 
(2005). We therefore predict a positive association between level of capitalization and MFI 
profitability. 
Closely related to capital is the gearing ratio which merely defines the source of business 
finance to boost financial performance. High proportion of fixed interest capital to equity would 
imply that MFIs are highly geared and therefore risks becoming insolvent. It may also imply that 
MFIs may be able to better deal with moral hazard and adverse selection, enhancing their ability 
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to deal with risk (Kyereboah-Coleman 2007). We therefore postulate a positive relationship 
between gearing ratio and profitability.  
The arguments in the literature with respect to credit risk are well known. Poor asset quality 
should reduce profitability in as far as it limits the MFIs’s pool of loanable resources. Changes in 
credit risk may also reflect changes in the health of MFI’s loan portfolio which may affect the 
performance of the institution (see Derban, Binner and Mullineux 2005; Cooper et al., 2003; 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga 2000). Consistent with theory, Miller and Noulas (1997) postulate 
that the more the risk exposure or the higher the accumulation of outstanding loans and therefore 
lower the profitability. We thus expect a negative relationship between portfolio at risk and MFI 
profitability. 
Efficiency in expenses management should ensure a more effective use of MFIs loanable 
resources, which may enhance profitability. Higher ratios of operating expenses to gross loan 
portfolio imply a less efficient management. Empirical evidence points to the fact that providing 
microfinance is a costly business perhaps due to high transaction and information costs (Hermes 
and Lensink, 2007; Gonzalez, 2007). Because the administrative costs per dollar lent are much 
higher for small loans than for large ones; to maintain the same level of profitability, the interest 
rates necessary to cover all costs including costs of funds and loan losses are much higher for 
MFI loans than for conventional bank loans (de Mel et. al., 2009b; Cull, McKenzie and Woodruff 
2007). Efficiency may also be influenced by corporate governance as evidenced by Mersland and 
Strøm, (2009), Mersland (2009a) and Gutiérrez-Nieto, et al (2009). Thus, cost decisions of MFI 
management are instrumental in influencing the performance. We therefore predict a negative 
association between inefficiency and profitability. 
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3.3.1.4 Macroeconomic environment 
A sound investment climate requires sufficient macroeconomic stability before microeconomic 
policies can gain much grip. Credit risk, for example, is influenced by economic growth, which 
affects the borrower’s repayment ability and the value of collateral. Whether inflation affects 
financial institution’s profitability will largely depend on whether inflation expectations are 
anticipated 23 or otherwise (Revell, 1979).  An unanticipated inflation lowers real rates of return 
for an MFI, and may cause it to react by building conservatively large inflation premia into 
interest rates. Similarly, inflation may impact on MFI's cost of funds. Borrowers’ incentives for 
delay and default can also be affected. Ahlin et al (2011) finds that MFIs cover costs better when 
macroeconomic growth is higher, partly due to lower default rates and operating costs. They find 
that MFIs appear to cope reasonably well with inflation, by raising rates. Krauss and Ingo (2009) 
find a significant exposure of MFI performance to changes in the Gross Domestic Product while 
Gonzalez (2007) concludes that macroeconomic developments do not influence MFIs in a 
significant manner. This evidence remains contestable. 
 
3.3.1.5 Institutions development  
Corruption, when endemic and deeply rooted, has significant adverse effects on an economy. 
Corruption destroys firms by promoting bad management, significantly raising the costs of doing 
business, increasing the risk and uncertainties of doing business; discouraging and reducing 
investment in general and in particular capital investment (Ng, 2006). Rent seeking distorts the 
allocation of talent away from entrepreneurship and innovation, thereby reducing growth (Aidt, 
2003). Competing arguments for corruption has been advocated by Ehrlich and Lui (1999) who 
 
23 Put differently, the impact depends on whether MFIs’ wages and other operating expenses increase at a faster rate than inflation. When 
inflation rate is fully anticipated the financial intermediary can appropriately adjust interest rates in order to increase their revenues faster than the 
costs and realize higher profits. However when unanticipated the financial intermediary may be slow in adjusting the interest rates, which results 
in a faster increase in costs than revenues with consequences of a negative impact on profitability. 
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point out, that corruption by itself need not impose a net social cost since it involves transfer 
payments from bribe payers to bureaucrats. Moreover, bribes can ameliorate the deadweight cost 
of government intervention by directing scarce resources towards higher bidders (Lui, 1985). 
Seminal theoretical work suggests that corruption might enhance commerce, by reducing 
transaction cost and lowers the cost of capital (see Lui, 1985; Kaufmann and Wei, 1999). We 
therefore postulate a negative relationship between corruption and return on MFI investments. 
The owner of a property right to an asset can decide upon its use, to receive the income 
from it and can transfer or exchange the asset, i.e. he has the control rights to the asset and has the 
right to the residual returns, as long as he obeys legal and social norms (Jansson 2008). The 
regulator may for example,  put constraints on prices which can affect the strategy of the firm 
particularly if the prices were calculated as a sum of costs plus a fair rate of return (Kim, and 
Mahoney 2005). The more certain the legal protection of property, the better the investment 
climate. Similarly, the higher the probability of government expropriation of property, the worse 
the investment climate24 (World Bank 2005). We therefore postulate a positive relationship 
between strong property rights and MFI performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 In an environment in which property rights are insecure, opportunism is possible, and the identification of new business opportunities is costly. 
There is then no incentive to be cost efficient as the price covers costs. 
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3.4. Data set, description and measurement  
Data description 
Given the abundance of theories and predictions, it is natural to turn to data in an attempt to 
disentangle and assess predicted effects. We use unbalanced dataset in this chapter. Incomplete 
panels are more likely to be the norm in typical MFI performance empirical settings since some 
MFIs may have started recording data later than others, while others may have stopped recording 
data altogether. Additionally some MFIs may have dropped out of the market while new entrants 
may have emerged over the sample period observed (Baltagi and Song 2006). 
This chapter examines the profitability of 210 MFIs across 31 developing economies in 
Sub-Sahara Africa for the period 1997-2007 based on their financial accounts. These spans across 
four different regions that include West (81), East (63), Central (23) and South Africa (43) 
totalling 2,310 observations (see Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix B for sample representation and 
country distribution). The dataset was assembled from three sources the principal being the MIX 
Market database, World Development Indicators (WDI) and the Heritage Foundation 
It is a publicly available website that contains information on more than 1800 MFIs, more 
than 100 investors (e.g. Calvert Foundation), and nearly 200 partners (umbrella organizations that 
facilitate multiple MFIs’ operations)25. MixMarket groups MFI’s into five categories―one 
through five-stars, based on amount and reliability of information reported. We restricted our 
dataset to include only three-five star MFIs whose data is reasonably reliable. Rather than taking 
MFIs statement of performance at face value, these data have been adjusted to account for 
subsidies which render the data valuable.  
Our initial sample comprised of 295 MFIs all of which had three diamond rating and above. 
85 MFIs were eliminated notably due to substantial missing information on one or more of the 
key variables. With regard to MFI types, the breakdown is as follows: 9 “credit unions", 10 
 
25 This information is taken from the mixmarket.org website during June/July 2010  
“banks”, 39 “non-bank financial institutions” and 52 “non-governmental organizations (NGO)"s. 
We exclude rural banks category because it does not have enough observations to provide 
significant within-category variation. Finally, we restrict the sample to MFI’s whose fiscal year 
corresponds to the calendar year, for comparability with the annual country-level macroeconomic 
and institutional data. All results should be viewed in this light.  
We merge the MFI level dataset with country-level data from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) and institutional development indices from the Heritage Foundation. From 
WDI we obtain annual rate of inflation and real GNI per capita levels expressed in current U.S. 
dollars, for each of the countries and years corresponding to MFI’s in the dataset. These are our 
focal measures of the macroeconomic environment, property rights and corruption indices.  
 
Definition and Measurement of the variables 
Given that the MFI data are collected from MIX Market, we use the MIX Market definitions of 
key variables. Capital (CAP) is the ratio of equity capital to total assets26. Gearing ratio (GR) 
defines the MFI capital structure which is measured by the ratio of debt and debt-like instruments 
to capitalization namely Short Term Debt + Long Term Debt divided by total shareholders' equity 
or simply the Debt/Equity ratio.  
To capture the relationship between MFI size (S) and profitability while also accounting for 
potential nonlinearities-due to possible diseconomies of scale as MFIs become too big, we use the 
logarithm of real MFIs’ total assets in period for each MFI. The squared size (S2) captures the 
possible non-linear relationship. If coefficient of the squared size variable turns out to be negative 
but statistically non-significant, this would provide evidence that MFIs in Africa enjoy enough 
market power to be able to pass costs on to clients. We observe that since the dependent variable 
t
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26 While Basel II addresses fewer concepts than the Standards in terms of direct application to MFI financial management, internal controls, and 
management reporting, it does outline three “pillars” that are relevant to microfinance 
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in the models (ROA) were deflated by total assets it would be appropriate to log total assets 
before including it in the models. We denote age (Ag) by the number of years MFI has been in 
operation in order to capture learning effect in MFI performance. 
The credit risk exposure (CR) is measured by the sum of the level of loans past due 30 days 
or more and still accruing interest namely Portfolio at Risk (PAR-30). In robustness tests we 
include further measures of credit risk by estimating various econometric specifications for three 
additional different explanatory variables; the write-off ratio (WOR) which is the value of loans 
written off during the year as uncollectible, as a percentage of average gross loan portfolio over 
the year27. An additional measure of credit risk is the Risk Coverage Ratio (RC) which is 
measured as the Adjusted Impairment Loss Allowance/PAR>30 Days and finally Loan Loss 
Reserve Ratio (LLR). This is measured as the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans or simply 
put as Loan loss reserve/Value of loans outstanding. It is an indicator of how much of the gross 
loan portfolio has been provided for but not charged off. It is important to note that only WOR 
and LLR are measures of default, while PAR is a measure of risk of default.  
Efficiency (EFF) in the management of operating expenses: The total MFI costs (net of 
interest payments) can be split into operating and other expenses (such as taxes, depreciation etc).   
We regard operating expenses as the only direct outcome of MFI management. We thus measure 
efficiency in expenses management by the ratio of Adjusted Operating Expense/Adjusted 
Average Gross Loan Portfolio and in robustness tests, we use Cost per Borrower (CB).  
We use two proxies for the macroeconomic environment; inflation and real GNI per capita 
growth. We use growth of GNI per capita28 at current US Dollars (GNI) to control for different 
levels of economic development in each country and year. Arguably, this is the most informative 
single indicator of progress in economic development, while inflation expectation is measured at 
 
27 It’s a form of serious default involving final non-repayment, measured as the value of loans written-off/Adjusted Average Gross Loan 
Portfolio. 
28 Baltagi and Song 2006)a number of macroeconomic variables (such as GDP, the unemployment rate and interest rate differentials). 
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time t-1 annual % change of the GDP deflator at market prices for each country where the MFI is 
located for each year.  
This study has also factored in the impact on performance by institutions development. 
Property rights (PR) Index ranges from 10 where private property is rarely protected to 100 
where private property is guaranteed. Put differently, it measures the extent to which a country’s 
laws protect private property and the extent to which government enforces those laws. Freedom 
from corruption is a quantitative measure that is derived from Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). This measures the level of corruption in 179 countries. It is 
based on a 10-point scale where a score of 10 indicates little corruption and a score of 0 indicates 
a corrupt government.  
 
Dependent variables 
MFI performance studies rely on accounting and profit or cost efficiency indicators based on the 
efficiency and productivity analysis. In the present study, we use accounting-based profitability 
indicators. The dependent variable is Return on Assets which is a measure of ex-post MFI profits. 
In order to test the robustness of our results we also use Return on Equity (ROE).  
(a) Return on Assets (%) = adjusted net operating income-taxes/adjusted average total assets 
(b) Return on Equity (%) =adjusted net operating income-taxes/adjusted average total equity 
These two variables make it possible for us to compare data across countries and through 
time. ROA reflects the ability of MFIs’ management to generate profits from MFIs assets, 
although it may be biased due to off balance-sheet activities.  It can however be argued that such 
activities may be negligible in Africa MFIs, while the risk associated with leverage is likely to be 
substantial. This is despite the institutional innovations that MFIs embrace in order to compensate 
for informational asymmetries. ROE captures the return on shareholders equity. MFIs with lower 
leverage/higher equity reports higher ROA and lower ROE. Since an analysis of ROE disregards 
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the risks associated with high leverage and financial leverage is often determined by regulation, 
ROA emerges as our key ratio for the evaluation of MFI profitability. Moreover, ROA is more 
appropriate since MFI equity in Africa is abnormally low (Lafourcade, et al 2006) and ROA is a 
more comprehensive measure of profitability. It is also widely used in the literature, which allows 
comparison with previous studies. Debt/equity levels also differ considerably between MFIs. The 
variables of interest, source of data and the predicted coefficient signs are summarized in Table 
3.2 
Table 3.2: Summary of variables and measurement 
Variable Notation  Measure Predicted 
effect 
Source of data 
Dependent variable 
Return on assets  ROA  Net profits after taxes/Assets   The MIX 
Return on equity  ROE Net profits after tax/Equity  
Determinants 
MFI-specific     
Capital  CAP Equity/Assets Positive  The MIX 
Credit risk   
Portfolio at Risk PAR-30 Outstanding balance, portfolio 
overdue> 30 Days + renegotiated 
portfolio/Adjusted Gross Loan 
Portfolio 
Negative  The MIX 
Write off Ratio WOR Value of loans written-off/Adjusted 
Average Gross Loan Portfolio 
Loan Loss Reserve 
Ratio 
LLR Loan loss reserve/Value of loans 
outstanding 
Risk Coverage Ratio RC Adjusted Impairment Loss 
Allowance/PAR > 30 Days 
Operational efficiency    
Efficiency  EFF Adjusted Operating Expense/Adjusted 
Average Gross Loan Portfolio 
Negative  The MIX 
 
Cost per Borrower CB Adjusted Operating Expense/Adjusted 
Average Number of Active Borrowers.  
Other factors   
Loan size29  LS Adjusted Average Loan Balance per 
Borrower/GNI per Capita 
Positive  
Gearing  GR Debt/equity ratio Negative  
Log Age Ag Log of Age of the MFI in years  Indeterminate  
Log Age2  Ag2  Log of Age2 of the MFI in years Indeterminate 
Log Size  S  Log of total assets  and (total assets)2 in 
period t 
Indeterminate 
Log Size2 S2 Log of total assets2 in period t Indeterminate 
Institutional development   
                                                 
29 This is also a proxy for depth of outreach 
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Property rights PR Composite Index ranging from 10 
(Private property is rarely protected) to 
100 (Private property is guaranteed by 
the government) 
Positive  Heritage 
Foundation 
Freedom from 
corruption 
COR Composite Index 10-point scale 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 
which a score of 100 indicates very 
little corruption and a score of 0 
indicates a very corrupt government 
Macroeconomic environment    
Inflation  
Expectations 
INF Annual % change of the GDP deflator 
in period t-1 
Indeterminate World Bank 
(WDI) 
Per capita Income GNI  GNI per capita, Atlas method (current 
US$) 
Positive  
 
3.5. Empirical methodology 
3.5.1 Estimation and testing procedures 
The parameters of model (3.3) are estimated using unbalanced panel data regression. This is 
because it contains MFIs entering or leaving the market during the sample period which is more 
likely to be the case in cross country’s MFIs profitability studies. To avoid the possibility of 
obtaining spurious correlations, we have ensured that all the variables incorporated into the 
empirical model are clearly established in the literature, to impact on bank profitability. That 
notwithstanding, our dataset suffers from several problems that dictate the choice of estimation 
procedure. First, we cannot assume homoskedastic errors. Since most of the exogenous variables 
are time variant though constant across MFIs, the estimated model may be prone to 
heteroscedasticity where the residual variance differs across time periods.  
In order to investigate whether there is evidence of heteroscedasticity in the residual 
variance, based on Breusch-Pagan test we calculate the Lagrange multiplier (LM) and compare 
the relevant statistic of the model with the critical chi-square value χ2 0.005,10= 25.182. Values 
below this would reject the null hypothesis of heteroscedastic residual variance. We thus estimate 
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model (3.3) using White’s transformation30 to control cross-section heteroscedasticity of the 
variables. Second, outliers can also bias regression slopes (Baltagi 2008). To check for outliers, 
we exclude observations that have both extremely high residuals and high leverage31 on the 
regression results. To the extent that these problems are present and not corrected, the analysis of 
panel data may actually produce incorrect analytic results thereby placing the validity of the 
inferences drawn from this particular study at stake (Baltagi 2008; Certo and Semadeni 2006).  
Empirical work on determinants of MFI’s profitability can also suffer from two sources of 
inconsistency: omitted variables and endogeneity problem. Combining cross-section and time-
series data is useful for three main reasons. First, since MFIs profitability may vary over time, it 
is necessary to use panel methodology because the time-series dimension of our variables of 
interest provides a wealth of information ignored in cross-sectional studies. Second, the use of 
panel data increases the sample size and the degree of freedom, which is particularly important 
when a relatively large number of regressors are used. Third, panel data takes into consideration 
potential endogeneity of the regressors, while at the same time controlling for firm-specific 
effects which cross-section regressions fails to take into account (Baltagi, 2008). If it appears 
then that there is correlation between the MFI and/or time effects and the exogenous variables, 
then and in order to solve for the endogeneity problem, the MFI and time effects should be 
estimated as dummy variables.  
Advantages of panel over time series data include the possibility that underlying 
microeconomic dynamics may be confounded by aggregation biases, while the scope that panel 
data offers to examine heterogenity in adjustment dynamics between different types of firms is 
immense. Although, these advantages can be realized with repeated cross-section, panel data 
 
30 The use of a White heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimator with ordinary least squares estimation in fixed effects models can yield 
standard errors robust to unequal variance along the predicted line (Greene, 2008; Wooldridge, 2002). Such standard errors are able to account for 
contemporaneous correlation, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation when the data set contains at least 15 time periods. 
31 The leverage of an observation is a multivariate measure of the distance of its X values from the means in the sample. 
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allows more of the variation in the micro data to be used in construction of parameter estimates as 
well as allowing the use of relatively simple econometric techniques (Baltagi, 2008). Estimation 
bias is therefore lower with panel data estimation than would have been the case with either time-
series or cross-sectional data, while multicollinearity is less of a problem. Moreover, panel data 
circumvents errors in model specification, with improved efficiency of estimation.  
If we were to undertake regression analysis on the panel data using the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method, we would have ignored the differences between MFIs, and this would 
have made it impossible to determine the direction of error, giving rise to heterogeneity bias. We 
therefore felt that the use of fixed effects and random effects model would be more appropriate. 
Previous studies that have used least squares methods of either FE or RE models include Bourke 
(1989), Naceur and Goaied (2001), Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999), Hsiu-Ling et al (2007), Pasiourasa and Kosmidou (2007) and Flamini et al 
(2009). 
For the purpose of estimation and testing we proceeded as follows. First, we test for non-
stationarity using the Fisher test which is based on combining the p-values of the test-statistic for 
a unit root in each MFI32. Based on the p-values of individual unit root tests, Fisher's test assumes 
that all series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis against the alternative (Greene 2008). 
Maddala and Wu (1999) contend that not only does this test perform better than other tests for 
unit roots in panel data, but it also has the advantage that it does not require a balanced panel, as 
most tests do. Depending on the outcome of the panel unit root test, we estimate the model 
excluding the non-stationary variables, especially if the excluded variables do not affect the 
model’s performance. 
 
32 The most disseminated results were developed by Levin and Lin (1993) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) while surveys on the topic appear in 
Banerjee (1999) and Maddala and Wu (1999). 
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The second issue we have to contend with is the choice between a Fixed Effect (FE) and a 
Random Effect model (RE). Under a FE model the vi’s are considered fixed parameters to be 
estimated. Here we transform the dependent and explanatory variables and then apply OLS to the 
transformed data to obtain the within estimator. FE model transforms the estimating equation so 
as to get rid of the fixed effects (Baltagi, 2008). Under a RE model the vi’s are assumed to be 
random and the estimation method is generalized least squares (GLS). GLS uses cross-section 
weights for every observed MFI i at time t, and the true variance components, in order to produce 
a matrix-weighted average of the within and the between which is obtained by regressing the 
cross section averages across time estimators (Baltagi, 2008; Greene, 2008). We perform the 
traditional Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) which is identical asymptotically to the Wooldridge 
(2002) test where we first estimate the fixed effects model, save the coefficients and compare 
them with the results of the random affects model. In the event that we obtain Hausman test value 
which is larger than the critical chi-square, then the FE estimator is the appropriate choice 
(Hausman, 1978). 
There is strong evidence that our specification follows a FE model as the Hausman test 
indicates. The relevant F-statistic is significant at the 1% level (F (181, 486) =4.47). Fixed effects 
approach is further reinforced by the absence of significant heteroscedasticity in the residuals 
from our estimated model. Therefore, under the null hypothesis, the two estimates differ 
systematically as indicated by the p-values in Table 3.3. This means that the coefficients of 
interest are statistically different in the two estimations; hence we reject the random effects 
solution both on substantive and statistical grounds.   
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Table 3.3: Hausman fixed random specification test    
ROA Notation                      Coefficients  
Fixed Effects (b) Random Effects (B) Difference (b-B) 
Log age     Ag -0.0127 -0.0042 -0.0086 
Log size    S 0.0243 0.0111 0.0132 
Capital CAP 0.0614 0.0472 0.0142 
Gearing ratio GR 0.0137 0.0167 -0.0030 
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.0106 -0.0112 0.0006 
Efficiency   EFF -0.1372 -0.0969 -0.0403 
Loan size LS 0.0021    0.0031          -0.0009 
GNI per capita  GNI -0.0127 0.0003 0.0011 
Inflation 
expectations 
INF 0.0243 0.0002 0.0017 
Property rights PR 0.0014 -0.0042 -0.0086 
Freedom from 
corruption 
COR 0.0019 0.0111 0.0132 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic Chi2 (10) = (b-B)'[S^ (-1)] (b-B), S = (S_fe-S_re) =71.90 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Finally, we performed sensitivity tests in order to develop robust empirical results for the 
empirical model. Accordingly, if the coefficients are not sensitive to the inclusion of different 
variables, then the variables of interest can robustly affect the dependent variable. We estimate 
the same linear specification both with and without the macroeconomic control variables and 
institutional factors. The joint impact of these additional variables is assessed by the 
improvement in the overall explanatory power of the model. Only the robust results of the 
empirical model are presented in this chapter. 
 
3.5.2 Univariate analysis 
Table 3.4 presents descriptive statistics. There is a wide variation in performance across MFIs. 
The means and standard deviation for ROA and ROE are all within the expected range but the 
minimum and maximum values suggest a wide range for each variable. It is evident from the 
summary statistics that there is a clear difference among MFIs. The standard deviations of most 
variables are quite large. Consistent with Balkenhol (2007), most MFIs in Africa post negative 
average returns on assets. ROA varies from 32% to negative 86%. Similarly, ROE varies from 
over 100% to negative 86%, prompting the use of robust regression methods as a check on 
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robustness to outliers. For the whole region the average period ROA stands at -0.1 per cent, while 
the average ROE is 0.1 per cent which perhaps is an indication that MFIs in Africa earn lower 
average financial revenues, which is consistent with low profitability as reported in Table 1.2 (see 
also Figure 2 and Table 9 in Appendix A for a global comparison). The operational inefficiency 
is also quite high at 43%. Indeed relative to other regions, the average cost per borrower among 
Africa MFIs is $ 72, which is higher than MFIs in other global regions (Lafourcade, et al 2006). 
Table 3.4: Descriptive and summary statistics 
Variable  Notation Obs  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
Return on assets  ROA 1058 -0.0128 0.000 0.0950 -0.8660 0.3240 
Return on equity  ROE 899 0.0140 0.000 0.2202 -0.8630 1.0760 
Age  AG 1143 9.2 8 6.2 0 40 
Capital  CAP 1145 0.3800 0.3258 
 
0.3428 -1.366 1.000 
Gearing  GR 953 0.6906 1.182 1.5811 0 9.09 
Efficiency EFF 899 0.4395 0.305 0.5739 0 12.25 
Log of cost per 
borrower  
CB 884 4.2749 4.299 1.1758 0.6931  8.9569 
Portfolio at Risk PAR 1145 0.0655 0.028 0.1103 0 1.05 
Write off Ratio WOR 1129 1.2343 0.00 2.7280 -1.32 20.59 
Loan Loss Reserve 
ratio 
LLR 906 0.9618 0.025 1.6369 0 16.49 | 
Risk Coverage 
Ratio 
RC 1111 0.5962 0.385 0.8356 0 9.64 
Loan size  LS 1143 0.9617 0.468 
 
1.6369 0 16.49 
Log Size  S 1140 14.485 14.36 1.9620 7.102 20.54 
Lagged Inflation 
rate 
INF 2066 0.0346 0.000 0.0628 -0.1390 0.3820 
Per capita income GNI 906 0.0854 0.087 
 
0.0938 -0.1880   0.2930 
Property rights PR 2211 39.47 30.00 12.78 10 70 
Freedom from 
corruption 
COR 2211 25.66 26.0 11.42 7 57 
This Table presents the summary statistics. A detailed description of the definition and sources of the variables is 
given in Table 3.2. 
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We anticipate that our regression may give us the coefficients that best describe the dataset, 
but the independent variables may not have a good p-value if multicollinearity is present. We 
therefore perform correlation test to investigate whether there is perfect linear combination 
among variables. Table 3.5 shows that most of the correlations among variables of interest are 
significant although the level of correlation is very low. Our primary concern though is whether 
multicollinearity is strong enough to invalidate the simultaneous inclusion of the explanatory 
variables in regressions. We contend that multicollinearity could only be a problem if the 
correlation coefficient is above 0.70 (Baltagi 2008; Kennedy 2008), which is not the case with 
our variables. Moreover, since panel data estimation gives more degrees of freedom, the 
multicollinearity problem is further reduced (Hsiao, 2003).  
With the exception of operating efficiency which is significantly correlated with cost per 
borrower (0.59) all other pair wise correlations between the regressors are less than 0.50. Most 
notably, profitability measures (ROA, ROE) are significantly positively correlated, but not 
perfect (at 0.65). Interestingly, age, MFI size, gearing ratio, operating efficiency, and credit risk 
are significantly correlated with performance which is an indication that profitable MFIs tend to 
be large and older, rely more on debt financing and are more efficient. Age in particular may 
have nothing to do with learning effect but rather survivorship bias which is exemplified by 
retaining successful borrowers instead of graduating them into mainstream banks. This would in 
essence release capital that could be borrowed by other households. Dropouts or survivorship 
bias may also imply that borrowers leave because they are doing so well or they are in trouble 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). It is likely that those who remain behind have the positive 
attributes of survivors, while the new borrowers have yet to be tested. Variables that proxies the 
quality of the institutions are not significantly correlated with return on assets. We do not detect 
any significant bivariate correlations relating the macroeconomic environment and MFI 
performance.  
84
 
The significant correlation between performance and gearing ratio is an indication that 
perhaps more debt relative to equity is used to finance microfinance activities and that long term 
borrowings impact positively on profitability by accelerating MFIs growth than it would have 
been without debt financing. Whereas these summary statistics presented in both Tables 3.4 and 
3.5 give us a clue of what might influence profitability of MFIs, a more precise investigation of 
the determinants of MFI profitability and the relative contribution of each factor can only be 
uncovered by using multivariate panel regression techniques. Panel regression analysis allows us 
to investigate the strength of these correlations after controlling for other relevant covariates.  
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Table 3.5: Correlation matrix 
 ROA ROE AG S CAP GR EFF CB PAR LLR RC WOR LS INF GNI PR COR 
ROA 1.000 
1058 
                
ROE .653** 
992 
1.000 
995 
               
AG .095** 
1055 
.120** 
992 
1.000 
1143 
              
S .121** 
1056 
.171** 
993 
.360** 
1141 
1.000*
* 
1144 
             
CAP -.016 
1058 
-.155** 
995 
-.166** 
1142 
-.112** 
1143 
1.000 
1145 
            
GR .130** 
876 
.200** 
849 
.163** 
950 
.153** 
952 
-.461** 
952 
1.000 
953 
           
EFF -.312** 
865 
-.134** 
804 
-.065* 
897 
.008 
899 
.062 
899 
-.211** 
754 
1.000 
899 
          
CB -.066* 
853 
.070* 
792 
.075* 
889 
.127** 
891 
-.178** 
891 
.043 
744 
.589** 
871 
1.000 
891 
         
PAR -.075** 
1057 
-.059 
994 
.060* 
1141 
.005 
1142 
-.081** 
1143 
-.004 
951 
.032 
898 
-.008 
890 
1.000 
1145 
        
LLR -.073* 
1057 
-.070* 
994 
.064* 
1142 
.022 
1143 
-.019 
1144 
-.021 
952 
.230** 
899 
.209** 
891 
.362** 
1144 
1.000 
1146 
       
RC -.048 
1027 
-.031 
965 
-.008 
1108 
-.005 
1109 
.023 
1110 
-.015 
921 
.097** 
873 
-.007 
865 
-.059* 
1110 
.039 
1110 
1.000 
1111 
      
WOR -.129** 
1044 
-.093** 
982 
.101** 
1125 
.015 
1126 
-.097** 
1127 
.013 
940 
.152** 
886 
.031 
875 
.147** 
1128 
.002 
1128 
.008 
1094 
1.000 
1129 
     
LS 
0.108*
* 
1091 
0.119*
* 
1086 
0.106*
* 
1144 
0.003 
1145 
-
0.117*
* 
1146 
0.097*
* 
954 
-0.098 
898 
0.227*
* 
890 
-0.026 
1146 
-0.043 
1146 
-0.075* 
1112 
0.014 
1130 
1.000 
1147 
    
INF .044 
1033 
.073* 
973 
.075** 
1109 
-.033 
1110 
.067* 
1111 
.005 
923 
.102** 
876 
-.027 
869 
.114** 
1111 
.062* 
1111 
.093** 
1078 
.090** 
1096 
-0.040 
1147 
1.000 
2066 
   
GNI .042 
865 
.053 
807 
.092** 
904 
.045 
904 
-.044 
906 
.078* 
756 
-.054 
858 
.024 
847 
.078* 
905 
.035 
906 
.018 
881 
.069* 
892 
-0.025 
938 
.240** 
897 
1.000 
906 
  
PR -.013 
1021 
.013 
961 
.036 
1104 
.064* 
1105 
.028 
1106 
-.011 
922 
.053 
880 
.059 
865 
-.026 
1106 
.043 
1107 
-.020 
1073 
-.037 
1093 
0.038 
1106 
-.046* 
1978 
-.127** 
880 
1.000 
2211 
 
COR -.025 
1021 
.044 
961 
-.046 
1104 
.079** 
1105 
.057 
1106 
-.115** 
922 
.041 
880 
.065 
865 
.034 
1106 
.011 
1107 
-.009 
1073 
.027 
1093 
0.043 
1106 
.017 
1978 
-.090** 
880 
.391** 
2211 
1.000 
2211 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Figures beneath are the observations (N) 
Where ROA=Return on Assets; ROE=Return on Equity; AG= Age of the MFI; S= Size; CAP= Capital; GR= Gearing ratio; EFF= Operating efficiency; CB= 
Cost per borrower; PAR=Portfolio at Risk; LLR= Loan loss reserve; RC= Risk cover; WOR= Write off ratio; INF= Lagged Inflation; GNI= Growth of per capita 
income; PR=Property rights index; COR= Freedom from corruption index 
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3.5.3 Multivariate regression analysis  
Having summarised the correlates of profitability, the next set of regressions explores the 
relationship between exogenous factors and MFI profitability. We make further 
considerations regarding the approach to estimations. Using a dataset with potential 
measurement error due to poor accounting standards that is common among developing 
countries and multiple observations from the same MFI, error terms may not be identically 
and independently distributed (IID). In particular, MFI-specific errors may be correlated and 
measurement error which is likely to be higher for some of the MFIs could be driving our 
regression results. Another problem with our analysis is that we have assumed that ROA 
values were completely independent from one MFI to the other. This is unlikely to be true 
since ROA within MFI are likely to be similar to one another. To find out how the extent of 
the variability within MFI versus the extent between MFIs, we compute an intra-class 
correlation which is One-way Analysis of Variance that  works only with first and second 
moments of the data and thus will not bias estimate between and within variance components, 
regardless of the distribution of the data. Table 3.6 shows an intra-class correlation of 0.33 
which is minimal. We proceed with our estimation allowing for differences in the variance 
and standard errors due to intra-group correlation33. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 Although the coefficient estimates and standard errors are the same for the xtreg, fe and .areg approach in stata, we use the latter for  our 
estimation. The advantage with .areg approach is that it allows for differences in the average level of across MFIs in addition to adjusting the 
standard errors taking into account the specific intra-group correlation. Areg procedure, involves estimating coefficients for each of the 
covariates plus each dummy variable for MFI groups while in the xtreg, fe procedure the R2 reported is obtained by only fitting a mean 
deviated model where the effects of the groups are assumed to be fixed. So, all of the effects for the groups are simply subtracted out of the 
model  and no attempt is made to quantify their overall effect on the fit of the model leading to low R squared and standard errors due to  
larger degrees of freedom for errors. It is for this reason that the calculation of the R2 is different. 
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Table 3.6: One-way Analysis of Variance for roa: ROA 
 
Number of obs=1058 
R-squared=0.46    
 
 Source                  SS             df            MS            F      Prob > F 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Between idfirm    4.3905        209       0.0210        3.46    0.0000 
Within idfirm       5.1433        848       0.0061 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total                  9.5338047    1057      0.0090 
 
Intra-class       Asy.         
Correlation      S.E.       [95% Conf. Interval] 
         ------------------------------------------------ 
0.3286         0.0351        0.2599     0.39728 
 
Estimated SD of idfirm effect            0.0545 
Estimated SD within idfirm                0.0779 
Est. reliability of idfirm mean          0.7113 
              (Evaluated at n=5.03) 
 
We introduce a quadratic term for the MFI size and age in the profitability equations, to 
capture non-linear effects of diseconomies of scale as firms become large and learning effect. 
The quadratic form can generate inverted U-shaped patterns consistent with the prediction 
that when non linear effects become severe, then overall profitability eventually falls as both 
size and age rise. 
 
3.6. Empirical results and discussion  
The estimated equations appear to fit the panel reasonably well as indicated by the R-squared 
values which have fairly stable coefficients among the alternative models. Table 3.7 reports 
results from our basic specification using ROA as the profitability measure. The estimations 
based on ROE produce inferior results (see Table 5 in Appendix B) as suggested by the 
coefficients estimates and hence they are not reported or discussed here. The performance 
based on the ROE specification may be related to the explanation given in Section 3.4.2. The 
third specification of Table 3.7 gives our preferred model. A comparison of the first and 
second model specification allows us to distinguish between non-linear effects and the 
robustness of the MFI-specific factors to the inclusion of macroeconomic and institutional 
quality variables (see the discussion in Section 3). Although model 1 shows both age and size 
and their corresponding non-linear effects, they were nevertheless estimated separately due to 
multicollinearity. 
Interesting results appear in both significant and non-significant findings. The overall 
Wald statistic shows rejection of the hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero in all 
specifications. We comment on all regressions together. The overall explanatory power 
(measured by adjusted R2) for both models is relatively high, and is not associated with high 
correlation among some of the trended variables (e.g. INF and GNI). Dropping either of these 
variables does not make much difference to the overall results or the explanatory power. On 
the other hand, reasonably high explanatory power has also been reported on banks 
profitability studies e.g. by Kosmidou (2008), Hsiu-Ling et al (2007), Pasiourasa and 
Kosmidou (2007). One would have expected much higher values for the adjusted 2R . One 
potential explanation for the not so high values is the use of accounting data. Performance 
proxied by accounting earnings, are backward-looking and tend to be smoothed relative to the 
underlying value of the firm. Accountants spread cost and revenue over multiple periods and 
this minimizes the sensitivity to market movements or regression coefficients and market-risk 
( 2R ) for our profitability indicators. This is because market impacts are not directly reflected 
in yearly accounting results. In addition to the missing variables, the poor quality of the 
accounting data creates variation that cannot be explained by the model, which subsequently 
slightly lowers the 2R  values in our results.  
A casual inspection of the dependent variable using a simple run-sequence plot shows 
that it is stationary having removed the outliers. We also removed outliers on the explanatory 
variables. Independent cross section data on the panel adds information and this leads to a 
stronger overall signal than that of the pure time series, depending on whether there exists or 
not a serial correlation in the time series component. Since both N and T are least squares 
estimator consistent, the asymptotic bias of the within estimator vanishes to zero as ∞→T  
(Phillips and Moon 1999). 
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Table 3.7: Estimation Results Using Fixed Effects-within (dependent variable: ROA) 
                                           Variant model specifications with robust standard errors    
Variable Notation 1 2 3 
Intercept  -0.4113*** 
(-3.92) 
-0.4588*** 
(-4.11) 
-0.5912*** 
(-4.64) 
Log Size  S 0.0169* 
(1.85)   
0.0237*** 
(2.53) 
0.0243*** 
(2.57) 
Log Size2 S2 0.0084 
(0.065) 
  
Log Age  AG  0.0091 
(0.41) 
-0.0209 
(-0.90) 
-0.0127 
(-0.53) 
Log Age2 AG2 0.0046   
(0.41) 
  
Capital  CAP  0.0619*** 
(2.66) 
0.0645*** 
(3.13) 
0.0614*** 
(2.95) 
Gearing  GR  0.0104 
 (0.95) 
0.0144 
(1.53) 
0.0137 
(1.45) 
Efficiency EFF -0.1314*** 
(-12.24) 
-0.1350*** 
(-10.03) 
-0.1372*** 
(-10.57) 
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.0105*** 
(-2.46) 
-0.0112** 
(-2.40)   
-0.0106*** 
(-2.35)   
Loan size  LS 0.0021 
(0.46) 
0.0013 
(0.29) 
0.0013 
(0.29) 
Inflation expectations INF  0.0660 
(1.07) 
0.0582 
(0.93) 
Per capita incomes GNI  -0.0123 
(-0.31) 
-0.0087 
(-0.21) 
Property rights PR   0.0014*** 
(2.27) 
Freedom from corruption COR   0.0019*** 
(3.33)   
R2  0.80 0.82 0.83 
No of obs.  508 485 476 
This Table presents regression with robust standard errors results conducted to determine the determinants of 
profitability for Africa MFIs. Estimations were performed using fixed effects estimation. T-Statistics are in 
parentheses and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, ** and *** respectively. A detailed 
description of the definition and sources of the variables is given in Table 3.2 
 
Based on a panel data set of 210 microfinance institutions, what inferences can we draw 
from the regression coefficients? We find that capital adequacy has robust and significant 
positive association with MFI profitability. This is depicted by the relatively high coefficient 
of the equity to assets ratio across the specifications. This effect remains so even after the 
inclusion of the external factors. Intuitively, this is an indication that well capitalized MFIs 
are more flexible in dealing with problems arising from unexpected losses and are confronted 
with a reduced cost of funding or lower external funding. It may also suggest that MFIs may 
be capital constrained. Weak capitalisation has hampered MFI performance in Africa where 
loan portfolios has been increasing by over a billion dollars a year while provision of enough 
funding to the institutions remains a major challenge (Lafourcade, et al 2006). Compared with 
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the banks’ average capital adequacy ratio of approximately 0.13, MFIs are much less 
capitalized, since it’s more difficult to leverage the risky microfinance loan portfolios 
(Conning, 1999). This result is consistent with the banking literature as evidenced by Sufian 
and Habibullah (2009), Kosmidou et al (2008), Athanasoglou, et al. (2008), Boubakri, et al. 
(2005), Naceur and Goaied (2001), Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, (1999), and 
comprehensively discussed in Berger (1995). This evidence is however inconsistent with 
Goddard et al (2010) who in the traditional banking industry, finds lower profitability for 
banks that are highly capitalised. 
As predicted by Miller and Noulas (1997) and subsequently by Cooper et al., (2003), 
credit risk measured by the sum of the level of loans past due 30 days or more (PAR>30) and 
still accruing interest is negatively and significantly related to MFI profitability. This study 
therefore finds evidence to support the conjecture that increased exposure to credit risk is 
normally associated with lower MFI profitability. This finding is consistent with CSFI (2009) 
which identified credit risk as the biggest risk faced by the MFIs globally. It also confirms 
Athanasoglou, et al. (2008), Kosmidou et al (2008), and Boubakri, et al. (2005) in the banking 
literature but contrary to Sufian and Habibullah (2009) who evidence a positive link between 
credit risk and profitability in China. As a robustness check, we carried out additional 
regressions using alternative specifications. Specifically, we re-run the regressions using three 
other measures of credit risk that include write-off ratio (WOR), risk cover (RC) and loan loss 
reserve ratio (LLR) which all turned out to be insignificant34. Intuitively, under some 
circumstances, self-financing could be used to mitigate adverse selection related problems 
(Amitrajeet and Beladi, 2010). 
 
34 It is however worth noting that whereas portfolio at risk (PAR) is a measure of risk of default, write-off ratio (WOR) and loan loss reserve 
ratio (LLR) are measures of actual default. Given dynamic incentives that MFIs clients have to repay their loans in order to secure additional 
loans and the effectiveness of loans collections by the MFIs staff, it is conceivable that most late loans will be paid at some point. This 
perhaps explains why whereas PAR coefficient is significant, WOR and LLR are insignificant.  
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The significant result for MFI size across all regressions where the relationship is 
linear35 confirms the economies of scale hypothesis in the microfinance intermediation 
process. This basic result does not change even with the inclusion of external factors. In 
microfinance literature, these findings confirm Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Morduch (2007). It 
is also consistent with Mersland and Strøm, (2009), Kosmidou (2008), Athanasoglou et al 
(2006) and Beck et al (2005) but is inconsistent with Sufian and Habibullah (2009), Hsiu-Ling 
et al (2007), Pasiourasa and Kosmidou (2007), Kosmidou et al (2006), Bikker and Hu (2002), 
Demerguç-Kunt and Huizingha (1999) in the banking industry. It can therefore be argued that 
failure to become profitable in microfinance is partly due to lack of scale economies. Our 
finding suggests that MFIs may have to institute a dual objective of profit maximization while 
presumably pursuing a managerial goal of firm size maximisation. It could also imply that 
profitable MFIs in Africa have a greater control of the domestic market, and therefore lending 
rates may remain high while deposit rates remain lower since larger MFIs may be perceived 
to be safer. This high interest rate spread translates to and sustains higher profits margins. 
We cannot confirm Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Morduch (2007) and the general 
literature that performance of MFI improves with age. We find insignificant results in all 
cases, suggesting that the length of time a MFI has been in operation doesn’t count towards 
profitability. The theoretical foundation that new entrants into the market are better able to 
pursue new profit opportunities which translate to higher profits is not supported here. Our 
findings do not confirm Hsiu-Ling et al (2007) and Beck et al (2005) who found a negative 
and significant relationship between age and performance in the banking literature. We also 
do not detect significant non-linear effect of age on MFI outcomes, or any reflection of a 
learning curve on performance.  
We find inefficiency in the management of operating expenses to significantly decrease 
MFI profitability. As a robustness check, we carried out additional regressions using Cost per 
 
35 We do not find support for non-linear effects as the square of MFI assets is similarly positive and significant 
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Borrower (CB), which yields similar results. This finding is consistent with Cull, Demirgüc-
Kunt, and Morduch (2007) amongst a sample of MFIs and Sufian and Habibullah (2009), 
Kosmidou (2008), Athanasoglou, et al (2008), Pasiourasa and Kosmidou (2007), 
Athanasoglou et al (2006), Kosmidou, et al (2005), Guru et al. (2002) in traditional banking. 
This perhaps reflects problems in corporate governance36 as evidenced by Mersland and 
Strøm (2009) who concludes that better corporate governance is a key factor for enhancing 
the viability of the microfinance industry. This is consistent with Chhaochharia and Laeven 
(2009) who concludes that improvements in corporate governance impacts positively on firm 
value.  
Guided by stakeholder and agency theories, Mersland (2009a) similarly draws a 
historical parallel found in savings banks to present corporate governance lessons for MFIs. 
His findings show that the survival of savings banks was largely due to monitoring by bank 
associations, depositors, donors, and local communities. In addition, cross-subsidization by 
the wealthier customers helped the banks to become financially stable. Further evidence by 
Bourke (1989), and Molyneux and Thornton (1992) point to a positive relationship between 
quality management and profitability of European banks. This inefficiency in cost 
management could also signal lack of competitive market. 
The insignificant gearing ratio suggests that most profitable MFIs neither finance their 
operations with debt instruments nor equity.  They may therefore be relying on deposit 
mobilization. Indeed and to draw the link or otherwise, existing evidence shows that whereas 
globally most MFIs rely heavily on donations and retained earnings to fund their activities, 
Africa MFIs fund only 25 percent of their assets with equity. 72 percent of the source of their 
liabilities is deposits which is significantly higher than MFIs in other regions (Lafourcade, et 
al 2006). Although the impact of gearing ratio warrants further research, it is important to 
 
36 To explore the effect of traditional governance mechanisms such as board composition and size, managerial incentives, ownership type, 
and regulation, Mersland and Strøm (2009) use a global dataset including 278 rated MFIs from 60 countries while Hartarska (2005) uses 
different datasets spanning 46 to 144 observations from East European MFIs. Both studies have difficulties in identifying significant 
governance influence though both conclude that governance matters, but the traditional governance mechanisms seem to matter less in MFIs. 
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point out that when attempting to identify variations in profitability arising from gearing ratio, 
it is important not to do so in a vacuum. If, for instance, long term borrowings negatively 
affected profitability but enable MFIs to expand their outreach such that they can loan to more 
poor people, then that effect should be considered when developing normative implications 
from the analysis. This conjecture, however, cannot be the entire explanation, because MFIs 
differ with respect to mission/objectives. 
Contrary to Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Morduch (2007), our results show that the 
average loan size variable is not significantly linked to MFIs profitability. Even after 
controlling for other covariates, MFIs that make smaller loans are not less profitable on 
average. The hypothesis that expanding loan sizes thereby making relatively large loans to 
fewer customers is likely to be more efficient than making large numbers of small loans to 
improve profitability by lowering average costs is not supported here. 
After controlling for MFI specific characteristics, we find no evidence suggesting a 
statistically significant relationship between changes in macroeconomic variables (GNI per 
capita growth and inflation) and profitability of MFIs which is contrary to Ahlin and Lin 
(2011) and Liu and Wilson (2010) in the banking sector. Indeed, Zaidi, et al (2009) show that 
inflation has not had a damaging effect on microfinance clients in the first nine months of 
2008 when it rose to 25 percent in Pakistan and predicts that it is not likely to have an effect 
in the subsequent months. This is may be an indication of the high resilience of MFI on local 
macroeconomic conditions. Intuitively, it could also imply that microfinance relies on a poor 
macro economy to thrive. To draw the link, Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) use index of the 
size of the informal market developed by the Heritage Foundation and conclude that the size 
of the informal market has a positive effect on microfinance performance. Specifically, an 
MFI operating in a country with an index of 3, such as South Africa, would have 8% lower 
operational sustainability than MFI in a country with an index of 4 such as Mozambique. We 
however caution that this conjecture needs to be corroborated by further research. 
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Proxies for quality of institutions are both positive and significant as predicted by 
theory. This suggests that freedom from corruption would enhance greater profitability since 
corruption may distort the allocation of talent away from entrepreneurship and innovation, 
thereby significantly increasing costs of doing business. This eventually stifles MFI growth by 
increasing the risk and uncertainties which is consistent with (Aidt 2003; Ng 2006). The 
positive and significant coefficient of property rights is consistent with Kim, and Mahoney 
(2005). This suggests that the more certain the legal protection of property, the better the 
investment climate or the higher the probability of government expropriation of property, the 
worse the investment climate. To conclude therefore the quality of institutions are 
prerequisites if MFIs are to achieve profitability. 
 
3.6.1 Robustness checks 
To confirm the main results, a robustness check was performed by running the same set of 
regressions for a smaller data set of 1,260 observations over a reduced period of six years 
(2002-2007). As shown in Table 6 (Appendix B), using a significantly reduced unbalanced 
sample does not fundamentally change the picture. The significance and the relative 
magnitude of influence of the MFI- specific and macroeconomic variables used in previous 
regressions are preserved. 
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3.7. Conclusions, policy implications and prescription 
 This chapter is a first attempt to study profitability of the microfinance industry in Africa. We 
specified an empirical framework to investigate the effect of MFI-specific, quality of 
institutions and macroeconomic determinants of profitability of MFIs in Africa. An 
unbalanced panel dataset of 210 MFIs operating across 31 countries during 1997-2007 
periods provided the basis for the econometric analysis.  
The impact of MFI-specific variables is in line with theoretical expectations, with 
notable exception of MFI age and gearing ratio which are insignificant. Our empirical 
findings are robust to alternative specifications. Although some of the findings are well 
known in the banking literature, they are nevertheless new in microfinance industry. 
Interesting estimation results are obtained, which shows that successful MFIs are most often 
larger, well-capitalized and that increased exposure to credit risk lowers profitability. While 
the usual caveat about drawing strong policy conclusions from cross-country analysis applies, 
the findings in this study do have a clear set of policy implications for policymakers in the 
microfinance industry. We suggest the following five points. 
 First, efficiency in delivering microfinance is an important determinant of profitability 
and therefore MFIs have much to gain if they improve on their managerial practices. Efficient 
cost management is a prerequisite to profitability since this sector may not have reached the 
maturity level required to link quality effects emanating from increased spending to higher 
MFI profits. One potential solution to reducing transactional costs is through the use of 
mobile phone micro-banking. Safaricom’s M-Pesa service in Kenya currently transfers an 
average of KSh150 million (US$2m) a day mostly in small amounts averaging KSh3, 800 
(US$50) per transaction.37 A major drawback would however be technological innovations in 
Africa which pose particular challenges because mobile phone usage has lower penetration 
than in the developing countries. The new technologies such as mobile banking and 
 
37 See Microfinance Insights Vol. 9, Nov/Dec 2008 at https://www.microfinanceinsights.com/index.asp. accessed on Jan 2009 
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branchless micro-banking may also pose a major threat to the data privacy of MFI consumers 
(CGAP, 2009b). 
Guided by stakeholder and agency theories on corporate governance, our findings 
suggests that MFIs may be able to effectively use local depositors as in the case of Irish loan 
funds (see Hollis, and Sweetman, 2007) not just for funding, but also because of the important 
financial discipline that depositors can impose on the management. Our findings suggest that 
MFIs may improve on performance by switching to lower frequency repayment schedules and 
save dramatically on the transaction costs of instalment collection. This policy implication 
may only hold if the risk composition of borrowers is not made worse by a more flexible 
repayment schedule. There are also issues of borrower runs to contend with (Bond and Rai 
2009), though evidence to date points on the contrary (Field and Pande 2008; McIntosh 
2010). This study could be extended by exploring the role of “managerial capital”, on MFI 
management which is distinct from human capital in line with Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar 
(2010).  
Second, the positive and highly significant capital variable coefficient is a clear 
indication that microfinance industry may be capital constrained. Therefore, at the MFI level, 
profitability can be realized by reinforcement of MFIs capitalization through national 
regulation programs and by reducing the proportion of non-interest bearing assets to the 
benefit of MFI loans.  
Third, the evidence of positive and significant MFI size is an indication that MFIs may 
have to institute a dual objective of profit maximization while presumably pursuing a 
managerial goal of firm size maximisation. It could be the case that MFI with lower 
repayment and a larger client base is more profitable. One of the most important questions 
underlying MFI policy is which size optimizes MFI profitability. Smaller MFIs in particular 
are at a disadvantage, struggling to cover the industry’s high operational costs and diversify 
their products in order to compete with larger microfinance providers. That notwithstanding, 
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governments and funders/donors face a challenge; although scale economies are important for 
profitability, local markets in Africa do not always allow such scale economies.  
Fourth, evidence on credit risk is consistent with our hypothesis. This calls for 
improvements in information capital. Better screening processes may enable MFIs to mitigate 
adverse selection problems. Most countries in Africa however lack credit reference bureaus or 
unique identification that would help minimise loan defaults (Janvry, McIntosh and Sadoulet 
2010). While some of the developing countries such as El Salvador have established 
reasonably well-functioning centralized risk-management structures, where nearly 
instantaneous credit checks are possible (McIntosh and Wydick 2005), the same lacks in 
Africa. But even with credit reference bureaus, lenders must still have to make a decision on 
whether to approve loans and on what terms (Karlan and Zinman 2009).  
These findings have therefore responded to the primary aims and objectives of our study 
and made a contribution to the existing literature. Overall, these empirical results provide 
evidence that the MFIs profitability is shaped by MFI-specific factors and quality of 
institutions that are not the direct result of MFIs’s managerial decisions.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
DO MICROFINANCE PROFITS CONVERGE? EVIDENCE FROM A DYNAMIC 
PANEL ANALYSIS38 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Microfinance competition has been transformed over the past two decades by forces such as 
regulation, increased commercialization of microfinance, technological changes and 
competition from the formal financial sector (Cull et al 2009c). MFIs operate in product and 
geographical markets that significantly differ from those that existed two decades ago. These 
developments have implications on MFIs profitability. Theoretical literature has established 
that intense competition leads to the poorest borrowers dropping out of the microfinance 
market (see e.g. McIntosh and Wydick 2005). Additionally, competition undermines the 
dynamic incentives at the root of microfinance loan contracts (Guttman 2008; Chowdhury 
2007). To a large extent, competition has gone under-studied in microfinance due to lack of 
data, regarding the performance of microfinance institutions. Recent improvements in the data 
enabled us to undertake this analysis. 
Our primary goal in this chapter is to test for the persistence of profits by combining a 
new dataset on the performance of microfinance providers with industry specific, 
macroeconomic indicators and location specific factors. This will enable us to offer evidence 
on whether microfinance industry in Africa is competitive by employing alternative method in 
the empirical analysis. Pertinent questions concern whether one observes convergence to the 
mean, moderate/high persistence or explosive paths.   
To achieve this objective, we use a system GMM dynamic model to test the hypothesis 
that entry and exit are sufficiently free to eliminate any supernormal profits quickly, so that 
MFI profit rates converge rapidly towards their long-run equilibrium values. The alternative 
 
38 A previous version of this chapter was presented at the 1st World Finance Conference, in Viana do Castelo (Portugal). I acknowledge the 
inputs of the conference participants. 
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hypothesis is that the structural characteristics of microfinance industry in particular 
countries, specialist knowledge or regulatory advantages enjoyed by incumbent MFIs, renders 
entry into these regions sufficiently costly. We argue that the slower is the speed of 
adjustment, the longer is the period over which supernormal profits may persist, and the 
greater is the extent of the potential departure from the competitive ideal. 
To date, academic research on microfinance competition is limited to; whether the 
presence of conventional banks affects the profitability and outreach of microfinance 
institutions (Cull, et al 2009b), whether microfinance competition worsens outreach and 
financial self-sufficiency (Hisako 2009), whether microfinance competition lowers interest 
rates (Porteous 2006), whether competition affects the incumbent village bank’s ability to 
attract new clients (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005), whether competition affects the effort and 
lending decisions of the incumbent, the effects of competition on deposit growth, loan 
portfolio composition, repayment rates, and other effort (Park, Brandt, and Giles 2003). These 
studies do not answer the research question “are microfinance profits persistent?” because; (i) 
their focus is not MFI profitability and (ii) they employ static analytical framework which are 
only relevant when identifying causal relationships between variables when markets are in 
equilibrium (Geroski, 1990). Cross-sectional data usually does not contain sufficient 
information on which to base reliable policy decisions to promote competitive outcomes. 
Moreover, any abnormal profit realized in one period may disappear in the subsequent period 
which renders intervention by government unnecessary. 
This chapter is similar to the previous in two ways. First, although the study employs a 
different estimation technique, the two studies nevertheless have employed the analysis of 
panel data methodology. Second, we use the same unbalanced dataset ranging from 1997 to 
2007. That notwithstanding, this study differs from the previous chapter in that although the 
main focus is persistence of MFI profits, it offers more robust estimates as we introduce a new 
set of control variables; location/regional variable as a measure of the diverse environments in 
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which MFIs operate and regulatory policy variable. In particular, we seek to establish whether 
the conclusions and policy recommendations arrived at in the previous chapter differ 
significantly when we consider more control variables. This enables us to probe further 
evidence on the determinants of MFI profitability. Variations in regional or location factors 
may contribute to the growth in loan portfolios differently. Additionally, costs associated with 
regulation are likely to be higher for MFIs because of their small scale (Cull, et al 2011). 
Regulation may also lead to a mission drift if the regulatory requirements such as capital 
adequacy divert resources away from serving the core poor to better-off borrowers in order to 
improve on capital requirements. Regulation may also curtail innovation in lending 
mechanisms that has been the driving force behind MFIs’ performance (Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak, 2007).  
We thus seek to answer two principal research questions (i) Are microfinance profits 
persistent in Africa? (ii) Does the level of persistence converge to the mean, or do we observe 
explosive paths? While the competitive environment hypothesis predicts that profit 
differentials across firms should disappear in the long run, the empirical evidence tends to 
give little support to this theory. Answers to these questions are important empirically as well 
as from a policy perspective for the evolving microfinance sector in Africa. To date, there has 
been relatively little discussion, at least within academic circles, and almost no empirical 
analysis of persistence of MFIs profits. To address these issues, we combine high-quality data 
for 210 leading MFIs from Africa. 
This study makes four contributions both to policy and literature as follows; (i) So far 
there is no empirical evidence on whether MFI predicted to earn a high long-run profit rate 
would in fact earn a high profit rate in subsequent periods. Previous studies examine the 
convergence of profitability to a long-run mean value, either for industries or for the economy 
as a whole; but the evidence for the microfinance sector is clearly lacking. We are convinced 
that the issue under investigation is highly relevant because if profits persistence is only a 
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short-term phenomenon among the MFIs, then its anti-competitive implication would be 
limited.  (ii) This study is pioneering in using dynamic GMM estimators, two-step estimation 
method, in studies of determinants of microfinance profitability. (iii) Profits are also an 
important source for equity. If reinvested, this should lead to more stable MFIs which could 
promote financial stability in the microfinance sector.  (iv) At the policy level, the existence 
of profit persistence may imply that shocks to profitability persist indefinitely and that 
competitive pressures never erode differences in profitability.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature 
review on persistence of firm profits. Section 3 describes the model specification. In Section 
4, we provide description of data, which include measurements of our variable of interest. 
Section 5 discusses econometric methodology. Section 6 presents the empirical results and 
findings. Finally, a seventh section spells out some concluding remarks and policy 
suggestions.  
 
4.2. Previous literature 
 
Theoretical underpinnings  
In a perfectly competitive market, no firm would be able to earn a profit rate above the 
competitive return39. Thus the hypothesis tested in the profit persistence literature is that entry 
and exit is sufficiently free to eliminate any supernormal profits whatever their cause, and that 
all firms’ economic profit tends to converge to the same long-run average rate (Berger et al., 
2000; Singh 2003; Cuaresma and Gschwandtner, 2008). The puzzling question however is 
why do some firms consistently report supernormal profits? Theoretical literature shows that 
some firms may be more innovative or endowed with advantages that give them an edge over 
the others, which prevent imitation or block entry. These unique endowments include firm 
characteristics such as size, market share, advertising and research and development 
 
39 The basic premise of microeconomic theory is that a firm's economic profits should converge to zero in competitive markets or to a level 
that is just sufficient to provide a normal risk-adjusted return on capital. 
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expenditures. Thus, along this line of argument, it is innovation competition that leads to 
persistence in profits rather than price competition, Consequently, abnormal profit may tend 
to persist from year to year, and differences in average profit rates may be sustained 
indefinitely40 (Galbreath and Galvin 2008). Indeed, financial institutions profits show a 
tendency to persist over time, reflecting either impediments to market competition or 
informational asymmetry (Berger et al., 2000).   
Another competing argument considers persistence in levels of profitability to be a 
reflection of sensitivity to regional or macroeconomic shocks (see Berger et al., 2000). To the 
extent that regional shocks are serially correlated ex post, firms in a region subjected to 
positive shocks will tend to remain in the high end of profitability, provided that entry into 
these regions is sufficiently costly. Similarly, firms in a region subjected to negative shocks 
would tend to remain in the low end of profitability levels, provided that regional exit is 
sufficiently costly. Arguably, if it is sufficiently costly for firms to adjust their risk-return 
profiles in response to changing macroeconomic conditions, firms with high risk or pro-
cyclical returns may perform consistently in the high end of the profitability levels during 
protracted economic expansions and perform consistently in the low end during protracted 
downturns (Singh 2003).  
Cubbin and Geroski (1987) observe that considerable heterogeneities exist within most 
industries. They also find that firms in highly concentrated industries adjust much more 
slowly toward long-run equilibrium profit rates. Other studies that have examined differences 
between firms persistence of profit and the speed of convergence include Geroski and 
Jacquemin, (1988) and McGahan and Porter, (1999).  
 
40 Theoretical literature also suggests that profit persistence among firms involve interesting questions such as; what are their sources; why 
don’t competitive forces make them vanish; and what their consequences are for industrial growth and dynamics. The distribution of profits 
in the future depends on the impact of the forces of competition over time on the present state, which is itself the outcome of similar previous 
forces. Since profit persistence reflects existence of impediments to competition that generates market power in output market and 
informational opacity which generates market power in the input markets, the argument that firms in concentrated markets might have some 
degree of market power and use it to manipulate prices in their favour both in the short and long run is intuitively plausible. Such firms could 
act to accelerate or retard the rate at which prices adjust to supply and demand shocks, affecting the speed of adjustment when equilibrium 
shifts (Gonzalo and Hachiya 2008). 
 103
                                                
MFIs differ in many respects, such as lending methodology. Cultural factors which are 
time invariant may also influence the direction of one lending type over another in a country 
or region, and it could be these social factors that are ultimately driving profitability rather 
than lending methodology. Having reviewed different strands in theoretical literature, it is 
clear that an appropriate empirical framework of the persistence of profits that controls for 
determinants of MFI profitability should capture several potential linkages.  
 
A review of empirical evidence 
Since the seminal work of Mueller (1977, 1986), there is a growing empirical literature 
focused on the persistence of firm profits. Mueller (1977), points that the average firm's profit 
comprises both permanent and short-run components, which converge over time. However, 
the direction of such effect is unclear; thus so far it is not possible to determine profit 
persistence in the microfinance sector a priori.  
Most of the existing empirical literature on persistence of profit is based on 
manufacturing data, with only a handful of studies investigating persistence of profit in 
banking. The pioneering contribution by Mueller (1977), and subsequent Mueller (1986) used 
a stochastic approach, modelling profitability as a first order autoregressive (AR (1)) 
process41. Glen and Singh (2003) test profitability persistence in seven leading developing 
countries and conclude that both short and long-term persistence of firm profit rates for the 
developing economies are lower than those for advanced economies which he attributes to 
lower sunk cost to enter markets, faster growth rates of firms, weaker role of governmental 
regulations, and the existence of many large business groups. This is however inconsistent 
with theoretical predictions since it implies there is a higher level of competition in emerging 
 
41 He concluded that there is significant variability in the speed with which profits adjust to their firm-specific permanent value across 
different sectors and countries. Moreover, difference in convergence patterns might be associated with steady flow of resources through the 
persistence of both higher market power and profits above or below average levels over time. The potential influence of initial profit rates 
(See e.g. Mueller, 1990; Goddard and Wilson, 1999) has also been the subject of research 
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markets, but the findings confirm Waring (1996) and Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) on a 
sample of industrial firms in three European countries.  
Consistent with theoretical postulation that innovations play the outmost key role in 
profit persistence, (Cefis, 2003) finds that firms that are persistent innovators and earn above-
average profits have a high propensity to continue doing both while earning above normal 
profits which corroborates previous findings by (Mueller 1990). However, extra profit due to 
innovations can only be temporary, vanishing when competitors start to imitate the products 
or processes of the innovative leading firm.  
What does the evidence in the financial sector show? A recent wave of studies in the 
banking sector has emerged consistently showing that the sector is not perfectly competitive. 
Using a dynamic panel model, Goddard, et al (2010) investigates the convergence of bank 
profitability in eight European Union member countries, between 1992 and 2007. Their 
results show evidence of persistence of excess profit from one year to the next, which was 
lower in 1999-2007 than it was in 1992-98 in all the eight countries. Their findings are 
consistent with Flamini et al (2009) who in a cross-country study for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
finds modest persistence.  Athanasoglou, et al. (2008) applies a dynamic panel data model to 
study the performance of Greek banks over the period 1985-2001 and find profit persistence. 
This result confirms those reported in Carbo and Fernandez (2007) who document persistence 
in bank spreads in Europe. Goddard, et al. (2004a) shows persistence of profit to be higher for 
savings and co-operative banks than for commercial banks whose profit levels tend to adjust 
fairly fast to their average level which corroborates Yurtoglu (2004) among Turkish banks. 
On the contrary Goddard, et al. (2004b) finds in both sets of their estimations that there are 
quite large differences between countries in the magnitudes of the persistence coefficients. On 
a similar vein Berger et al. (2000) conclude that profit converges to its long-run average value 
more slowly in U.S. banking than in manufacturing, and market power plays a significant role 
in enabling abnormal profit to persist. On the contrary, Bektas, (2007) uses the panel data 
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method to test for unit roots of profitability for 28 surviving banks in Turkey between 1989 
and 2003 and their persistence. He concludes that persistence of profits does not exist in the 
long run. One of the central conclusions in the literature is that rivalry alone does not 
therefore erase persistent asymmetries among firms.  
Turning to regulatory policies as a control variable, Cull, et al42 (2011) finds 
supervision to be negatively associated with profitability which confirms previous findings by 
Hartarska (2005). This is however inconsistent with Mersland and Strøm (2009), who using 
an endogenous equations approach establish that regulation does not have a significant impact 
on financial performance. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) similarly find that regulation does 
no matter on financial performance, after controlling for the endogeneity of regulation. Barth 
et al, (2008; 2004) similary finds cross-country evidence that regulation has no impact on the 
performance of conventional banks. Clearly this issue remains contestable.  
Table 4.1: Summary of profit persistence studies 
Author Country  Sample period Observation per 
firm 
Speed of 
adjustment 
Muller (1990) US 1950-1972 23 0.183 
Cubbin and Geroski 
(1987) 
UK 1948-1977 30 0.482 
Geroski and Jacquemin, 
(1988) 
UK 1947-1977 29 0.488 
France 1965-1982 18 0.412 
Germany 1961-1981 21 0.410 
Waring (1996) US 1970-1989 20 0.540 
Goddard and Wilson, 
(1999)  
UK 1972-1991 20 0.590 
Berger et al (2000) US banks 1969-1997 29 0.900 
Maruyama and Odagiri 
(2002) 
Japan 1964-1982 19 0.639 
1983-1997 15 0.597 
Glen and Sign (2003) Emerging countries 1980-1994 10 0.01-0.42 
Ces (2003) UK-with patent 1978-1991 14 0.187 
UK-no patent 1978-1991 14 0.813 
Goddard, et al. (2004a) EU-Savings banks 1992-1998 7 0.299 
EU-Commercial 
banks 
1992-1998 7 -0.149* 
Goddard, et al. (2004b) EU-Banks  1992-1998 7 0.260 
Yurtoglu (2004) Turkish banks 1985-1998 14 0.430 
Bektas, E (2007). Turkish banks 1989-2003 15 0.030 
Galbreath and Galvin Japan  1991-2001 11 0.560 
                                                 
42 Investigates implications and trade-offs of regulation for the world’s largest MFIs, by examining impact on profitability and outreach to 
small-scale borrowers and women, drawing on a financial data of 245 MFIs from the MIX database that allows for within-country variation 
regarding MFI regulation and supervision. 
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(2008). 
Athanasoglou, et al. 
(2008) 
European 
banks 
1995-2001 7 0.350 
Flamini et al (2009) Sub-Sahara Africa 1998-2006 Cross country 0.210 
Goddard, et al. (2010) European 
banks 
1992-2007 Cross country 0.333 
*Insignificant 
Table 4.1 shows that the empirical evidence to date focuses on a relatively small 
number of countries, and identifies positive autocorrelation in firm profit rates observed over 
time. The persistence of firm profit is driven by firm-specific, industry-specific and 
macroeconomic context. Moreover, literature lacks formal verification of the persistence on 
microfinance profitability, which might be relevant for the constantly evolving microfinance 
industry. The main objective of this chapter is therefore to fill this gap in the existing 
literature. This study therefore formulates a dynamic model of the determinants of MFI 
profitability, while controlling for other factors that are expected to influence profitability. 
 
4.3. Design of the model  
The persistence of profit approach is based on empirical investigation of the dynamics of firm 
level profit. Much of the existing literature is based on the structure conduct performance 
paradigm which is based on the static, cross-sectional methodology. An alternative to 
conduct-based measure of competition uses H-statistic and reports evidence of monopolistic 
competition (Carbo et al. 2009; Goddard and Wilson, 2009). There is no certainty that 
conduct or performance measures observed at any point in time represent equilibrium values. 
For example, an empirical association between high concentration and high profitability that 
is the standard in structure conduct performance models may simply appear by chance, from 
observations taken during a period when the relevant market is in a state of disequilibrium 
(Goddard and Wilson, 2009). 
Rather than the standard linear regression model adopted in the previous chapter, and to 
infer the speed at which abnormal profits above or below the normal tend to dissipate, we 
develop a dynamic model which enables us to derive the rate of adjustment that is most 
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consistent with the observed panel data43. We therefore augment model (3.3) in the previous 
chapter to a dynamic specification (4.1).  
We also control for other factors that may explain MFI profitability. Due to country 
specific differences that exist in the Africa microfinance sector, we test for potential location 
effects. We contend that even within the same continent, location specific variations may have 
an impact on MFI profitability44. Additionally, we note that, given the large time frame of our 
dataset and the developments that might have taken place in the Africa microfinance sector 
during the sample period, it is possible that time effects are present in the error component of 
the model. Failure to account for these two effects might bias the estimates in unknown 
magnitudes and directions. We test for these effects by augmenting model (4.1) to include 
regional dummies for West, East, South and Central Africa. We further augment the model 
with industry-specific factors such as the type of the charter that has established the MFIs and 
regulatory environment. From an economics point of view, the main difference between for-
profit and not-for-profit status is the ability to distribute profits (Glaeser and Shleifer 2001). If 
not-for-profits earn revenues greater than costs, they reinvest it back into the firm to further 
social missions. On the contrary, for-profit institutions have a leeway on what they can do 
with after-tax profits. 
 In order to avoid over-identification problems, and to control for the overall 
institutional development on MFI profitability, we replicate the two time-variant exogenous 
variables from Heritage Foundation in the empirical specifications that were used in the 
previous chapter. We also include all the variables described in the previous chapter to control 
for important influences on MFI profitability. Thus, to examine profit persistence, while 
 
43 One may however be tempted to ask the question why we have to undertake cross-country study rather than country specific. We argue 
that  including several countries in this study is important as it enable us understand the impact of the different location advantages, 
regulatory restrictions on MFI growth, institutions development and macroeconomic environments on MFI profitability which we control for 
before we draw any conclusions. By undertaking a cross-country analysis, it is possible to narrow the range of factors. In view of the 
findings, we are able to draw some policy implications that may be useful to MFI management, policy makers and shareholders in the Africa 
economies.  
44 Undocumented regional differences, such as prices, infrastructure, or cultural attributes, may influence the demand for and use of credit. 
controlling for other covariates in a rather simplified way, the econometric model is expanded 
as follows: 
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More formally, is the profitability of MFI i located in country c, at time t, with i=1, . . .,N, 
t=1, . . ., T; α is the regression constant, is a vector of MFI-specific characteristics (j) of 
MFI i in country c during the period t; is a vector of macroeconomic country-specific 
variables (m) in country c during the period t;  is a vector of institutional development 
indicators (n) in country c during the period t;  refers to industry-specific factors (l) 
and
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iict μγυε ++= is the disturbance; tγ is the unobservable time effects, iυ is the 
unobserved complete set of individual MFI-specific effect which controls for all cross-
sectional (or ‘between MFIs’), and ictμ is the idiosyncratic error. Augmenting the model with 
unobservable time effects modifies the specification into an unbalanced two-way error 
component model. D is a binary for the location-specific dummy variables. δβη ,,  are the 
coefficients to be estimated. 
1−Π ict  is the one-period lagged profitability and η  is the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium which gives us some information about the structure of the market. A value of η  
between 0 and 1 implies that any shock to profits will persist but will nevertheless return to 
their normal level. In competitive firms, we expect this to occur quickly, while in less 
competitive industries we might anticipate high persistence and a value of η ‚ closer to 1. If η  
lies between 0 and -1, then profits revert to normal in an oscillating manner. This might occur 
in periods of rapid change in the structure of the microfinance sector which can cause MFI 
profitability to become highly volatile.  
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4.4 Data and measurement 
Data description  
This study analyses profit persistence of the microfinance industry in Africa economies, using 
the same data set and measurements as the previous chapter. This comprises 210 MFIs across 
31 developing economies in Africa for the period 1997-2007 with 2,310 observations. 
Persistence of profits is evaluated by using the net income after tax to total assets (ROA) as a 
profit measure. In order to avoid duplication we shall not dwell into a detailed discussion 
about the same. Reference should be made to previous chapter on a formal discussion of the 
conceptual framework, data and measurement of the variables. 
Industry specific factors are characteristics that are unique to the microfinance sector. In 
order to control for the differences in profitability arising from the charter that establishes the 
MFIs, we use (i) Prof as a dummy variable indicating MFIs formal profit status45 (equal to 
one if the organization is for-profit). Again, the markers are drawn from MIX data set. MFIs 
with not-for-profit charters tend to have objectives and funding arrangements that are 
different from those of more commercially-oriented MFIs (such as banks or credit unions). 
Not-for-profit MFIs place more emphasis on outreach while at the same time relying 
relatively more on donated funds to subsidize those efforts (Cull, et al, 2009a). (ii) Region is a 
dummy variable for each of the four regions in Africa to capture location impacts. The nature 
and composition of microfinance business may be such that certain locations are favoured 
while others are avoided. (iii) REG is a binary variable indicating regulation status equal to 
one if regulated and zero otherwise46. Table 4.2 lists the variables used to proxy profitability 
and its determinants (including notation and the predicted effect of the determinants according 
to the literature). 
 
45 More of the objectives of  commercial microfinance is discussed by Robinson (2001). 
46 To the extent that reserve requirements are not remunerated or remunerated at less-than market rates, MFI regulation may impose a 
burden on these institutions. Moreover, regulation of MFIs may lead to a mission drift if the regulatory requirements such as capital 
adequacy divert resources away from serving the poor to serving better off borrowers in order to improve capital adequacy ratios with 
implications on profitability.  
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Table 4.2: Summary of variables and measurement 
Variable Notation  Measure Predicted 
effect 
Source of 
data 
Dependent variable 
Profitability ROA  Net profits after taxes/Assets   The MIX 
Control variables 
MFI-specific     
Capital  CAP Equity/Assets Positive  The MIX 
Credit risk   
Portfolio at Risk PAR-30 Outstanding balance, portfolio 
overdue>30 Days + renegotiated 
portfolio/Adjusted Gross Loan 
Portfolio 
Negative  The MIX 
Write off Ratio WOR Value of loans written-
off/Adjusted Average Gross Loan 
Portfolio 
Loan Loss Reserve Ratio LLR Loan loss reserve/Value of loans 
outstanding 
Risk Coverage Ratio RC Adjusted Impairment Loss 
Allowance/PAR > 30 Days 
Other factors   
Efficiency  Eff Adjusted Operating 
Expense/Adjusted Average Gross 
Loan Portfolio 
Negative  The MIX 
Gearing  GR Debt/equity ratio Negative  The MIX 
 Age Ag Age of the MFI in years  Indeterminate  
Size  S  Log of total assets   Indeterminate 
Loan size LS Adjusted Average Loan Balance 
per Borrower/GNI per Capita 
Positive  
Industry-specific 
For-profit dummy Prof Dummy variable equal to one for 
profit and zero otherwise 
Indeterminate The MIX 
Regulated  REG Dummy variable equal to one for 
regulated and zero otherwise 
Indeterminate  
Region  WA Dummy variable equal to 1 for 
West Africa and 0 otherwise 
Indeterminate The MIX 
CA Dummy variable equal to 1 for 
Central Africa and 0 otherwise 
SA Dummy variable equal to 1 for 
South Africa and 0 otherwise 
EA Dummy variable equal to 1 for 
East Africa and 0 otherwise 
Institutional development    
Property rights PR Composite Index ranging from 10 
(Private property is rarely 
protected) to 100 (Private property 
is guaranteed by the government) 
Positive  Heritage 
Foundation 
Freedom from corruption COR Composite Index 10-point scale 
Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) in which a score of 100 
indicates very little corruption and 
a score of 0 indicates a very 
corrupt government 
Macroeconomic environment     
Inflation expectations INF Previous annual % change of the 
GDP deflator 
Indeterminate World Bank 
(WDI) 
Per capita Income GNI GNI per capita, Atlas method 
(current US$) 
Positive  
 
4.5. Empirical methodology 
4.5.1 Estimation and testing 
We begin this section by first estimating and testing for the time effects. Consistent with the 
previous chapter, we tested the joint significance of the unobservable time effects by 
the 0................32:0 === TH γγγ at the 95% confidence level. We experimented with many 
year dummies and it turns out that none of the time dummies is significant. The fact that the 
year dummy variables are insignificant suggests that there may be no additional aggregate 
macroeconomic effects influencing MFI returns in Africa other that those we have explicitly 
controlled for in the estimation model. Since Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests show that time 
effect is not significant, we proceed with the estimation of the following model; 
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Static panel estimates, as do the OLS models, omit dynamics causing the problem of 
dynamic panel bias and as such do not allow us to study the dynamics of adjustment (Baltagi, 
2008). Omitted dynamics means that such models are misspecified, because they omit the 
entire history of the right-hand-side variables (Greene, 2008).  
When estimating equation (4.2), several econometric problems may arise. First is 
endogeneity: more profitable MFIs may be able to increase their equity more easily by 
retaining profits. They could also pay more for marketing their products and increase their 
size, which in turn may affect profitability. However, the causality could also run in the 
opposite direction, as more profitable MFIs may hire more personnel (as per the expense 
preference theorem), reducing their operational efficiency.  
The dynamic structure of our model makes the OLS estimator biased upwards 47 and 
inconsistent, since the lagged level of profitability is correlated with the error term. The 
                                                 
47 The estimation methods based on the OLS principle are vulnerable to the omitted variable bias if some important determinants of MFI 
profitability are not included among the regressors. 
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within transformation does not solve the problem, because of a downward bias (Nickel, 1981) 
and inconsistency. We tackle these problems by moving beyond the methodology currently in 
use in the empirical literature of bank profitability of mainly fixed or random effects48.  
A possible solution on the endogeneity problem is represented by the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) technique. GMM developed by Hansen (1982), and the first-
differenced GMM estimators for the AR (1) panel data that was later developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) provides a convenient framework for obtaining asymptotically efficient 
estimators in this context. GMM estimators are designed for datasets that has many panels and 
few periods and gives consistent estimates under the assumption that there is no 
autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors and the explanatory variables are weakly 
exogenous. The identifying assumption that there is no serial correlation in the idiosyncratic 
errors itε can also be validated by testing for no second order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals. Negative first order serial correlation is expected in the first-differenced 
residuals if the idiosyncratic errors itε  are serially uncorrelated while positive serial correlation 
is expected in the levels residuals (Bond and Windmeijer, 2002). 
With a fixed number of years panel and a substantial number of observations, Arellano 
and Bond (1991) suggests estimating equation (4.2) with GMM in first-differences, by first 
differencing the initial equation, which removes the time invariant iυ . This renders the 
equation estimable by instrumental variables as;  
)3.4.(..........).........()()()( 11211 −−−−− −+−+−+−=− ititiiititititiitit xx μμυυυβππαππ  
Arellano and Bond estimator has however been criticized when applied to panels with very 
small T, on the premise that under such conditions this estimator is inefficient if the 
instruments used are weak (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bover 1998; Phillipsa and 
Donggyu 2007).  Blundell and Bond (1998) for example shows that when η  approaches 1, so 
                                                 
48 Recent studies in the banking literature that use fixed or random effects include for example Flamini et al (2009); Sufian and Habibullah 
(2009), Kosmidou (2008), Hsiu-Ling et al (2007) 
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that the dependent variable follows a path close to a random walk, the differenced-GMM 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) has poor finite sample properties, and it’s downwards biased, 
especially when T is small. Therefore, Blundell and Bond (1998) proposed the System-GMM 
which is derived from the estimation of a system of two simultaneous equations, one in levels 
(with lagged first differences as instruments) and the other in first differences (with lagged 
levels as instruments). In multivariate dynamic panel models like ours, System-GMM 
estimator is shown to perform better than the differenced-GMM when series are persistent 
(η close to unity) and there is a dramatic reduction in the finite sample bias due to the 
exploitation of additional moment conditions (Blundell and Bond 2000).  
We thus resort to the system GMM49 since there is a gain in efficiency, and the 
instrument set is valid. The system GMM estimator also controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Moreover, it’s more suited to estimate MFI profitability equations in our 
empirical framework, than the first-differenced GMM estimator used by some previous 
authors (see for example Flamini et al, 2009). MFIs profitability outcomes may be highly 
persistent so their lagged levels might be very weak instruments for the first differenced 
equations. We instrument for all regressors except for those which are clearly exogenous.  
We are also confronted with the choice of using one-step or two-step estimation. The 
one-step estimator assumes homoscedastic errors while the two-step estimator uses the first-
step errors to construct heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors which imply that the one-
step estimators are less efficient than the two-step estimators even in the presence of 
homoscedastic error terms (Arellano and Hahn, 2007). Although two-step estimators are 
asymptotically more efficient, they present standard errors estimates that are severely 
downward biased. However, it is possible to solve this problem using the finite-sample 
                                                 
49 There are two types of GMM estimators that have been frequently used. The first one is the first-difference GMM estimator, developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), which uses first-differenced equations with suitable lagged levels as instruments. The second one is the system 
GMM estimator, developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which augments the former by addition of 
equations in levels with lagged first-differences as instruments. The system GMM estimator uses the levels equation (e.g. equation 4.1) to 
obtain a system of two equations: one differenced and one in levels. By adding the second equation, additional instruments can be obtained. 
Thus the variables in levels in the second equation are instrumented with their own first differences.  
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correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by Bond and Windmeijer (2002), which 
can make two-step robust GMM estimates more efficient than one-step robust ones, especially 
for system GMM (Roodman, 2009).  
The last challenge is the risk of omitted variables. To that end, we follow a general to 
specific strategy by estimating an equation with all possible regressors according to the 
existing literature and Africa specific characteristics (see Appendix A). We, then, test through 
a Wald test the joint hypothesis that the coefficients of the variables that are not significant 
individually are equal to zero. If not rejected, we re-estimate the model only with the controls 
which were significant in the general regression. Otherwise, we test a less restrictive 
hypothesis but still trying to reduce the number of non-significant regressors to the maximum 
extent possible. We stop reducing the number of regressors when we can reject that the 
remaining set of coefficients of the control variables is equal to zero. The coefficients 
obtained in this way are even more efficient as the number of regressors is reduced to the 
minimum.  
Finally, to confirm the validity of the instruments, we perform Hansen's or Sargan test 
of over-identifying restrictions, which is asymptotically distributed as where k  denotes 
the number of over-identifying restrictions and a test of serial correlation among the residuals. 
We test whether Arellano-Bond orthogonality conditions are fulfilled. If there is no 
autocorrelation in the levels equation, then the error term in the first-difference equation has 
negative first-order autocorrelation and zero second order autocorrelation (Baltagi 2008). If 
we reject the hypothesis that there is zero second order autocorrelation in the residuals of the 
first-difference equation, then we also reject the hypothesis that the error term in the levels 
equation is not autocorrelated which indicates that the Arellano-Bond orthogonality 
conditions are not valid no matter the number of lags used as instruments. 
)(2 kχ
In order to design a suitable model, one key issue remains to be dealt with. We should 
confirm whether capital is better modelled as an endogenous variable or as a predetermined 
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variable. It may be the case that the profits earned are fully or partially reinvested which may 
lead to higher capital. In this case, we would predict a positive causation from profits to 
capital and based on these considerations, model capital as a predetermined variable rather 
than strictly exogenous variable. Although Athanasoglou, et al (2008) finds a positive and 
significant effect of capital on bank profitability, Berger (2005) finds positive causation in 
both direction between capital and profitability. Based on this argument, we test this 
hypothesis by re-running model (4.2) and treating capital as a predetermined variable. The 
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions shows that our specification is well modelled, 
with a significantly higher p–value based on the hypothesis that capital is predetermined50 
(see Table 4 in Appendix B). 
To probe further on the capital-profits association, we conduct Granger causality tests. 
This enables us to examine how each variable affects future changes in the other variable. We 
are aware that Granger-causation cannot establish causality in a theoretical sense; it is not a 
test for strict exogeneity and may be misleading if, for example, the processes determining the 
variables of interest involve expectations and that it only reflects historical correlations which 
does not necessarily imply economic causation. We nevertheless believe that this enables us 
to infer the link between capital and profits. We report our simple Granger causality test in 
Table 5 (Appendix B).  
One limitation of using GMM estimator is that the differencing removes any time 
invariant explanatory variable along with the panel level effect, which does not allow us to 
introduce the main policy control variables of interest for regulatory status, diversity in 
regional distribution and for profit status into our main estimation. We would encounter the 
same effect by estimating a linear model with fixed effects (FE), since this doesn’t allows us 
to control for factors which differ across MFIs but are constant through time and which we 
 
50 When capital is assumed to be endogenous variable, the p-value for this hypothesis is 0.00. In contrast, when capital is assumed to be 
exogenous, the p-value is 0.18, implying that the instruments used are acceptable. 
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cannot measure directly known as unobserved MFI heterogeneity51. A random effect model 
seems to be the natural choice. We therefore re-estimate model 4.2 in a linear fashion by 
assuming random effects (RE).  
 
4.5.2 Univariate analysis 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present summary statistics. When descriptive statistics are broken down by 
region, we observe some interesting regional differences. All the regions report an average 
negative profitability. Although West Africa has the oldest MFIs on average, the region has 
the highest number of MFIs reporting average loan default rate and the most inefficient on the 
management of operational expenses. This may partly be explained by the fact that MFIs in 
some West Africa economies face interest rate ceilings, such as the West African Monetary 
Union usury law that caps MFI interest rates at 27 percent and bank interest rates at 18 
percent (Lafourcade, et al 2006). Although South Africa region has the highest capital 
adequacy ratio, it also reports the lowest return on assets (at an average of -2.5%) while 
Central Africa has the most mature MFIs based on age. East Africa has the largest MFIs in 
terms of average assets. It also offers the smallest loan size. Perhaps this explains why the 
region has a higher depth of outreach than other regions. The region dominates in terms of 
outreach with 52 percent of all savers and 45 percent of all borrowers in Africa (Lafourcade, 
et al 2006). With respect to gearing ratio, MFIs from Central Africa region use more of debt 
relative to equity in terms of choice of financing compared to other regions. There seems to be 
no regional patterns with respect to macroeconomic variables in the raw data. 
 
51 In micro-econometrics the unobserved firm heterogeneity means unobserved firm characteristics such as corporate governance and firm 
structure. Time variant explanatory variables, however, may be correlated with this unobserved firm heterogeneity. Managers may for 
instance opt to work for unregulated MFIs depending on their preferences for autonomy in decision making, desire and ability to implement 
microfinance innovations and therefore MFI regulation may limit the manager’s ability to innovate. The significant heterogeneity of MFIs 
suggests that corporate governance may be correlated with MFI characteristics including regulatory status. 
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Table 4.3 Regional/location descriptive and summary statistics 
 South Africa Central Africa 
Variable Notation Obs  Mean  Median  Std Dev Min  Max  Obs  Mean  Median  Std Dev Min Max  
Return on 
assets  
ROA 194 
 
-0.025 0.00 0.103 -0.458 0.226 113 
 
-0.007 0.00 0.082 -0.342 0.195 
Age  AG 223 7.543 7 4.104 3 28 121 
 
9.612 8 8.186 3.00 40 
Capital  CAP 222 
 
0.465 0.51 0.495 -1.366 1.000 121  0.313 0.235 0.244 -0.024 1.000 
Gearing  GR 196 
 
1.231 0.63 1.486 0.000 9.090 91 
 
2.325 2.382 1.595 0.000 5.650 
Efficiency  EFF 163 
 
0.776 0.59 0.643 0.080 4.150 87 
 
0.293 0.235 0.315 0.000 2.580 
Portfolio at 
Risk 
PAR 223 
 
0.103 0.04 0.156 0.000 1.050 121 
 
0.081 0.03 0.109 0.000 0.500 
Log Size  S 223 
 
14.488 14.46 1.549 9.720 19.756 121 
 
13.862 13.81 2.156 7.268 18.802 
Loan size  LS 224 1.1085 0.541 1.604 0.000 9.038 89 1.267 0.632 2.403 0.00 16.48 
Lagged 
Inflation rate 
INF 404 
 
0.045 0.00 0.063 -0.006 0.340 252 
 
0.026 0.000 0.056 -0.139 0.299 
Per capita 
income 
GNI 165 
 
0.073 0.06 0.106 -0.188 0.289 92  0.076 0.083 0.079 -0.167 0.242 
This Table presents the summary statistics. A detailed description of the definition and sources of the variables is given in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.4 Regional/location descriptive and summary statistics 
 East Africa West Africa 
Variable  Notation Obs  Mean  Median Std Dev Min Max  Obs  Mean  Median  Std Dev Min  Max  
Return on 
assets  
ROA 353 
 
-0.015 0.00 0.099 -0.866 0.324 442 
 
-0.0064 0.00 0.0886 -0.409 0.100 
Age  AG 382 9.199 7 6.807 3 33 437
  
9.78 9 5.78 3 31 
Capital  CAP 382
  
0.410 0.37 0.292 -1.140 0.994 431 
 
0.318 0.27 0.303 -0.983 1.000 
Gearing  GR 328 
 
1.603 1.151 1.479 0.000 6.100 353 
 
2.082 1.597 1.921 0.000 11.000 
Efficiency EFF 307 
 
0.434 0.34 0.736 0.000 12.250 379 
 
2.211 0.230 11.149 0.000 121.000 
Portfolio at 
Risk 
PAR 381 
 
0.050 0.022 0.077 0.000 0.790 452 
 
0.719 0.027 0.585 0.000 0.748 
Log Size  S 377 
 
14.793 14.51 1.929 8.412 20.541 421 
 
14.299 14.36 2.433 7.102 19.063 
Loan size  LS 429 1.007 0.523 1.88 0.000 15.05 450 1.025 0.318 1.864 0.00 15.05 
Lagged 
Inflation rate 
INF 627 
 
0.032 0.000 0.049 -0.058 0.219 795 
 
0.041 0.000 0.118 -0.139 2.3 
Per capita 
income 
GNI 310 
 
0.077 0.10 0.092 -0.106 0.273 351 
 
0.138 0.096 0.231 -0.125 0.434 
This Table presents the summary statistics. A detailed description of the definition and sources of the variables is given in Table 4.2. 
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We present a correlation test matrix in Table 4.5. Although most correlation coefficients 
among variables of interest are low, they are nevertheless significant but not perfectly linear. 
Most notably, regulation status, credit risk measure, efficiency, age, size, gearing ratio are all 
significantly correlated with profitability measure which is perhaps an indication that MFIs 
with higher ROA are those that are regulated, larger in size, older, efficient and with lower 
loan default rates. Age may reflect survivor bias but it is also positively and significantly 
correlated with size, gearing and regulation, an indication that as MFIs matures, they also 
become larger, use more of debt in their financing options and become regulated over time. 
The significant correlation between ROA and gearing ratio implies that higher debt relative to 
equity mat be driving profitability. Interestingly none of the quality of institutions indices or 
regional dummy variables are significantly correlated with profitability. Both security of 
property rights and freedom from corruption are nevertheless significantly and positively 
related with Central and South Africa dummies but not collinear. To uncover the impact that 
these summary statistics may have on MFIs profitability requires rigorous econometric 
analysis which we pursue in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120
Table 4.5 Correlations Matrix 
 ROA AG S CAP GR EFF PAR LS INF GNI PROF WA SA EA CA REG PR COR 
ROA 1.000 
1058 
                 
AG .095** 
1055 
1.000 
1143 
                
S .121** 
1056 
.360** 
1141 
1.000 
1144 
               
CAP -.016 
1058 
-.166** 
1142 
-.112** 
1143 
1.000 
1145 
              
GR .130** 
876 
.163** 
950 
.153** 
952 
-.461** 
952 
1.000 
953 
             
EFF -.312** 
865 
-.065* 
897 
.008 
899 
.062 
899 
-.211** 
754 
1.000 
899 
            
PAR -.075** 
1057 
.060* 
1141 
.005 
1142 
-.081** 
1143 
-.004 
951 
.032 
898 
1.000 
1145 
           
LS .123** 
1055 
.108** 
1139 
.003 
1140 
-.116** 
1141 
.096** 
949 
-.098** 
897 
-.026 
1142 
1.000 
1143 
          
INF .044 
1033 
.075** 
1109 
-.033 
1110 
.067* 
1111 
.005 
923 
.102** 
876 
.114** 
1111 
-.062* 
1109 
1.000 
2066 
         
GNI .042 
865 
.092** 
904 
.045 
904 
-.044 
906 
.078* 
756 
-.054 
858 
.078* 
905 
-.006 
904 
.240** 
897 
1.000 
906 
        
PROF -.061 
1058 
.022 
1143 
.045 
1144 
.045 
1145 
-.147 
953 
.080 
899 
.045 
1145 
-.168 
1143 
.081 
2066 
.013 
906 
1.000 
2310 
       
WA .054 
1058 
.077** 
1143 
-.041 
1144 
-.117** 
1145 
.097** 
953 
-.178** 
899 
-.067* 
1145 
.031 
1143 
-.003 
2066 
.096* 
906 
.123** 
2310 
1.000 
2310 
      
SA -.057 
1058 
-.128** 
1143 
-.018 
1144 
.121** 
1145 
-.145** 
953 
.276** 
899 
.166** 
1145 
.044 
1143 
.083** 
2066 
-.064* 
906 
.030 
2310 
-.402** 
2310 
1.000 
2310 
     
EA -.019 
1058 
.004 
1143 
.079** 
1144 
.062* 
1145 
-.040 
953 
-.007 
899 
-.102** 
1145 
-.096** 
1143 
-.025 
2066 
-.063 
906 
-.079** 
2310 
-.519** 
2310 
-.332** 
2310 
1.000 
2310 
    
CA .018 
1058 
.041 
1143 
-.038 
1144 
-.071* 
1145 
.118** 
953 
-.059 
899 
.052 
1145 
.043 
1143 
-.060** 
2066 
.031 
906 
-.115** 
2310 
-.279** 
2310 
-.175** 
2310 
-.230** 
2310 
1.000 
2310 
   
REG .134** 
1051 
.131** 
1135 
.116** 
1136 
-.202** 
1137 
.144** 
945 
-.166** 
892 
-.026 
1137 
.142** 
1135 
-.040 
2056 
.006 
899 
-.219** 
2299 
.109** 
2299 
-.072** 
2299 
-.104** 
2299 
.077** 
2299 
1.000 
2299 
  
PR .202 
58 
.514** 
66 
-.101 
66 
.113 
65 
-491** 
52 
.159 
56 
-.129 
66 
0.038 
66 
.002 
113 
-.168 
54 
-.038 
132 
0.80 
132 
.453** 
132 
-290** 
132 
-301** 
132 
-.179* 
132 
1.000 
132 
 
COR -.148 
58 
.235 
66 
-.031 
66 
-.156 
65 
-438** 
52 
.365** 
56 
.045 
66 
-0.043 
65 
-0.92 
113 
-2.04 
54 
.098 
132 
.119 
132 
.344** 
132 
-.114 
132 
-499** 
132 
-284** 
132 
.562** 
132 
1.000 
132 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Figures beneath are the observations (N) 
4.5.3 Multivariate regression analysis 
 Having examined the correlations which present an insight into how variables are related, we 
proceed to estimate a dynamic panel regression analysis which overcomes the multicolinearity 
between return on assets (ROA) and the previous return and which allows us to investigate the 
strength of these correlations. The estimation models encompass explanatory variables 
defined in Table 4.2.  
 
4.6. Empirical results and discussions 
Table 4.6 reports the results from our basic specification (4.2). The estimated model fits the 
panel data reasonably well, having fairly stable coefficients, while the Wald-test indicates fine 
goodness of fit since the overall test statistic shows rejection of the hypothesis that all 
coefficients are equal to zero (rejects the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of 
parameters). Although the estimated equation indicates the presence of negative first-order 
autocorrelation, this does not imply that the estimates are inconsistent. Inconsistency would 
only hold if the second order autocorrelation was present but this is rejected by the test for AR 
(2) errors (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The value test for the second order autocorrelation 
implies that the moment conditions of the model are valid.  
 
4.6.1 Persistence of profit and speed of convergence  
The final column of Table 4.6 gives the preferred model. In all the regressions, the speed of 
adjustment coefficient η  (the lagged profitability measure) is positive and significant. The 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is about 0.3 and significantly greater than zero. 
The departure from perfect competition is however marginal—profits tend to adjust fairly fast 
to their average level. This implies that there is some moderate persistence in microfinance 
profitability in Africa. It is plausible that if there is a shock to profitability level in the current 
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year, about 30% of the effect will persist into the following year. Intuitively, microfinance 
industry in Africa is not competitive.  
The theoretical proposition tested in the profit persistence literature that entry and exit is 
sufficiently free to eliminate any supernormal profits whatever their cause, and that all firms’ 
economic profit tends to converge to the same long-run average rate (see Berger et al., 2000; 
Singh 2003; Cuaresma and Gschwandtner, 2008) is not supported here. Our findings signal 
barriers to competition reflecting either impediments to market competition or informational 
asymmetry (Berger et al., 2000). It may also indicate the existence of market power in the 
industry (Goddard and Wilson, 2009). All these factors may encourage and intensify 
competition or slow/accelerate the convergence process. Because microfinance industry in 
Africa is not competitive, the application of dynamic incentives at the root of microfinance 
loan contracts as postulated by Guttman (2008) and Chowdhury (2007) may not be 
undermined. The role of the state should thus be to foster competition in the microfinance 
industry. Government policies that prioritise MFIs stability over competition may have a 
tendency to introduce new barriers to competition by insulating incumbent MFIs from rivalry.  
Comparable evidence amongst the MFIs is scant. Cull, et al (2009b) for example 
examines competition between conventional banks and MFIs and how this impacts on MFIs 
profitability and outreach of MFIs. They find that the effect of competition on MFI 
profitability appears weak. Hisako (2009) investigates whether microfinance competition 
worsens outreach and financial self-sufficiency. He finds that competition does not worsen 
financial self-sufficiency (FSS) and therefore does not raise subsidy dependence. Porteous 
(2006) examines whether microfinance competition lowers interest rates. Mcintosh, De 
Janvry and Sadoulet (2005) examine whether competition affects the incumbent village 
bank’s ability to attract new clients while Park, Brandt, and Giles (2003), investigates whether 
competition affects the effort and lending decisions of the incumbent. These studies do not 
answer the research question as to whether microfinance profits are persistent ostensibly 
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because; (i) their focus is not on MFI profitability and (ii) their empirical framework does not 
control for endogeneity on performance using a dynamic panel econometrics; they employ 
static analytical framework which is nevertheless useful only in identifying causal 
relationships between key variables when markets are in equilibrium (Geroski, 1990).  
In the conventional banking industry, a similar weak evidence of profit persistence was 
found for the conventional European banks by Goddard, et al (2010; 2004), amongst retail 
banks in Africa by Flamini et al (2009) and for the Greek banks by Athanasoglou, et al. 
(2008). It is however far from a foredawn conclusion that what holds true for large, traditional 
banks as a whole will also hold true for MFI’s. 
 
4.6.2 Control variables-further analysis 
Table 4.6 shows that the significance and the relative magnitude of influence of the MFI-
specific, macroeconomic and quality of institutions measures, evidenced in the previous 
chapter are preserved with notable exception of security of property rights, which is positive 
but insignificant. Property rights finding is counter-intuitive and should be investigated 
further. Macroeconomic context is similarly insignificant. However, as financial systems 
develop and the ongoing reform process in Africa ends, both the current and future rates of 
economic growth are likely to have an enhanced impact on MFI profitability. Consistent with 
the previous chapter, MFI age is not significantly associated with MFI profitability. Contrary 
to the previous chapter, we find evidence that gives credence to the hypothesis that firms 
which use more of debt financing are more profitable. The difference in results with this 
chapter is due to a major methodological update, including retroactive revisions and updating 
of the MIX market database. Our findings imply that MFIs that are more leveraged are also 
more profitable. 
Results show that efficient MFIs are more profitable. Consistent with previous chapter 
and with much of the previous banking literature (see e.g. Goddard et al 2010, Athanasoglou, 
et al 2008), efficiency appears to be a more important determinant of MFI profitability. 
Similarly size and credit risk are significant in explaining microfinance profitability which 
reinforces our findings in the previous chapter. Freedom from corruption is also significant 
suggesting a higher implicit cost of doing business.  
Table 4.6: Two-step system GMM estimation results (dependent variable: ROA) 
Variable  Notation  Variant of model specifications 
1 2 
Lagged ROA 
1−Π t  0.2499***  (9.22)      0.3169***    (10.63) 
Log size  S 0.0090***    
(3.35)    
0.0060***    
(3.54)    
Log age  AG  -0.0001   
(-0.14) 
-0.0117      
(-0.80)    
Capital  CAP  0.0507**    
(2.22) 
0.0750*** 
(2.79) 
Gearing  GR  0.0716***  
(2.98)  
0.1163***  
(3.60) 
Efficiency EFF -0.1863***  
(-6.17)  
-0.2234***    
(-9.70)    
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.0327* 
(-1.79) 
-0.0096** 
(-1.94) 
Loan size  LS 0.0008 
(0.94) 
 
Inflation expectations INF  0.0457    
(1.32) 
Per capita incomes GNI  -0.0067    
(0.70)  
Property rights PR  0.0405 
(1.51) 
Freedom from 
corruption 
COR  0.0019***  
(2.77) 
Wald-test     χ2(7) =  169.97  
Prob>chi2=0.96 
χ2(11)= 173.06 
Prob>chi2=0.96 
Sargan-testa    χ2(44) =  28.39 
Prob>chi2=0.97 
χ2(44) =  21.62 Prob>chi2=0.99 
AR(1)b     z = -2.98 
p-value = 0.00 
z =-2.79 
p-value = 0.00 
AR(2)c      
 
 z = 1.58 z =-1.77 
P-value = 0.85 P-value = 0.97 
This table presents the results from regressions conducted to determine the determinants of MFI profitability in 
Africa. For the definition of the variables see Table 4.2 
Estimations were performed using GMM estimation. T-Statistics are in parentheses and significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level is noted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 The Wald test is a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the given equation are all zero (Greene, 
2008). A low value indicates null hypothesis rejection.  
a Test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. 
b Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0.  (H0: no autocorrelation). 
c Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0. (H0: no autocorrelation). 
 
To gain a deeper insight into the processes affecting MFI profitability while controlling 
for time invariant factors, we run a random effects (RE) model with complete set of controls, 
including dummies for location, regulation and charter status. We are aware that FE model is 
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inappropriate since it would remove the time-invariant variables of interest. It is therefore not 
surprising that the Hausman (1978) specification test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients between RE and FE are not systematic and the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
Multiplier (LM) test similarly confirms the presence of individual effects which provides 
evidence in favour of the FE model. We take cognizance of the fact that while the presence of 
unobserved panel effects correlated with the explanatory variables in the regression may bias 
the result; we try to overcome this bias by including a full set of location dummies. 
On the basis of evidence adduced in Table 4.7, we do not find empirical support for the 
hypothesis that institutions formally constituted as NGO’s are less profitable. As elucidated in 
the data section (see previous chapter), to be attractive investment opportunities, most MFIs 
reporting to MIXmarket strive to run their operations very efficiently and pay close attention, 
among other variables, to profitability of their operations. This finding is consistent with Cull, 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch (2007) who finds the for-profit dummy insignificant in all their 
regressions.  It also confirms Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) who shows that the variable 
NGO is not significant in their profitability regression. This however does not support the 
theoretical proposition by Besley and Ghatak (2005) who predict that non-profit status alone 
can positively affect performance as donors would be more willing to support MFIs that are 
NGOs because the non-profit status guarantees permanency of the MFI social mission. 
Consistent with our findings is Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2011) who while investigating the 
existence of a difference in performance amongst MFIs in Sub-Saharan Africa according to 
their legal status, does not find significant difference in profitability between for profit and 
NGOs. 
We find no evidence to confirm the hypothesis of a positive link between regulation and 
MFI profitability, contrary to the arguments offered by proponents of regulating MFIs (see for 
example McGuire and Conroy, 2000; Steel and Andah, 2003). This counter intuitive finding 
confirms Mersland and Strøm (2009), who establish that regulation does not have a 
significant impact on financial performance and Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) who after 
controlling for the endogeneity of regulation, find that regulation has no impact on financial 
performance. Previous findings consistent with these results include Barth et al, (2004) who 
find cross-country evidence that regulation has no impact on the performance of conventional 
banks but inconsistent with Cull, et al (2011) and Hartarska (2005) who find supervision to be 
negatively associated with profitability. Clearly this issue deserves further empirical scrutiny. 
We also find that location or regional factor is also not significant in explaining MFI 
profitability, suggesting that MFIs’ profitability is mainly driven by local conditions. This is 
contrary to Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch (2007) who found MFIs from Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia and those from Sub-Saharan Africa outperformed those from other regions 
in terms of return on assets. As the microfinance industry aims at greater geographic 
diversification, our results indicate that profitability is not sensitive to location or regional 
distributional factors which reinforces the correlations in Table 4.5 
Table 4.7: Random-effects GLS regression results (dependent variable: ROA) 
Variable Notation Model specification 
Intercept 
itα   
Log Size  S 0.0100*** 
(2.49) 
Log Age  AG  -0.0056 
(-0.49) 
Capital  CAP  0.0453** 
(2.22) 
Gearing  GR  0.0168* 
(1.76) 
Efficiency EFF  -0.1001*** 
(-12.42) 
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.0107*** 
(-2.88) 
Inflation expectations INF 0.1329** 
(2.35) 
Loan size  LS 0.0035 
(0.92) 
Per capita incomes GNI -0.0005 
(-0.01) 
Property rights PR 0.0002 
(0.37) 
Freedom from corruption COR 0.0002 
(0.29) 
For profit PROF 0.0038 
(0.23) 
Regulated  REG 0.0056 
(0.30)   
West Africa WA 0.0521 
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(0.78) 
South Africa SA 0.0732 
(1.07) 
East Africa EA 0.0505 
(0.75)   
Central Africa CA 0.0390 
(0.66) 
R2  0.40 
No of obs.  471 
Wald test 
 
 chi2(16=  247.97 
Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
multiplier test 
 
 chi2(1)= 71.63  
Prob>chi2=0.0000 
H0:Var(u_i)=0 
Hausman specification test 
 
 chi2(11) = 73.06 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Ho: difference in coefficients not 
systematic 
This Table presents the results from regressions conducted to determine the determinants of profitability for 
Africa MFIs. Estimations were performed using GLS estimation. T-Statistics are in parentheses and significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is noted by *, ** and *** respectively. For the definition of the variables see Table 
4.2 
 
Further region/location analysis 
Studies of the location of services by commercial banks find that they generally favour 
economically well-endowed areas/regions to boost their profit margins. Is this the case with 
MFIs as well? To probe further on the location impacts on MFIs profitability, we split the 
sample of MFIs into four sub-samples, based on the regional distribution and estimate a fixed 
effect model for each sub-sample. This will allow us to compare the results with the summary 
statistics on Tables 4.3 and 4.4.  The results show that economies of scale do not matter with 
respect to MFI profitability in South Africa region. It appears MFIs in this region are more 
constrained by capital. Although loan size is not significant in explaining profitability in other 
regions, it is crucial in West Africa. Cost inefficiency is more of a problem in East Africa than 
other regions perhaps because of the higher outreach as shown in Table 4.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 128
Table 4.8: Estimation Results Using Fixed Effects-within (location effects) 
                                           Variant model specifications with robust standard errors    
Variable Notation WA SA CA EA 
Intercept  -0.1221 
(-2.13) 
0.2550 
(0.75) 
-0.5312 
(-1.90) 
-0.4128 
(-2.10) 
Log Size  S 0.0099 
(2.52) 
0.0145 
(0.60) 
0.0386 
(1.97) 
0.0353 
(2.41) 
Log Age  AG  -0.0004 
(-0.25) 
-0.0065 
(-0.89) 
-0.0036 
(-0.42) 
-0.0123 
(-0.39) 
Capital  CAP  0.0026 
(0.10)   
0.0509 
(2.45) 
0.4182 
(2.70) 
0.1893 
(5.36) 
Gearing  GR  0.0058 
(2.40) 
0.0188 
(1.12) 
0.0032 
(0.21) 
0.0148  
(2.64) 
Efficiency EFF -0.1828 
(-7.43) 
-0.1410 
(-5.43) 
-0.4722 
(-4.81) 
-0.3245 
(-11.32) 
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.0157  
(-0.34) 
-0.0158 
(-0.21) 
-0.1215 
(-1.91) 
-0.1520 
(1.97) 
Loan size LS 0.0095 
(2.50) 
-0.0035 
(-0.69) 
0.0026 
(0.23) 
-0.0046 
(-0.38) 
Inflation 
expectations 
INF -0.0011 
(-0.01)   
0.2949 
(1.47) 
0.0544 
(0.33) 
0.0330 
(0.27) 
Per capita incomes GNI -0.0500 
(-1.00) 
-0.0206 
(-0.28) 
0.1340 
(1.42) 
0.1252 
(1.56) 
R2  0.28 0.44 0.79 0.61 
No of obs.  269 105 40 229 
This Table presents regression with robust standard errors results conducted to determine the determinants of 
profitability for Africa MFIs. Estimations were performed using fixed effects estimation. T-Statistics are in 
parentheses and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, ** and *** respectively. A detailed 
description of the definition and sources of the variables is given in Table 4.2 
 
 
4.6.3 Robustness checks 
To confirm the main results, a robustness check is performed by running the same set of 
regressions for a smaller data set of 1,260 observations over a reduced period of six years 
(2002-2007). Using a significantly reduced unbalanced sample does not fundamentally alter 
the results. Table 4.9 shows that the significance and the relative magnitude of influence of all 
variables of interest are preserved. Therefore, while controlling operating expenditure remains 
the most important task for MFIs, credit risk, capital adequacy and scale economies play a 
significant role in determining MFI profitability. 
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Table 4.9: Random-effects GLS regression results (dependent variable: ROA) 
Variable Notation Model specification 
Log Size  S 0.0113*** 
(2.84) 
Log Age  AG  -0.0104 
(-0.89) 
Capital  CAP  0.0508*** 
(2.46) 
Gearing  GR  0.0198** 
(2.10) 
Efficiency EFF -0.0951*** 
(-11.87) 
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.0102*** 
(-2.56) 
Loan size  LS 0.0031 
(0.92) 
Inflation expectations INF 0.1668*** 
(2.89) 
For profit PROF 0.0105 
(0.66) 
Regulated  REG -0.0005 
(-0.02) 
West Africa WA 0.0487 
(0.74) 
South Africa SA 0.0717 
(1.08)  
East Africa EA 0.0494 
(0.75) 
Central Africa CA 0.0449 
(0.75) 
R2  0.39 
No of obs.  444 
Wald test 
 
 chi2(14)= 229.25 
Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
multiplier test 
 
 chi2(1)=58.64 
Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
H0:Var(u_i)=0 
Hausman specification test 
 
 chi2(9) = 35.97 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Ho: difference in coefficients not 
systematic 
This Table presents the results from regressions conducted to determine the determinants of profitability for 
Africa MFIs. Estimations were performed using GLS estimation. T-Statistics are in parentheses and significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is noted by *, ** and *** respectively. For the definition of the variables see Table 
4.2 
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4.7. Conclusions, policy implications and prescriptions  
In this chapter, we specified a dynamic empirical framework to investigate persistence of 
microfinance profits in Africa. Novel features of this chapter are the analysis of the effect of 
previous levels of MFI profits and additional time invariant control variables on profitability 
by use of an appropriate econometric methodology. All the estimated models are robust 
across various specifications while the results obtained in the previous chapter on the control 
variables are confirmed. This makes our findings more reliable and credible. The study 
identifies a series of new findings and policy implications.  
First, although competition is effective in eliminating excess profit, our results suggest 
that this is not happening within microfinance industry in Africa. Therefore successful MFIs 
with advantages which enable them to earn supernormal profits can be expected to take 
measures to try and maintain those advantages in the future. This calls for some serious 
reconsideration of microfinance policy in Africa. Government regulations faced by MFIs are 
often ambiguous and opaque in most of the Africa countries which makes it difficult as well 
as labour intensive to create financial stable MFIs (see Lafourcade, et al 2006). Policymakers 
should therefore strive to remove MFI entry barriers as well as other obstacles to competition 
and similarly lower regulatory costs. Competition may support profitability of MFIs if the 
benefits of agglomeration effects and a stronger regulatory environment outweigh negative 
spillovers.   
In order to maintain a competitive environment, policy makers will need to concentrate 
not only on capital adequacy, but also on competition in product markets. That 
notwithstanding, few issues remain unresolved. For example, competition for deposits 
imposes a cost that has to be borne under increased microfinance competition, and its role 
should be analyzed in a dynamic framework that allows for the development of customer 
relationships. Also, MFI's ability to raise funds may be correlated with depositors' or 
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investors' expectations concerning profitability, so that MFIs that are perceived as being 
profitable should find it easier to raise funds as well as entering new markets.  
Second, although this chapter upholds the findings from the previous chapter on the 
control variables, there are interesting new findings. Efficient MFIs in the management of 
operating expenses are more profitable. Further research should therefore be undertaken to 
uncover how technology can optimally be used to enhance operational efficiency, and what 
partnerships are required to scale up technological solutions. Since one of the primary 
obstacles to an MFI’s ability to adopt mobile banking is the lack of adequate back office 
systems, any scaling up of mobile and cell phone banking will need to take into account the 
management information systems and operational challenges that MFIs face in Africa and 
how best to address these issues. There is however need for more understanding on corporate 
governance in MFIs which may be a contributory factor on cost inefficiency. 
Third, we find that regional distribution of MFIs or location effects matters. The nature 
of microfinance products and technology, and the constellation of incentives within MFIs may 
be such that certain locations are systematically favoured while others are avoided. Clearly 
more comprehensive data collection and more research are needed to better understand what 
factors drive the differences and the impact on profits. 
Fourth, we find that capital is important in explaining MFI profitability which gives 
credence to an appropriate policy of imposing higher capital requirement to strengthen and 
stabilize microfinance sector in Africa. Our findings regarding equity therefore calls for a 
policy that advocates for better access to capital sources including savings mobilization. 
Fifth, successful MFIs appear to be larger and therefore one can conclude that failure to 
become profitable is partly due to the lack of scale economies. Consequences of failure to 
achieve scale of economies may be manifested in reduced financial intermediation.  
Sixth, while freedom from corruption is a significant factor in explaining MFI profits, 
we do not obtain conclusive results as to whether security of property rights influences MFI 
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profitability. We find that regulation of MFIs is not significant in explaining MFI profitability. 
Though these results are intuitive from an economic perspective, it remains an open question 
whether the benefits of supervision in terms of better protection of depositors’ funds improves 
MFI profitability. Perhaps studies of past pro-poor banking systems such as the Irish loan 
funds, savings banks and cooperatives, which once operated in uncompetitive and unregulated 
markets similar to MFIs can yield new empirical knowledge for today. 
Given the important role that the microfinance sector plays in the expansion of the 
private sector, future research on the persistence of MFI profits should focus on country-
specific studies that will provide country-level policy conclusions. The model put forward in 
this study can easily be expanded to include a persistence parameter that account for 
asymmetric profits and profit persistence dynamics or regime shifts in the autoregressive 
parameter governing the autocorrelation in profit rates. Put differently, future research should 
seek to answer research questions such as; to what extent is the estimated speed of adjustment 
for MFIs reporting negative profits different from that of positive profits and the impact of 
lending technology and the type of contract on profit persistence. Another possible extension 
could be the examination of differences in the determinants of profitability between small and 
large or high-profits and low-profits MFIs. These are important considerations for 
microfinance development in Africa.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
MICROFINANCE PROFITABILITY: DOES THE FINANCING CHOICE 
MATTER?52 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
A profitable microfinance industry is vital in maintaining the stability of the micro-banking 
system53. Low profitability weakens the capacity of MFIs to absorb negative shocks, which 
subsequently affect solvency. Profitability reflects how MFIs are run given the environment in 
which they operate, which should epitomize their efficiency, risk management capabilities, 
competitive strategies, quality of management and levels of capitalization.    
Why is financing choice important for MFIs profitability? Financing choice raises 
particularly important research and policy questions regarding the microfinance industry. 
Microfinance industry promotes small scale investments that generates sufficient revenues 
from otherwise unrealized market activities while yielding a return on the investment. Agency 
costs may be particularly large in this industry because MFIs hold private information on their 
loan clients. In addition, MFIs access to grant funding and other safety net protections may 
increase incentives for risk shifting or lax risk management, potentially increasing the agency 
costs of outside debt.  
Financing choice involves a trade off between risk and return to maximize shareholder 
wealth (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). The objective of an optimal financing choice 
for any firm is therefore to have a mix of debt, preferred stock, and common equity that will 
maximize shareholders wealth. A higher leverage can boost the rate of return on equity during 
prosperity. On the contrary, a higher leverage may raise the risk on the part of the firm’s 
 
52 A previous version of this chapter was presented at the Annual Canadian Economics Association Conference held at University of Ottawa 
2nd-5th June, 2011. I acknowledge the inputs of the conference participants. 
53 Measured by return on assets (ROA), MFIs are on average more profitable than conventional banks in their respective countries. This 
does not imply that MFIs are more profitable than conventional banks. Rather, it is a pointer that microfinance industry has not yet matured 
in most countries where providers’ profits have not yet been squeezed down. Measured by return on the equity (ROE), MFIs are on average 
less profitable than banks, perhaps because MFIs are not yet as fully leveraged as banks. Contrary to conventional banks, MFIs fund their 
assets with more of their own capital and less of deposits.  
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earnings stream. Moreover, the presence of debt may exert pressure on MFI management to 
ensure profitability in order to honour such debt obligations. Although debt as a homogeneous 
source of MFI funds is a powerful theoretical construct, this chapter goes beyond the leverage 
decision and investigates other dimensions of MFIs funding choice. Even with respect to debt, 
the nature of debt and its incentive properties can differ according to, for instance, maturity 
and to the providers. 
Table 5.1 shows that MFIs have two broad funding options beyond debt which include 
deposits (if regulation allows), and equity. Deposits may be a cheaper option than debt or 
equity if volume and terms leverage potential market demand. It is also evident from Table 
5.1 that MFIs in Africa rely more on savings to finance their activities. Indeed existing 
evidence shows that whereas globally most MFIs rely heavily on donations and retained 
earnings to fund their activities, 72 percent of Africa MFIs fund their activities with deposits 
which are significantly higher relative to other regions (Lafourcade, et al 2006).  
Table 5.1: Financing Structure 
 Debt to equity 
 
Deposits to loans 
 
Deposits to total assets 
 
Portfolio to assets 
 
 Units  (%) (%) (%) (%) 
 Year 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
Age54 New (1-4 
yrs) 
        
2.5  
        
3.4  
          
2.9  4.0 6.2 0.0 2.7 3.7 0.0 
    
76.4  71.2 77.9 
Young 
(5-8 yrs) 
         
1.8  
        
2.7  
          
3.1  0.0 1.1 4.8 0.0 1.0 2.1 
     
81.7  80.6 74.4 
Mature 
(over 8 
yrs) 
        
2.9  
        
3.2  
          
3.4  10.1 6.2 1.4 4.9 4.6 3.3 
     
78.1  79.4 79.3 
Charter Type 
Bank 
        
1.2  
        
1.7  
          
1.9  69.3 64.0 66.3 41.6 41.4 51.0 
    
67.3  68.0 71.6 
Credit 
Union 
        
3.9  
        
4.6  
          
4.4  79.8 80.8 71.9 61.7 62.1 61.0 
    
80.6  78.6 78.8 
NBFI 
        
2.7  
        
3.3  
          
3.5  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
    
80.4  81.0 81.4 
NGO 
         
1.3  
         
1.7  
          
2.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
    
80.6  80.9 80.7 
Methodology 
Individual 
        
3.7  
        
4.2  
          
4.0  20.4 16.9 31.0 9.5 9.7 20.8 
    
80.5  82.2 83.0 
Individual
/ 
Solidarity 
         
1.9  
        
2.5  
          
2.9  0.6 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.3 
    
79.9  79.1 77.5 
Solidarity 
         
1.7  
        
2.4  
          
2.8  19.8 19.0 20.4 11.3 13.9 13.9 
    
67.6  70.4 72.7 
Village 
Banking 
        
2.0  
        
2.2  
          
2.6  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
    
77.2  79.1 79.7 
                                                 
54 Microbanking Bulletin classify MFIs into three categories (new, young, and mature) based on the maturity of their microfinance 
operations. This is calculated as the difference between the year they started their microfinance operations and the year of data submitted by 
the institutions. 
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Profit Status 
Profit 
         
4.1  
        
4.3  
          
4.3  21.1 26.8 21.5 16.1 11.9 17.2 
    
73.0  71.9 71.5 
Not for 
Profit 
         
1.7  
         
2.1  
          
2.5  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
    
80.8  80.9 81.0 
Region 
Africa 
        
2.3  
        
2.5  
          
2.7  54.4 51.2 49.1 31.2 34.0 34.9 
    
66.7  66.5 67.3 
Asia 
        
4.5  
        
1.4  
          
4.9  23.3 23.5 24.2 11.2 14.8 11.7 
    
74.0  71.0 73.5 
ECA 
         
1.8  
        
2.7  
          
2.9  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
    
87.2  86.7 89.1 
LAC 
        
2.5  
        
2.6  
          
3.2  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
    
80.5  81.2 82.2 
MENA 
        
0.6  
        
0.8  
          
0.9  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
     
82.1  81.0 82.0 
 Source: MicroBanking Bulletin, September 2010 (Issue No. 20).     
Mature MFIs are more likely to have been licensed to mobilize deposits and therefore 
may have a higher deposit to assets, deposit to loans, and loans-assets ratio, ceteris paribus 
(see Table 5.1). It is also evident that mature MFIs have higher debt-equity composition 
perhaps because as firms mature they become known to the market, which enables them to 
expand their access to capital. Put differently, as MFIs get older, the weight of external 
financial sources steadily decreases while the equity steadily becomes a more important 
source of finance. Additionally, mature MFIs may have lower debt ratios as they accumulate 
deposits and/or plough back into lending the retained profits. It also appears that NGO type of 
MFIs rely more on debt financing relative to other type of MFIs, perhaps because many are 
not regulated (see Table 10, Appendix B) to mobilize deposits. Table 5.2 provides details of 
the characteristics of both international and domestic MFI funding instruments.  
Voluntary deposits55 are a source of inexpensive and sustainable source of funds for 
MFI lending but, deposits may require widespread branching and other expenses with 
implications on MFI profitability. MFIs with access to donor funds may not respond to 
funding pressures to operate efficiently or may deliberately choose outreach over profitability 
by serving poorer or rural clients with higher delivery costs (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). 
The shift from donor dependence to sourcing funding from capital markets also raises 
fundamental questions regarding the role of funding instruments with obvious implications on 
MFIs profitability.  
                                                 
55 In this study the term deposits is applicable to any type of instrument used by MFIs to mobilize deposits and is not restricted to any 
particular type of instrument, such as time deposits or savings accounts. 
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Table 5.2. Alternative sources of funding instruments 
Instrument Investor Strengths  
When/How to Use 
International    
Policy Support  Donors Helps government make sound decisions 
and take a constructive role. 
When specialized expertise is needed  
Technical 
Assistance  
Donors Builds much-needed human capacity. Needs to be market-based and client-responsive. 
Best for donors that can work directly with private sector. 
Grants  Donors Helps build equity that can later be 
leveraged. 
When commercial sources unavailable, avoid distorting markets with 
money perceived as “too easy”. 
Loans   
Concessional  Donors  Source of cheap funds. Its important to avoid foreign exchange risk when in hard currency. 
If commercial alternatives exist, avoid distorting domestic markets 
and reducing incentives to mobilize deposits. 
Commercial  Donors, IFIs56, Private 
Funds 
 
Source of funds for cash-strapped financial 
institutions. Focus on efficient 
microfinance operations. 
For mature institutions. If commercial alternatives exist, avoid 
distorting domestic markets and reducing incentives to mobilize 
deposits. 
Quasi-equity57  Donors, IFIs Source of funds for financial institution. Same as concessional debt but only relevant to mature MFIs 
Equity 
Investment  
Private Funds, IFIs Contributes equity that can be leveraged on 
domestic  
Applicable to mature, formal institutions that sell shares. 
Avoid crowding out local investors. 
Domestic   
Savings  Individual Savers  Independence from external funding low 
cost over time. 
This only applies to regulated MFIs as some MFIs may need support 
to develop products and systems to lower costs and manage growth 
of deposits. 
Loans    
Concessional  Apexes58, Govt. Credit 
Schemes 
Apexes, if well-designed and administered, 
can help develop retail MFIs. 
If commercial alternatives exist, avoid distorting develop retail 
MFIs.  
Commercial  Commercial Banks Integrates MFIs into mainstream (although 
it may not include longer-term financing 
required for some activities, for example 
agriculture). 
For mature institutions. Initial incentives or partnerships might be 
needed to jump-start funding between commercial banks and 
specialized MFIs. 
Bonds  Local Investors Allows financial institutions to tap into 
domestic capital markets. 
Requires sufficiently developed secondary market; markets; 
dependent on local shocks. May require initial incentives to get 
started in some markets. 
                                                 
56 Subordinated debt at a subsidized interest rate that can be converted to equity. Usually medium- to long-term loans designed to be repaid from profits. 
57 Publicly-owned international finance institutions that are involved in microfinance. Includes bilateral institutions such as the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation and its counterparts. 
58 Government sponsored agencies that function as wholesale market institutions, channelling funds to smaller MFIs 
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Equity 
 
 
Direct 
Investments  
Local Investors Builds an equity base that can be leveraged 
on domestic market.  
This only applies to licensed MFIs. Avoid mission drift because of 
stockholder demands by balancing socially and profit-oriented 
owners. 
Stock Market  Local Investors Allows financial institutions to tap into 
domestic capital markets. 
Only licensed financial institutions are eligible to sell shares on the 
market. Avoid mission drift because of diluted ownership and 
stockholder demands. 
Source: Helms (2006) 
 138
                                                
Most of the existing literature on the impact of capital structure on firm performance has 
dealt on large and listed firms within developed economies. Although several research 
questions remain unresolved in the banking industry, due to banks being informational 
opaque, (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006), it similarly remains so for the microfinance 
industry where information asymmetry is also severe.  Bogan (2009) investigates the impact 
of existing sources of funding on the efficiency and financial sustainability of MFIs. He finds 
causal evidence to the effect that more use of grants by MFIs decreases OSS. What is missing 
in the literature is a focus on profitability while controlling for endogeinity and other country 
and firm level covariates. 
Since the seminal contribution by Modigliani and Miller (1958), several subsequent 
studies59 show that a firm with high leverage tends to have a capital structure that translates 
into a better performance. The basic MM principles are applicable to financial intermediaries, 
but only after taking into consideration the fundamental differences in how financial 
institutions and other type of corporations operate (Cebenoyan and Strahan 2004). This has 
motivated researchers to examine the impact of capital structure on performance; though the 
main focus has been on the non-financial firms.  
Empirical evidence on the agency costs hypothesis in the banking and finance literature 
is mixed and remains contestable (see Titman, 2000 and Myers, 2001 for reviews). In some 
cases negative relationships are found, but opposite results have similarly been documented. 
The lack of non-contestable evidence may partly be explained by the difficulty in defining a 
measure of performance that is close to the theoretical definition of agency costs. The mixed 
results in the previous research may also be due to the possibility of reverse causation from 
performance to capital structure. If for instance MFI profitability affects the choice of 
financing, then failure to take this reverse causality into account may result in simultaneous-
equations bias (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006).  
 
59 There is a vast amount of literature with respect to the optimal capital structure of corporate firms (See for example, Faulkender and 
Petersen 2006; Harris and Raviv 1991) 
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Using a sample of French manufacturing companies, Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) 
investigate the linkage among capital structure, ownership structure, and corporate 
performance. They find evidence supporting the theoretical predictions of the Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) hypothesis; that higher leverage is associated with improved efficiency over 
the entire range of observed data. An analysis from listed firms in Tehran Stock Exchange, by 
Arbabiyan and Safari (2009) found short-term and total debts to be positively related to 
profitability (ROE) and a negative relation between long-term debts and profitability. While 
focusing on the link between capital structure and profitability on small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) in Ghana, Abor (2005) shows that short-term debt ratio is positively 
correlated with return on equity. This confirms Hadlock and James (2002) who find that 
banks with high leverage report high level of profitability and Michaelas et al. (1999) who 
similarly found a positive impact on performance. 
On the contrary, several studies reveal a negative relation between capital structure and 
performance. Using the ratio of profit before interest, tax and depreciation to total assets and 
ratio of cash flows to total assets as profitability proxies, and two leverage measures, 
including ratio of total borrowing to asset and ratio of total liability to sum total of liability 
and equity, Chakraborty (2010) finds a negative relation. This confirms Huang and Song 
(2006) among Chinese firms. The negative influence of profitability on leverage should 
however become stronger as firm size increases. This is consistent with Caesar and Holmes 
(2003), Chiang et al. (2002), who document a negative relationship between profitability and 
both long-term and short-term debt. Other studies that find high levels of debt in the capital 
structure to decrease firm's profitability include Gleason et al (2000), Hirota (1999), Krishnan 
and Moyer (1997), Rajan and Zingales (1995). With mixed evidence in the literature, it is 
clear that financing choice and profitability is an important research agenda. 
The main goal of this study therefore is to investigate the role that individual funding 
instruments play in influencing MFI profitability. To achieve this objective, we employ 
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dynamic panel data analysis to a broad sample of 167 MFIs across 32 Africa economies, for 
the period 1997-2008. Rather than delve into whether profitability is directly related to 
particular stages of a life cycle pattern of funding (see Helms, 2006), this study uncovers the 
role individual funding instruments play in determining MFI profitability. In spite of a 
possible association between funding sources and microfinance profitability, there have been 
no systematic studies for a large group of MFIs with a focus on Africa that provide robust 
evidence of how variations in funding affect MFI profitability. 
We explore this issue by addressing the research questions; does source of funding 
matter on microfinance profitability? What is the optimal mix of debt, equity and deposits 
which ensures profitability? It is in light of these research questions, that this study seeks to 
broaden and deepen our understanding on the impacts of choice of financing structure on MFI 
profitability.  
This study makes contributions to the existing knowledge four fold. First, since capital 
constraints have hindered the expansion of MFIs activities in Africa (Lafourcade, et al 2006), 
the question of how best to finance MFIs is crucial. Understanding the role played by various 
instruments of funding MFIs is important both to the shareholders and MFIs management—
who are interested in making effective decisions that will help boost the profitability of their 
respective MFIs. 
Second, the huge interest in MFI investment vehicles makes this study unique. There 
has been a rapid growth in foreign investment by various funds that tend to be more 
commercially oriented, such as the Dexia Microcredit Fund and MicroVest (Abrams and 
Ivatury, 2005). In 2003, for example, foreign investors in microfinance invested USD 62 
million in debt, equity, and guarantees in 104 MFIs in Africa. This accounted for 21 percent 
of recipients of foreign investment (104 of 505 global MFIs). Understanding the role played 
by financing structure in enhancing MFI’s profitability may therefore help these investment 
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funds that target their money towards MFI’s, with the aim of earning returns from the 
investments.  
Third, at the policy level the outcome of this study is important to the MFI managers 
and regulators when making choices on alternative funding instruments. MFIs managers who 
are able to identify an optimal financing choice may be rewarded for minimising MFIs cost of 
capital which has implications on profitability. From a creditor's perspective, it is possible that 
the debt to equity ratio aids in understanding MFIs' risk management strategies and how MFIs 
determine the likelihood of default associated with financially distressed firms.  
Finally, at the macro level, capital structure issues raise particularly policy relevant 
questions regarding the microfinance industry. This is because of the crucial roles played by 
MFIs in channelling credit to non-financial firms and in transmitting the effects of monetary 
policy. This is vital in providing stability to the economy as a whole.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: In the next section we review the 
related literature. Section 3 describes conceptual framework and empirical specifications. 
Section 4 describes data and measurements of our variables of interest. Section 5 outlines 
econometric methodology. Following good practice guidelines suggested by a number of 
authors, (see e.g. Roodman, 2009), we report the main econometric specification choices that 
we faced and explain why the dynamic system-GMM panel model is our preferred model 
over the OLS and static panel estimation. In section 6 we present the empirical results and 
explore a number of robustness checks. Conclusions and policy suggestions are offered in the 
final section by pointing out some unresolved issues. 
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5.2 Theoretical underpinnings: firm performance and capital structure 
In this section we review trade off, agency, and pecking order theories of capital structure and 
relate the same to microfinance. The seminal paper dealing with irrelevance of debt in capital 
structure for determining firm value by Modigliani-Miller (1958) included a number of 
assumptions—one of which was absence of corporate tax. Subsequently when Modigliani-
Miller (1963) controlled for corporate tax, it was found that theoretically the value of a firm 
should increase with debt because of higher interest tax shield. But monotonic increase of 
debt for higher tax shield increases bankruptcy cost especially when profitability of the firm is 
low and fluctuating. This leads to ‘trade off’ theory of capital structure that considers an 
optimum debt level or target level, where the marginal increase of present value of tax saving 
is just offset by the same amount of bankruptcy cost.  
Although we may not be able to determine the exact debt target level objectively in 
microfinance, because of MFIs industrial organization, trade off theory explains that that there 
is a limit to debt financing and the target debt may vary from MFI  to MFI depending on 
profitability, among a host of other factors. Consistently profitable MFIs with a lot of tangible 
asset that can be offered as collateral for debt may have a higher target debt ratio. Simply put 
high proportion of fixed interest capital to equity would imply that the MFI is highly indebted 
and risks becoming insolvent. On the other hand highly leveraged MFIs may perform better 
by enjoying scale economies and enhancing their capability to boost profitability.  
The second theory relevant to financing choice is known as ‘pecking order’ developed 
by Myers (1984). It is based on the premise that in reality successful firms with high and 
consistent profitability rarely use debt financing. The origin of pecking order theory is 
asymmetric information where managers know more about a firm’s prospect than the outside 
investors. The theory suggests that if the firm issues equity shares to finance a project, it has 
to issue shares at less than the prevailing market price. This signals that the shares are 
overvalued and the management is not confident to service the debt if the project is financed 
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by debt. On the contrary if external borrowing is used to finance the project, it sends a signal 
that the management is confident of the future prospect of servicing debt. Hence debt is 
preferred over shares in financing decision. If debt is issued, pricing of debt instrument 
remains a problem. To avoid controversy the management may wish to finance project by 
internal fund generation, i.e. by retained earning. Thus, financing follows an order, first-
retained earning, then-debt and finally equity when debt capacity gets exhausted. This 
explains why the profitable firm uses less debt. These preferences exhibit transitivity in the 
choice of financing. MFIs in Africa may represent an interesting scenario since on average 
retained earnings are zero and perhaps following the pecking order may opt for debt since 
quite a number are not regulated and therefore have no access to capital market. Should we 
find evidence that is consistent with the pecking order theory then our results may highlight a 
negative relation between debt and MFI profitability. 
The theoretical foundation on agency cost hypothesis is that the managers’ interests and 
that of the shareholders are not perfectly aligned. This workhorse is due to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). They also contend that agency costs could also arise from conflicts between 
equity and debt holders. These conflicts arise when there is a risk of default. The risk of any 
default may lead to debt-overhang or underinvestment (Myers 1977). In this case, debt will 
have a negative effect on the value of the firm and therefore profitability. It could also be a 
scenario where managers have for instance incentives to take excessive risks as part of risk 
shifting investment strategies (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Williams 1987). This is where 
higher leverage becomes useful as a governance mechanism to reduce wasteful cash flow by a 
threat of liquidation (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Williams 1987). This may also lead to higher 
pressure on the part of the management to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses on the 
part of the debt (Jensen, 1986). We therefore expect higher leverage to impact positively on 
firm performance.  
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There is however a threshold beyond which a rise in the proportion of debt in the capital 
structure; the benefits of leverage may not be realized (Altman, 1984; Titman, 1984). When 
leverage becomes relatively high, further increases may generate significant agency costs, 
ostensibly because of increase of bankruptcy costs (Titman 1984), managers may reduce their 
effort to control risk which result in higher expected costs of financial distress, bankruptcy, or 
liquidation (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006) and inefficient use of excessive cash used 
by managers for empire building (Jensen, 1986). But firm performance may also affect the 
capital structure choice (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006).  
The literature survey presented in this section underscores the importance of financing 
choice on firm performance. Agency theory is very relevant in the microfinance industry 
since the interests of MFIs management and those of social investors may not be aligned. 
Some MFIs have continuously received grants and subsidized loans from development 
agencies to finance the transition into deposit mobilization. Grant financing may for example 
create moral hazard or incentive issues with respect to MFI operations and subsequently 
profitability. Donors and social investors have vested goals all aimed at boosting outreach 
while MFI management may be profit motivated. Agency costs may be particularly large in 
microfinance industry because MFIs are by their very nature informational opaque—where 
they hold private information on the borrowers. Moreover, regulators in the case of MFIs that 
are formally constituted may set minimums for equity capital in order to deter excessive risk 
taking which may affect agency costs directly and alter MFIs’ financing choice with 
consequences on profitability. In addition, MFIs access to grant funding and other safety net 
protections may increase incentives for risk shifting or lax risk management. 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Empirical Specifications 
5.3.1 Design of the model  
Microfinance literature devotes considerable attention to the life cycle model which is 
basically a process of “NGO transformation”. The basis of the argument is that sources of 
MFIs financing are intertwined with the stages of MFI development (Helms, 2006). However, 
it does not seem to tell the entire story with respect to financing choice. We abstract from this 
line of argument since our primary focus is on the impact different sources of funding have on 
the outcome―profitability. We therefore estimate the following basic regression: 
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Where the outcome is a measure of the profitability ictΠ  of microfinance institution i in 
year t located in country c, with i=1. . .N, t=1, . . ., T; α is the regression constant,  
represents capital structure variables,  represents other MFI or firm-level characteristic, 
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unobservable time effects, iυ is the unobserved complete set of MFI-specific effect and ictμ is 
the idiosyncratic error. δβη ,,  are the coefficients to be estimated.  is the one-period 
lagged profitability and 
1−Π ict
η  is the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. This is a one-way error 
component regression model, where  and independent of .  )2υσ,0(IIN~υi )2μσ,0(~ IINμ it
We acknowledge the possibility of an alternative model, where funding may be 
assumed to shift or to evolve in tandem with changing market share. Although this is well 
grounded in the finance literature, it nevertheless appears less relevant in microfinance. 
Conceptually, market share fails to capture MFIs characteristics that graduate from informal 
arrangements and pre-existing MFIs. Additionally, the market share approach does not allow 
for changes in MFI profitability that may be associated with economies of scale, even if the 
growth in market share outpaces the growth of MFI size. 
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5.4 Data and hypotheses  
Hypothesis testing and predictions 
Some MFIs use more of borrowed funds than equity or vice versa. The impact of more debt is 
on the various risks perceived by the providers of equity capital which is construed to have a 
significant impact on the cost of capital. High proportion of fixed interest capital to equity 
especially in times of rising interest rates would imply that the MFI is highly leveraged and 
risks becoming insolvent. This is particularly so due to the additional interest that has to be 
paid out for the debt. 
On the contrary, highly leveraged MFIs may perform better by enjoying scale 
economies. Additionally, debt instrument may acts as a governance mechanism by reducing 
management discretionary power on cash flow (Harris and Raviv, 1990). This in turn may 
boost profitability. We therefore hypothesize an indeterminate relationship between debt and 
MFI profitability.  
Deposit to assets ratio is only relevant to MFIs that mobilize deposits. The lower the 
ratio, the greater is the MFI’s capability to fund its assets from deposits. As long as the 
deposits program is efficient, we expect a proportionally larger deposit-total asset ratio to 
translate to a lower cost of funds. External funding is often a costly source of funding than 
deposits but which is the case when the deposit-total asset ratio is higher.  MFIs may also 
effectively use local depositors as in the case of Irish loan funds (Hollis, and Sweetman, 2007) 
not just for funding, but also because of the important discipline that depositors can impose on 
expenses management—which has an impact on profitability. We therefore postulate a 
positive relationship between deposits mobilization and profitability. 
Portfolio to asset ratio may also affect profitability. In the empirical banking literature, 
portfolio to asset ratio is often used both as a measure of credit risk and lending specialisation. 
Loans are less liquid but more risky than other assets in MFIs’ portfolio. The risk of default, 
and the additional costs incurred in managing credit risk, requires MFIs to apply a risk 
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premium to the interest rate charged for the loan. MFIs with a relatively high portfolio to asset 
ratio may be at greater risk of failure. However, if portfolio to asset ratio is interpreted as 
measure of lending specialisation, a high portfolio to asset ratio might indicate that MFI 
specialises in lending because it benefits from informational advantages, which may reduce 
intermediation costs and enhance profitability (Freixas, 2005). Larger share of loans to total 
assets may therefore translate to more interest revenue because of the higher risk. However, 
MFI loans are subject to significantly higher transaction costs than retail profit seeking banks, 
which include cost of funds for on-lending, the loan loss, and administrative costs (Cull et al 
2009a). MFI clients may often live in inaccessible locations. Since MFIs operations are 
heavily dependent on personal contact for their execution which is very time-consuming, this 
translates to a higher absolute transaction cost per loan. That notwithstanding, profitability 
should increase with a larger share of loans to assets as long as interest rates on loans are 
liberalized and the MFI applies mark-up pricing. We therefore predict a positive relationship 
between portfolio to asset ratio and MFI profitability.  
 
Other MFI specific variables 
Most of the control variables in equation (5.1) are the same as those used in the other studies 
of MFI performance (Ahlin et al, 2011; Cull, et al 2009b, 2011; Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Morduch 2007). Additional MFI-specific characteristics are captured by controls for share of 
lending to women. Existing literature with respect to share of lending to women remains 
contestable. Several studies shows that MFIs with a higher share of lending to women report 
better repayments, which lowers risk and increases profitability (D’Espallier et al 2011, Pham 
and Lensink 2007; Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright 2006; Khandker 2005; Kevane and Wydick 
2001; Pitt and Khadker 1998). Indeed Armendáriz and Morduch (2010), points that Grameen 
Bank originally had a majority of male clients but decided to concentrate almost entirely on 
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women due to repayment problems related to male clients60 and perhaps because female 
entrepreneurs face tighter credit availability compared to men (Fletschner 2009); even though 
they do not pay higher interest rates (Bellucci, et al 2010). On the contrary, MFIs that focus 
on women usually advance smaller loans, which increase their operational costs (D’Espallier 
et al 2010; Balkenhol, 2007). We therefore predict an indeterminate effect on profitability a 
priori. 
Consistent with the previous chapter, the regressions also include a number of country-
level controls. We use two proxies for the macroeconomic environment; inflation and GDP 
per capita growth. We use GDP per capita61 growth which is arguably the most informative 
single indicator of economic progress. It can be considered an approximate summary statistic 
for the various institutional, technological, and factor-accumulation related ingredients of 
development. Inflation expectation is measured at time t-1 annual % change of the GDP 
deflator at market prices for each country where the MFI is located for each year. 
 Further country-level controls include rural population share (in 1990). Microfinance is 
heavily dependent on personal contact for its execution which is very time-consuming and 
resource intensive. MFI clients may however often live in inaccessible locations. Group 
lending may be more difficult in sparsely populated areas and contact between borrowers and 
individual lenders that are not located nearby is likely to be problematic. We also include 
rural population growth (since 1990). McIntosh, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2005) found that 
most of the microfinance entry in Uganda in the 1990s occurred in rural areas. On the 
contrary, Arun and Hulme, (2008) shows that the provision of MFIs mainly focuses on the 
cities, towns and major rural trading centres. We therefore control for the possibility that 
 
60 The proportion of female clients of the Grameen Bank steadily increased from 44 per cent in October 1983 to 95 per cent in 2001 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2010). 
61 Ahlin et al (2011) use a similar measure.  Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) used the annual growth rate of GDP and GNP per capita to 
identify such a relationship, while Bikker and Hu (2002) used a number of macroeconomic variables such as GDP, the unemployment rate 
and interest rate differentials. 
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rapidly growing rural areas may attract MFIs with a different profitability profile. We also 
control for persistence of MFI profitability. 
 
Data and measurement  
In order to capture the dynamics of relationship between financing choice and microfinance 
profitability in the backdrop of the theoretical underpinnings detailed in section 5.2 and 5.4.1, 
this study uses a data sample that contains 2,004 observations. This corresponds to 167 MFIs 
for the period 1997-2008 that varies from a minimum of 10 in 1997 to a maximum of 167 in 
2005 based on their financial accounts. This spans across four different regions namely West 
(67), East (53), Central (17) and South Africa (30). Our panel is unbalanced62 since not all 
MFIs have information for every year—some MFIs may have closed as others enter the 
market. In order to avoid duplication we shall not dwell into a detailed discussion about the 
same. Reference should be made to chapter three for a formal discussion of the conceptual 
framework, data and measurement of the variables. 
We analyze the impact of different sources of funding on MFI profitability which 
include (i) accepts deposits dummy (ii) deposits relative to assets ratio,   (iii) loans relative to 
assets ratio (iv) and debt to equity ratio (gearing).  Given that capital structure data is MFI 
specific and collected from MixMarket, we use the MixMarket definitions of key variables.  
Deposits to assets ratio measures the relative portion of the MFI’s total assets that is 
funded by deposits and gives an informed analysis of the role of deposits as a source of 
funding. Accepts deposits dummy is a binary variable which indicates whether or not the MFI 
mobilize deposits. This variable is given a value of 1 if the MFI accepts deposits. The variable 
is set to 0 otherwise. Portfolio to assets ratio is measured as the ratio of adjusted Gross Loan 
Portfolio/Adjusted Total Assets. Gearing ratio (GR) or debt to equity ratio is measured by the 
ratio of debt and debt-like instruments to capitalization namely short term debt + long term 
 
62 We opt for an unbalanced panel not to lose degrees of freedom. 
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debt divided by total shareholders' equity or simply the Debt/Equity ratio. It captures the ratio 
of capital employed that is funded by debt and long term finance.  
Studies on firm performance employ various measures to test the predictions of 
different capital structure hypothesis. Some of the measures of performance that have been 
used over the years include financial ratios (Mehran, 1995), stock market return and their 
volatility (Cole and Mehran, 1998; Saunders et al., 1990) and also, Tobin’s q (Himmelberg et 
al., 1999; Zhou, 2001). For the purpose of this study we employ return on assets as our 
profitability proxy. ROA remains a valuable measure of MFI’s profitability.  
Due to data limitations, the empirical analysis does not address (i) grants (ii) retained 
earnings, (iii) share capital, (iv) debt relative to assets and (v) commercial funding liabilities 
ratio. We leave this for future research. All the empirical findings should be viewed in that 
light. Table 5.3 shows all variables definitions, source and measurements. 
Table 5.3: Summary of variables and measurement 
Variable Notation  Measure Predicted 
effect 
Source of data 
Dependent variable 
Return on assets ROA  
 
Net profits after taxes/Assets   The MIX 
Exogenous variables 
Financing choice    
Accepts 
Deposits  
DEP Value of 1 if the MFI accepts deposits 
and 0 otherwise. 
Positive The MIX 
Portfolio to 
Assets 
PAsset Adjusted Gross Loan Portfolio/Adjusted 
Total Assets 
Positive 
Deposits to 
assets  
DepAsse Voluntary Deposits/Total assets Positive 
Debt to equity 
ratio (gearing) 
GR Debt/equity ratio Indeterminate  
Capital  CAP Equity/Assets Positive  
Other firm-specific controls   
Portfolio at Risk PAR-30 Outstanding balance, portfolio overdue> 
30 Days + renegotiated 
portfolio/Adjusted Gross Loan Portfolio 
Negative  The MIX 
 
Efficiency  EFF Adjusted Operating Expense/Adjusted 
Average Gross Loan Portfolio 
Negative  
Age Ag Age of the MFI in years  Indeterminate  
Size  S  Log of total assets  in period t Indeterminate 
Loan size LS Average Loan Balance per 
Borrower/GNI per Capita 
Positive  
Share of lending 
to women  
Wom Share of MFI borrowers that are women Indeterminate 
Country level controls  World Bank 
(WDI) Inflation  
Expectations 
INF Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) in 
period t-1 
Indeterminate 
Per capita GDP Gross Domestic Product (at current Positive  
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Income growth  US$) divided by midyear population in 
period t-1 
Rural 
population (%) 
RPOP Rural population share (in 1990) Negative  
Population 
growth 
POPG Rural population growth (since 1990). Negative  
 
 
5.5 Estimation and testing 
 
When estimating equation (5.1), we are likely to encounter endogeneity problem: Berger and 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, (2006) observes that the mixed results in the previous empirical studies 
may be due to the possibility of reverse causation from performance to capital structure. If for 
instance MFI profitability affects the financing choice, these regressors may be correlated 
with the error term. Failure to control for this endogeneity may result in simultaneous-
equations bias. Further estimation challenges are similar to those noted in the previous 
chapter. In order to avoid duplication we shall not dwell into a detailed discussion about the 
same. Reference should be made to chapter four for a formal discussion of the same. 
In order to allow for comparison with previous studies, we conduct robustness tests with 
fixed effects and OLS. The use of OLS and fixed effect regressions can also be considered as 
a robustness test for the results with the GMM system method, at least for the sign of the 
coefficients. Moreover, by comparing the results of fixed effect model with those of the 
GMM system, we can identify the source of endogeneity in the data. Such simple models also 
help account for the fact that a large sample is needed for the properties of the GMM 
estimator to hold asymptotically. 
 
5.5.1 Univariate analysis 
Descriptive statistics of all variables are reported in Table 5.4. There is a wide variation in 
performance across MFIs. The means and standard deviation for ROA are all within the 
expected range but the minimum and maximum values suggest a wide range for each variable. 
Profitability is widely dispersed suggesting that the overall mean profitability may be driven 
by a few MFIs. It remains to be seen which MFI characteristics explain the wide dispersion of 
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profitability measure. The distributions of AGE and of SIZE variables indicate considerable 
heterogeneity in these characteristics. 
Table 5.4 shows that on average a majority of the MFIs lend about 66% of their assets. 
It also shows that most of the MFIs are not highly leveraged as shown by the mean gearing 
ratio of 0.26, suggesting a considerable dependence on other sources of funding (e.g. 
voluntary savings) for their operations. This is further corroborated by the ratio of debt to 
equity which is negatively skewed, suggesting that more MFIs may be employing less of debt 
in their capital structure. The standard deviation, the minimum and maximum values of 
gearing ratio is an indication of an industry which is highly unevenly distributed with regards 
to leverage levels. This is consistent with Lafourcade, et al (2006) who shows that 72 percent 
of MFIs in Africa fund their activities with deposits. We uncover the magnitude and direction 
of this variability in the next section.  
Table 5.4: Descriptive and summary statistics 
Variable  Notation Obs  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
Return on assets  ROA 946    -0.016 0.007 
 
0.121 -0.851 0.830 
Debt to equity 
ratio 
GR 844 0.257 1.602 
 
1.348 -6.215 3.218 
Deposits to 
assets ratio 
DEPASE 382 0.386 0.329 
 
0.255 0.000 0.960 
Portfolio to 
Assets 
PAsset 805 0.659 0.673 
 
0.173 0.057 0.990 
Capital  CAP 945     0.369 0.307 
 
0.279 -0.983 1.000 
Log Age  AG 945    2.180  2.197 
 
0.607   0 3.7 
Log Size  S 947     15.02 14.79 
 
1.821 7.86 20.71 
Efficiency  EFF 914     0.379 0.294 
 
0.285 0.025 1.92 
Portfolio at Risk PAR30 937     0.066 0.037 
 
0.093 0 0.737 
Share of lending 
to women 
WOM 764 0.604 0.615 
 
0.260 0.000 1.000 
Loan size  LS 847 0.790     
 
0.569 
 
0.709 
  
0  3.541 
Rural 
population share 
RURALPOP 950 0.687 0.684 
 
0.132 0.390 0.910 
Growth of rural  
population 
POPGROW 955 1.950 2.240 
 
0.821 -0.880 3.820 
GDP Per capita GDP 784     0.998 2.837 
 
0.845 -2.43 2.37 
Lagged Inflation 
rate 
INF 951     0.672 0.062 
 
0.063 -0.09 0.431 
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This Table presents the summary statistics. A detailed description of the definition and sources of the variables is 
given in Table 5.3. Data has been winsorized at 10% 
 
Mean values of ROA across institution types reported in Table 5.5 suggest several 
important regularities. Figures suggest that profitability varies across MFIs having different 
organizational structure, with credit unions being generally more profitable, relative to others, 
which necessitates controlling for organisational structure when analyzing MFI profitability. 
This observation is consistent with Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2011) who finds that the 
performance of for-profit MFIs is better than that of NGOs.  This is perhaps because non-
profit MFIs make smaller loans on average and serve more women than do commercialized 
MFIs, and therefore their costs per dollar lent are also much higher (Cull et al 2009a, c). Are 
variations in Table 5.5 significant? We uncover the magnitude and direction of this variability 
in the next section. 
Table 5.5. Mean MFIs profitability across MFI types 
 Obs Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Non-governmental 
Organizations 
254 -0.050 0.176 -0.851 0.830 
Credit unions 305 0.005 0.067 -0.254 0.204 
Bank  87 -0.005 0.087 -0.421 0.124 
Non-bank financial 
institutions 
301 -0.010 0.107 -0.820 0.600 
This Table presents averages of individual MFI returns on assets. Data has been winsorized at 10% 
 
The Correlations 
The bi-variate relationships shown in Table 5.6 are consistent with the argument that MFIs 
that mobilize deposits are more profitable perhaps because deposits constitute cheaper 
funding compared to borrowed funds. An interesting observation is the positive and 
significant debt to equity correlations with profitability. This may be an indication that more 
debt relative to equity is used to finance increased microfinance activities and that long term 
borrowings positively impact on profitability.  
The negative rural population share (in 1990) correlation with profitability may reflect 
on the difficulties encountered by MFIs in employing group lending mechanism in sparsely 
populated areas. Contact between borrowers and MFIs that are not located nearby is likely to 
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be costly and time consuming. Of particular concern however is the high and significant 
bivariate correlation between population share and growth of rural population―which calls 
for separate inclusion of the two variables in the estimation model. The rural population 
growth variable is significantly correlated with greater lending to women, suggesting the 
importance of rural controls. Other bi-variate relationships follow expectations based on the 
existing literature that uses this database. Although most correlation coefficients among 
variables of interest are low, they are nevertheless significant though not perfect linear. 
Regression analysis allows us to investigate the strength of these correlations after controlling 
for other relevant covariates.  
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Table 5.6: Correlations   
  ROA ACDEP DEPASE PAsset GR CAP  RURALPOPPOPGROW AG S EFF PAR  LS WOM GDP  INF  
ROA 1.000 
948 
               
ACDEP .068* 
943 
1.000 
944 
              
DEPASE .019 
377 
.068 
378 
1.000 
383 
             
PAsset .065 
805 
-.019 
804 
.084 
381 
1.000 
385 
            
GR .172** 
870 
.057 
868 
.166** 
364 
.001 
759 
1.000 
888 
           
CAP -.101** 
943 
-.109** 
938 
-.123** 
374 
-.021 
803 
-.367** 
869 
1.000 
945 
          
RURALPOP -.072* 
948 
.012 
944 
.012 
383 
.028 
860 
-.101** 
888 
.102** 
945 
1.000 
2004 
         
POPGROW -.016 
948 
-.047 
944 
.052 
383 
.022 
860 
-.127** 
888 
.028 
945 
.605** 
2004 
1.000 
2004 
        
AG .142** 
942 
.181** 
937 
-.033 
372 
-.002 
801 
.110** 
867 
-.204** 
941 
-.094** 
945 
-.039 
945 
1.000 
945 
       
S .111** 
946 
.146** 
941 
-.030 
376 
-.030 
805 
.124** 
871 
-.142** 
945 
-.010 
948 
-.030 
948 
.351** 
944 
1.000 
948 
      
EFF -.524** 
912 
-.074* 
908 
-.045 
371 
-.075* 
786 
-.130** 
844 
.217** 
912 
.046 
914 
-.108** 
914 
-.190** 
910 
-.086** 
914 
1.000 
914 
     
PAR -.046 
935 
.025 
930 
-.024 
372 
-.004 
797 
.101** 
863 
-.067* 
936 
-.083** 
937 
-.066* 
937 
.056 
933 
.008 
937 
.017 
905 
1.000 
937 
    
LS .178** 
846 
.094** 
843 
.060 
345 
.102** 
725 
.058 
788 
-.240** 
846 
.065 
848 
.132** 
848 
.052 
844 
.133** 
848 
-.197** 
819 
-.004 
841 
1.000 
848 
   
WOM -.179** 
721 
.000 
720 
-.065 
344 
.112** 
750 
-.154** 
675 
.203** 
719 
-.063 
765 
-.072* 
765 
-.095** 
717 
-.148** 
721 
.274** 
698 
-.090* 
714 
-.307** 
654 
1.000 
765 
  
GDP -.035 
913 
.171** 
908 
-.099 
366 
.036 
775 
-.070* 
844 
.132** 
913 
.248** 
929 
.021 
929 
-.090** 
912 
-.003 
915 
.139** 
885 
.086** 
906 
-.016 
817 
.016 
694 
1.000 
929 
 
INF -.028 
935 
.103** 
930 
-.026 
371 
.004 
796 
-.036 
863 
.144** 
935 
.048 
951 
-.105** 
951 
-.034* 
934 
.023* 
937 
.193** 
906 
.132** 
927 
-.025 
898 
.142** 
712 
.378** 
929 
1.000 
951 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Figures beneath are the observations (N) 
Where ROA=Return on Assets; AG= Age of the MFI; S= Size; CAP=Capital; EFF= Efficiency; PAR=Portfolio at Risk; LS=loan size; WOW=share of lending to women; 
INF= Lagged Inflation; GDP=Growth of per capita income; DEPASS=deposit to assets; DEPLOA=deposit to loans; PAsset=gross loan portfolio to assets; GR=gearing ratio; 
RURALPOP=share of rural population; POPGROW=growth of rural population;  ACDEP is a dummy variable for MFIs that accepts deposits  
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5.6 Empirical results and discussion  
 
The main aim of this chapter was to determine the extent to which microfinance profitability 
depends on MFI financing choice. The summary statistics in the previous sub-section led us to 
a more comprehensive model specification to test further the link between MFI profitability 
and financing choice, while controlling for other MFI specific characteristics and factors that 
are not within the control of MFI management. 
Table 5.7 reports results from our basic specification using ROA as the profitability 
measure. Our preferred system GMM estimates in model 2 suggest that the choice of funding 
is important for MFI profitability, which is an overwhelming support for our main hypothesis. 
In particular larger share of deposits to assets appears to boost MFI profitability. A plausible 
interpretation of these results is that the more deposits are transformed into loans, the higher 
the interest margin and profits. Thus a proportionally larger deposit base will typically lead to 
an overall lower cost of funds for the MFIs with an implication of improved 
profitability―assuming that the deposits program is efficient.  
This finding is especially interesting in light of recent calls suggesting that MFIs should 
broaden their services towards deposits mobilization. This would also broaden the lending 
capacity of these institutions. However, Cull et al. (2011) shows that such an approach may 
not be welfare enhancing. These results are however contrary to García-Herrero, (2009) who 
do not find significant results in the Chinese banking industry. All banks by default mobilize 
deposits and as such our finding cannot be generalized in banking.  
We also find portfolio to asset ratio to significantly influence profitability in the 
anticipated way. MFIs that dedicate a higher proportion of their balance sheets to lending 
activity are, on average, more profitable. Traditional lending business is the main source of 
income for the many MFIs across Sub-Sahara Africa (see Appendix A, Table 9). Making 
loans provides informational advantages, which may lower intermediation costs and improve 
profitability (Freixas, 2005). A larger share of loans to total assets may therefore translate to 
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more interest revenue because of the higher risk. This finding is contrary to Demerguç-Kunt 
and Huizingha (1999) who in the conventional banking report that a larger ratio of bank assets 
to GDP lead to lower margins and profits. MFI's gross loan portfolio is however different 
from that of traditional bank. This is because not only is the loan portfolio generally semi-or 
uncollateralized, but because loan maturity is generally short, ranging from 3 to 12 months 
(Cull et al 2009a). Thus the quality of the loan portfolio can deteriorate in a matter of weeks 
only. 
Another new and interesting finding is that of debt to equity ratio which is positive and 
significantly related to profitability. Although comparative evidence in microfinance is 
lacking, this finding is consistent with the agency costs hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling 
1976) where higher leverage or a lower equity capital ratio is associated with higher 
profitability over the entire range of the observed data. Beyond internal resources, debt may 
therefore be preferred to equity because the issuing costs are usually lower and because debt 
reduces verification costs (e.g., Townsend 1979).  This is likely to be the scenario with MFIs 
which typically face very high transactions costs in issuing new equity due to their average 
small size. 
Additionally, MFIs managers may have incentives to take excessive risks as part of risk 
shifting investment strategies as postulated by Jensen and Meckling, (1976) and Williams 
(1987). Thus a higher level of leverage may be used as a governance mechanism to reduce 
managerial cash flow waste through the threat of liquidation (Grossman and Hart, 1982; 
Williams 1987) or through pressure to generate cash flow to honour debt obligations (Jensen, 
1986), to reduce expense preference behaviour and make better investment decisions. Under 
these circumstances, higher leverage will impact poisitvely on MFI profitability. If higher 
debt to equity ratio were to increase profitability by a greater margin than the cost of the debt, 
then the shareholders would benefit as more earnings are being spread among the same 
number of shareholders.  
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Evidence in the banking industry include Berger and di Patti (2006) who found that 
leverage affects agency costs and thereby firm performance in the US banking industry data. 
Their results were statistically significant. This is also consistent with Hadlock and James 
(2002) and Michaelas et al. (1999) who find that banks with high leverage report high level of 
profitability.  
The previous evidence on banking is difficult to generalize in microfinance industry. 
MFIs are characterized by a different production function and with risk and return profile 
different from that of conventional banking. While traditional bank loans are characterized by 
large sizes, large markets, long maturities; microfinance receivables are uncollateralized and 
with a short term maturity. Moreover, MFIs also have a double bottom line mission of 
reducing poverty while at the same time maximizing firm value. Additionally, the presence of 
the regulatory safety net that protects the safety and soundness of banks which is likely to 
lower bank capital and regulatory capital requirements may not apply to all MFIs. It is 
therefore plausible that what holds for banks may not in the microfinance industry. Berger and 
di Patti (2006) in particular use profit efficiency rather than ROA or ROE as a measure of 
performance. Although the use of profit efficiency addresses some of the difficulties in other 
performance measures employed in the literature, the profit efficiency measures are also 
imprecise and embody measurement error.  
There is also some empirical work that has unearthed some stylized facts on the 
influence of capital structure choice on firm performance, but this evidence is largely based 
on non-financial firms; it is not at all clear how these facts relate to different theoretical 
models and how the same would apply to MFIs. For instance, Margaritis and Psillaki (2010), 
Arbabiyan and Safari (2009) and Abor (2005) finds evidence supporting the theoretical 
predictions of the Jensen and Meckling (1976) hypothesis. On the contrary, Chakraborty 
(2010), Huang and Song (2006), Caesar and Holmes (2003), Esperance et al. (2003) and 
Chiang et al. (2002) find a negative influence on firm performance.  
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Although microbanking is to some extent a regulated industry, MFIs are subject to the 
same type of agency costs and other influences on behaviour as other non-financial firms. But 
without testing the robustness of these non-financial firms findings outside the environment in 
which they were uncovered, it is hard to determine whether these empirical regularities are 
merely spurious correlations, let alone whether they support one theory or another. The mixed 
results in the previous studies may also be due to the possibility of reverse causation from 
performance to capital structure (Berger and di Patti 2006). Overall it appears that the 
investigation of the influence of capital structure on MFIs profitability has been largely 
overlooked. 
The effect of other MFI-specific and macroeconomic variables on profitability is in line 
with expectations, with notable exception of age, loan size, share of lending to women which 
are insignificant. The coefficient on the linearly separable AGE term is statistically 
insignificant.  
The insignificant result on share of lending to women coefficient may point to the fact 
that high repayments may not necessarily translate to profitability, perhaps because MFIs that 
target women clients are also less efficient and therefore less profitable (Hermes, Lensink, and 
Meesters 2011). It may also point to the fact that MFIs which focus on women usually extend 
smaller loans, which reduces their operational efficiency and subsequently lowers profitability 
(D’Espallier, et al 2010). Consistent with the previous chapter, the results also provide strong 
evidence that credit risk represents a serious obstacle to microfinance profitability, while 
capital adequacy matters for MFI profitability.  
Rural population share (in 1990) similarly turns out as insignificant perhaps because the 
bulk of the population in Africa is rural with a low population density at 77 people per square 
kilometre. This population density is among the lowest in the world (World Bank, 2009). We 
however find evidence that rapidly growing rural areas may attract MFIs with a different 
profitability profile. Rapidly growing rural areas is negatively associated with profitability 
which suggests that microfinance operations may be more difficult in rural areas characterized 
by weak infrastructure since micro-banking is heavily dependent on personal contact for its 
execution. Intuitively, MFIs that chose to locate in urban settings may be more profitable.  
The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is about 0.2 and significantly greater 
than zero. This implies that there is some moderate persistence in microfinance profitability. It 
is plausible that if there is a shock to profitability level in the current year, about 20% of the 
effect will persist into the following year.  
Table 5.7: The impact of financing choice on MFI profitability 
  
Notation 
Variant of model specifications 
Variable 1 2 
Lagged ROA 
1−Π t  0.2126***    (9.03)    0.2278*** (9.16)      
Deposits to assets ratio DEPASE    0.1194***     
(10.60) 
0.1630***   
(13.81)    
Portfolio to assets PAsset 0.1470*** 
(2.61) 
0.0610*** 
(3.19) 
Debt to equity ratio GR 0.0044** 
(1.93) 
0.0067*** 
(4.97) 
Capital  CAP 0.2370*** 
(7.66)    
0.1332***    
(9.31) 
Log Age AG -0.0033 
(-1.16)     
-0.0072 
(-0.36)       
Log size  S 0.0435*** 
(2.75)       
0.0353***    
(2.59)    
Efficiency EFF -0.3172***     
(-13.59)    
-0.2984*** 
(-15.14)       
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.2319***   
(6.76) 
-0.2347*** 
(-8.29)       
Loan size LS 0.0051 
(0.49)      
       
Share of lending to women WOM 0.0149  
(0.56) 
 
Rural population share RURALPOP 0.0523  
 (0.34)       
 
Growth of rural  
Population 
POPGROW -0.0723*** 
(-2.86)  
-0.0813*** 
(-2.91)  
GDP Per capita GDP -0.0013 
(-0.81)       
 
Inflation expectations INF -0.0137 
(-0.20)       
 
Number of instruments   59 55 
Wald-test     χ2(15) = 120.6 
Prob>chi2=0.000 
Χ2(10)= 316.7 
Prob>chi2=0.000 
Sargan-testa   χ2(60) = 54.08 
Prob>chi2=0.691 
Χ2(50)= 43.03 
Prob>chi2=0.747 
AR(1)b     z =-4.419 
p-value=0.000 
Z=-1.923   
p-value=0.0546   
AR(2)c     
 
 z =0.064  Z=0.113  
p-value = 0.9489 P-value = 0.9104      
Observations   545 312 
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This Table presents estimations performed using Blundell and Bond (1998) system robust GMM (Two-step) 
estimator. For the definition of the variables see Table 5.3. Robust z values are in parentheses and significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is noted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 The Wald test is a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the given equation are all zero (Greene, 
2008). A low value indicates null hypothesis rejection.  
a Test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. 
b Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0  
           (H0: no autocorrelation). 
c Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 
(H0: no autocorrelation). 
 
 
5.6.1 Interaction effects  
 
One might wonder if a combination of MFI specific factors comes into play in explaining 
profitability. Although evidence adduced so far in the previous chapters shows MFI age may 
not be relevant on influencing profitability, it could be the case that portfolio-assets (PAsset) 
ratio depends on MFI age (AG). It could also depend on portfolio at risk (PAR). We thus 
interact portfolio-assets ratio with age (AGXPAsset) and PAR (PAssetXPAR). Young MFIs 
are less likely to have been licensed to mobilize deposits and therefore may have a higher 
portfolio-assets ratio, ceteris paribus. From this perspective, we interact age with portfolio-
assets ratio (AGXPAsset) and age with deposits to assets ratio (AGXDEPASE).  
MFI age may also affect the debt-equity composition because as firms mature they 
become known to the market, which enables them to expand their access to capital. As MFIs 
mature, the weight of external financial sources steadily decreases while the equity becomes a 
more important source of finance. Additionally, mature MFIs may have lower debt ratios as 
they accumulate deposits and/or utilize the retained profits. Towards this end we interact age 
with debt-equity ratio (AGXGR). There could also be an association between deposit 
mobilization and gearing ratio. Since deposits are a cheap source of funding, MFIs that 
mobilize deposits may be able to offset the cost of long term debt with implications on higher 
profitability. If this is found to non-negligibly predict profitability, then it may be the optima 
mix of the MFIs capital structure. We therefore interact being licensed to collect public 
deposits with debt-equity ratio (ACDEPXGR). 
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MFI age may also affect the impact of changes in the PAR rate. Informational 
constraints may affect the younger MFIs more than the older MFIs. Older MFIs are likely to 
have more information capital through relationship lending which generates valuable 
information about the borrower’s quality in line with Berger, and Udell (2006) theoretical 
postulations. Hence, their ability to screen borrowers is likely to be better than that of younger 
MFIs. The adverse selection problem is likely to be more acute for younger MFIs, for any 
given average quality of borrowers. We therefore interact age with PAR (AGXPAR). The 
estimated coefficients is a good measure of the length of time period the MFI needs  before it 
accumulates enough information capital to overcome the adverse selection effect. It also 
implies building trust in both informal and formal lending (Turvey and Kong 2010). We thus 
augment the baseline model with interaction terms and report the results in Table 5.8 
While our previous findings are preserved, the results from interacted variables indicate 
that mature MFIs that mobilize deposits are more profitable. Age of the MFI therefore matters 
on MFIs that collect deposits. Therefore older MFIs have higher deposit to assets which 
translates to lower cost of capital and higher profitability. We also find that portfolio-assets 
ratio depends on age of the MFI with an implication on higher profitability. Our hypothesis 
that the effect of credit risk on MFIs profitability diminishes with the age of the MFI, is not 
supported here as indicated by the negative and insignificant sign of the interaction of the 
portfolio at risk with MFI age. Our hypothesis that older MFIs may have accumulated 
sufficient information capital to counteract the negative effect of default rate is not supported 
here. Indeed, McIntosh, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2005) shows that young MFIs are willing to 
enter the market where other MFIs are already present to take advantage of the effect of 
training and screening already conducted on clients by the incumbent lenders. 
 
 
 
Table 5.8: The impact of financing choice on MFI profitability-alternative model  
Variable Notation Estimation coefficients  
Lagged ROA 
1−Π t  0.1169***    (4.14)     
Deposits to assets ratio DEPASE    0.1288***    
(9.49)    
Portfolio to assets PAsset 0.0786***     
(4.45)       
Debt to equity ratio GR 0.0102**   
(2.18) 
Capital  CAP 0.1162*** 
(4.59)      
Log Age AG -0.0022    
(-1.26) 
Log size  S 0.0649***     
(4.13)      
Efficiency EFF -0.2496***    
(7.67) 
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.1977***    
(-4.90)    
Growth of rural  
Population 
POPGROW -0.0352**   
(-2.20)   
Portfolio-assetXPortfolio at risk  PASSETXPAR 
 
0.2282    
(0.76) 
AgeXPortfolio-asset AGXPASSET  0.0163***   
(4.37)     
AgeXDeposit-asset ratio AGXDEPASE  0.0023*** 
 (4.05) 
AgeXGearing AGXGR 0.0002 
(0.52) 
AgeXporfolio at risk AGXPAR -0.0102  
(-1.61)     
Accept depositsXgearing ACEPXGR 0.0041***     
(6.43)    
Number of instruments   60 
Wald-test     Χ2(16)= 315.0 
Prob>chi2=0.000 
Sargan-testa   Χ2(40)= 37.30 
Prob>chi2= 0.6925 
AR(1)b     Z=-2.30 
P-value = 0.0021 
AR(2)c      Z=  1.29 
P-value = 0.7985  
Observations   276 
This Table presents estimations performed using Blundell and Bond (1998) system robust GMM (Two-step) 
estimator. For the definition of the variables see Table 5.3. Robust z values are in parentheses and significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is noted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 The Wald test is a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the given equation are all zero (Greene, 
2008). A low value indicates null hypothesis rejection.  
a Test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. 
b Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0  
           (H0: no autocorrelation). 
c Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 
(H0: no autocorrelation). 
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5.6.2 Does organization type matter? 
 
Since MFI type may be correlated with some of the capital structure variables, we split the 
sample of MFIs into four sub-samples (see Table 5.9) based on the charter that established the 
MFIs and estimate a random effect model for each sub-sample. MFIs formally constituted as 
non-government organizations (NGOs) are more likely to be non-profits (social mission 
driven), tend to be slightly older, employ group lending methodology that entail smaller loans, 
more female clients, greater reliance on subsidized funding, higher costs per dollar lent, and 
less profitability. On the contrary commercially-oriented MFIs are more likely to have for-
profit status and to use standard individual debt contracts, with larger loans, fewer women 
clients, lower costs per dollar lent and higher profitability (Cull et al, 2009a, c).  
The results show that MFIs formally constituted as NGOs but mobilize deposits are 
more profitable. This is contrary to Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2011) who does not find 
significant difference in profitability between for profit and NGOs amongst MFIs in Sub-
Saharan Africa. All other findings are preserved with some few exceptions on credit union 
and banks perhaps due to low degrees of freedom. The findings for the subset of MFIs 
therefore reinforce our findings for the full sample. 
Table 5.9: GLS estimation by charter type 
Variable Notation NGOs Credit unions NBFIs Banks  
Intercept -0.6825*** 
(-2.72) 
0.2064** 
(1.90)   
0.4905*** 
(3.22) 
2.3799* 
(1.78) it
α  
Accepts 
Deposits  
ACDEP 0.1638** 
 (2.01) 
0.0173 
(0.30) 
0.0118 
(0.26) 
— 
Portfolio to 
assets  
PAsset 0.1787*** 
(3.04) 
0.1346** 
(2.23) 
0.1022** 
(2.22) 
0.1801 
(1.53) 
Deposits to 
assets  
DEPASE 0.2075*** 
(2.92) 
0.0024 
(1.47)   
0.1105** 
(2.06) 
0.1287* 
(1.87) 
Debt to equity 
ratio (gearing) 
GR 0.0099***  
(3.16) 
0.0019. 
(1.17) 
0.0049* 
(1.81)   
0.0161*** 
(3.63) 
Capital  CAP 0.3418***  
(7.34) 
0.2192*** 
(2.62) 
0.1132*** 
(3.56) 
0.3078** 
(2.27) 
Log Age  AG -0.0020 
(-0.67) 
-0.0052 
(-1.01) 
-0.0024 
(-0.34) 
0.0108 
(0.38) 
Log size  S 0.0283*** 
(2.59) 
0.0369* 
(1.79) 
0.0088 
(0.99) 
0.0195*** 
(2.63) 
Efficiency EFF -0.4375***  
(-12.45) 
-0.4171***  
(-7.70) 
-0.2347*** 
(-8.77) 
-0.1962*** 
(-3.11) 
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.2612*   
(-1.75) 
-0.2472*** 
(-3.21) 
-0.3146*** 
(-3.27) 
-0.1993 
(-1.37)   
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Loan size LS 0.0149 
(0.84) 
0.0074 
(0.75) 
0.0069 
(0.49) 
-0.0002 
(-1.66) 
Share of lending 
to women 
WOM 0.0269 
(1.40) 
0.0315 
(1.59) 
0.0024 
(0.08) 
-0.2200 
(-0.57) 
Rural 
population share 
RURALPOP 0.0022 
(0.98) 
-0.0004 
(-0.24) 
-0.0009 
(-0.86) 
-0.3705 
(-0.84)   
Growth of rural  
population 
POPGROW -0.0649** 
(-2.16) 
-0.0179*  
(-1.74) 
-0.0428* 
(-1.78) 
-0.0303 
(-1.00) 
Inflation 
expectations 
INF 0.2217 
(1.18) 
0.1661 
(1.13) 
0.0627 
(0.81) 
-0.4284 
(-0.59) 
GDP Per capita GDP -0.0016 
(-0.25) 
0.0371 
(0.38)    
0.0026* 
(1.85) 
0.0015 
(0.10) 
Wald-test     Wald  
chi2(16)= 178.5 
Prob>chi2= 
0.0000 
Wald 
chi2(16)= 
76.86 
Prob>chi2= 
0.0000 
Wald chi2(16)= 
121.24 
Prob>chi2= 
0.0000 
Wald  
chi2(16)= 
 61.67 
Prob>chi2= 
0.0000 
R2  0.67 0.72 0.34 0.57 
Number of obs      85 55 118 31 
This Table presents the results from regressions conducted to determine the influence of financing choice on 
MFI profitability in Africa. t-statistics are in parentheses and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is noted 
by *,** and *** respectively. For the notation of the variables see Table 5.3 
 
 
5.6.3 Robustness 
 
In order to test the robustness of the results, we perform some alternative regressions. We 
estimate fixed effect regressions as a robustness test for the System-GMM estimations, at 
least for the sign of the coefficients and report the results in Table 5.10. A fixed effect model 
can account for regional, country or MFI differences. Using fixed effect regressions does not 
fundamentally change the picture. The significance and the direction of influence of the 
financing choice variables shown in the estimations are preserved.  
One limitation of using system GMM estimator is that the differencing removes any 
time invariant explanatory variable which does not allow us to control for the policy choice 
variable of accepting deposits. Without necessarily controlling for profit persistence, a 
random effect model seems to be our choice. A random effect model may also control for the 
potential correlation that may exist between regressors and for unobservable individual MFI 
effects. We therefore re-estimate model 5.1 in a linear fashion by assuming random effects 
(RE). While the number of observations is considerably reduced, some of our findings hold. 
In particular, Table 5.10 shows that we cannot confirm the hypothesis that MFIs who 
mobilize public deposits are more profitable. Perhaps what matters is the magnitude of the 
deposits. Higher proportion of deposits to assets also appears to enhance MFI profitability, 
while MFIs with higher loans to assets ratio are more profitable. Better capitalized MFIs are 
more profitable, while higher gearing translates to greater profitability. 
Table 5.10: Robustness results (dependent variable: ROA) 
Variable Notation Fixed effects regression Random-effects GLS regression 
Intercept 
itα  -0.3077*** (-3.03) -0.2568** (-2.40) 
Accepts Deposits  ACDEP  -0.0041 
(-0.10) 
Portfolio to assets  PAsset 0.0816** 
(1.96) 
0.1026*** 
(2.72) 
Deposits to assets  DEPASE 0.0706***  
(2.24) 
0.0725** 
(1.85) 
Debt to equity ratio 
(gearing) 
GR 0.0066*** 
(3.04)   
0.0053*** 
(3.43) 
Capital  CAP 0.2158*** 
(5.98) 
0.2158*** 
(8.07) 
Log Age  AG -0.0062 
(-0.96) 
-0.0020 
(-1.57) 
Log size  S 0.0135** 
(2.12) 
0.0141*** 
(2.83) 
Efficiency EFF -0.3753*** 
(-9.11) 
-0.2258*** 
(-8.74) 
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.1484* 
(-1.80) 
-0.1676*** 
(-2.30) 
Loan size LS 0.0082 
(0.57) 
0.0011 
(0.11)   
Share of lending to 
women 
WOM 0.0206 
(0.57) 
0.0313 
(1.14) 
Rural population 
share 
RURALPOP -0.0095 
(-0.98) 
-0.0004 
(-0.40) 
Growth of rural  
population 
POPGROW -0.0313 
(-1.40) 
-0.0102 
(-1.66) 
Inflation 
expectations 
INF 0.1118 
(1.61) 
0.1159 
(1.65) 
GDP Per capita GDP 0.0014 
(0.90) 
0 .0008 
(0.57) 
Wald-test      Wald chi2(16)= 230.6 
Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
R2  0.57 0.53                        
Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian 
multiplier test 
  chi2(1)= 27.3 
Prob>chi2= 0.0000 
H0:Var(u_i)=0 
Hausman 
specification test 
 
  chi2(15) =  46.09 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0001 
Ho: difference in coefficients not 
systematic 
Number of obs             278 278 
This Table presents the results from regressions conducted to determine the influence of financing choice on 
MFI profitability in Africa. t-statistics are in parentheses and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is noted 
by *,** and *** respectively. For the notation of the variables see Table 5.3 
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5.7 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
In the context of Africa microfinance industry, this chapter is pioneering in analyzing the 
impact of financing choice on microfinance profitability. It is also pioneering in using 
dynamic GMM estimators and in using the two-step estimation method in studies of 
determinants of microfinance profitability. While most information on the financing choice is 
highly fragmented, this study has taken a first empirical step to synthesize the information to 
better understand the link between MFI funding and profitability.  
Although previous empirical evidence on the impact of capital structure on firm 
performance remains mixed and contestable, microfinance industry appears to have been 
neglected in this research agenda. This study identifies a series of novel findings. Key among 
new findings is that highly leveraged microfinance institutions are more profitable. Therefore 
this study calls for the development of appropriate regulatory policies that enable MFIs to 
have access to long-term debt to improve their profitability. This may include relaxation of 
the listing requirements in the capital market.  
Another new finding is that a proportionally higher deposit as a percentage of total 
assets is associated with improved profitability, assuming that the deposits program is 
efficient. Deposit mobilization may therefore help MFIs achieve independence from donors 
and investors. Savings mobilization may therefore lead to greater profitability since it 
provides MFIs with inexpensive and sustainable source of funds for lending. This perhaps 
explains why it is an indispensable element for well-performing MFIs.  
Deposits may however require widespread branching and other expenses. Moreover, for 
MFIs to mobilize deposits, they require license which calls for transition to regulation. 
Though MFIs located in many of the Latin American countries have undergone a transition to 
regulation with implications which enables them access market funding (Jansson, 2003), 
many in Africa remain unregulated with NGO structures. This implies that Africa MFIs may 
be constrained in financing options, with no shareholder structure for attracting equity or 
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license to mobilize deposits. That notwithstanding, the question of whether transformation 
into regulated entities has positive effect on profitability remains contested.  
We also evidence that higher portfolio to total assets may also translate to more interest 
revenue and therefore profitability because of the higher risk. Although a contrasting finding 
has been documented in the banking literature (see for example García-Herrero, 2009), it is a 
novel finding in the microfinance industry. Portfolio to assets ratio is however very much 
influenced by regulation which through administered lending and deposit rates may result in 
the misallocation of credit. Stakeholders should note that since MFIs in Africa are capital 
constrained an optimal combination of long-term debt instruments and deposits are perhaps 
the optimal combination of MFI financing choice. 
Another new and interesting finding is that mature MFIs that mobilize deposits are more 
profitable. Older MFIs have higher deposit to assets which translates to lower cost of capital 
and higher profitability. The impact of portfolio-assets ratio on MFI profitability similarly 
depends on age of the MFI.  
These findings have responded to the main aim of our study appropriately. To improve 
on profitability, MFIs should employ innovative financing and instruments. This is likely to 
lower transaction costs so that more new financial instruments can increase the liquidity in the 
MFI funding market. 
This work is a first attempt to study the influence of capital structure on microfinance 
profitability in Africa economies. Future research could address the impact of (i) grants (ii) 
retained earnings, (iii) share capital, (iv) debt relative to assets and (v) commercial funding 
liabilities ratio on microfinance profitability. A focus on country-specific studies that may 
provide country-level policy conclusions would also be relevant. Other issues that could be 
covered in future research include the impact of capital structure on MFIs profitability while 
controlling for contract design and the industrial organization. Recently available data could 
be used to clarify important issues that may affect the direction of microfinance. For example 
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the interaction of economies of scope in the provision of deposits and loans and the 
subsequent influence on profitability are yet to be estimated for various environments. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER FOR MICROFINANCE PROFITABILITY?63  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The Microbanking Bulletin 201064 shows that for the years 2005-2008, MFIs operating in 
Africa consistently posted negative profits (see Table 1.2). On the contrary MFIs across the 
other continents have recorded positive profits over the same time period. Are there 
constraints unique to Africa environment that hinders MFIs profitability?   
The main goal of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which microfinance 
profitability depends on institutions of the host country. To achieve this objective, we used a 
panel data for a broad sample of 167 MFIs across 32 Africa economies for the period 1997-
2008. Researchers use diverse definitions and measurements of institutions which include 
political instability, the attributes of political institutions, social characteristics and social 
capital and measures of the quality of institutions that affect economic exchange. Although 
the concept of governance is widely used by policymakers and in the academia, there is no 
strong consensus on a single definition of governance or institutional quality (Kaufmann 
2009). Drawing from institutions theory, we use governance institutions to proxy country 
specific institutional environment. 
 In an attempt to explain differences in the level of microfinance performance, there is a 
substantial literature focusing on governance. Much of the existing literature has dealt on 
corporate governance. Studies on this front include performance and corporate governance 
(Mersland and Strøm 2009); external control exercised by stakeholders and accountability 
mechanisms to enforce internal governance (Hartarska 2009); governance history (Mersland 
2009a); cost of ownership in microfinance (Mersland 2009b); ownership structure and 
 
63 A previous version of this chapter was presented at Maxwell Fry Financial Sector Development Workshop held at Birmingham Business 
School, on 21st  Jan 2011 and the II World Finance Conference, held at Rhodes Island, Greece, 15-17 June 2011. I acknowledge the inputs 
of the conference participants. 
64 http://www.themix.org/publications/microbanking-bulletin/2010/09/microbanking-bulletin-september-2010-issue-no-20-0 
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transparency (Mersland and Strøm 2008); organizational governance―performance based 
compensation, external directors, auditing, rating, or supervision (Hartarska 2005).  There is 
hardly any rigorous analysis and evidence documented on the influence of country level 
governance institutions on MFIs profitability, while controlling for MFI specific factors and 
cross-country differences in macroeconomic and financial sector development. This study is a 
first attempt to quantify this contribution and fill this important research gap. 
Good governance is a prerequisite to secure property rights, enforcement of contracts 
and for the provision of adequate public goods (Dixit, 2009). One would expect a country’s 
institutional environment to remain the same over time, in which case institutional variables 
might be considered fairly exogenous to MFI profitability. However, in many developing 
countries, institutional quality can deteriorate sharply and periodically as a result of political 
instability, policy reversals, or fiscal austerity programs (Aron, 2000) and even historical 
origin of a country’s laws (La Porta et al 2008). 
Although a well functioning government is known to influence the performance of the 
financial sector, there is little evidence linking well-functioning institutions to financial 
intermediaries’ outcomes (Kaufmann et al. 2009). Using stochastic frontier analysis, Lensink 
et al (2008) examine whether the efficiency of foreign banks depends on the institutional 
quality of the host country and on institutional differences between the home and host 
country. Hasan, et al (2009), extends this study by investigating the impact of ‘good’ 
institutions on bank efficiency in China. It is however not clear from these studies how 
institutional development would influence microfinance profitability.  
The relationship between microfinance profitability and the institutional environment 
cannot be extrapolated from results on traditional retail banking industry. There are clear and 
substantial differences. MFIs serve a more economically marginal clientele and finance small 
and medium enterprises which are mainly informal (Cull, et al 2009a; c). Their service 
delivery technologies that include screening and monitoring may therefore significantly differ 
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from that of the conventional retail banks. Moreover, a number of MFIs are subsidized, 
indefinitely or at least during an initial start-up phase-which explains why MFIs failing to 
break even for a number of years cease to exist (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010).  
Whereas quality of institutions may cause poor countries and poor people to stay poor 
(Pande and Urdy 2005; Xu, 2010), stylized facts show that financial sectors in Africa 
economies operate within weak institutional environments (Anayiotos and Toroyan 2009). 
Additionally, Africa is characterized by weak; judicial system, bureaucracy, law and order, 
property rights and political incentives (Creane, et al 2004).  Of the 30 Africa countries 
covered in the 2010-2011 Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum; 25 
score below 4, placing them among the worst 58 countries. Among the 10 worst performers in 
the same competitiveness index, 8 are from Africa. Additionally, 38 of the 44 Africa countries 
that are covered by the 2011 Economic Freedom Index (of the Heritage Foundation) are 
considered either “mostly unfree” or “repressed”. It is also evident from Table 6.1 that 
although Africa economies rank poorly globally in terms of institutional development, there is 
also a wide variation within the same continent65.  
Table 6.1: Ease of doing business-global rankings (2010) 
Economy Ease of Doing Business  
Starting a 
Business 
Getting 
Credit 
Protecting 
Investors 
Paying 
Taxes 
Enforcing 
Contracts 
Closing a 
Business 
Mauritius 17 10 87 12 12 66 73 
South Africa 34 67 2 10 23 85 76 
Botswana 45 83 43 41 18 79 27 
Namibia 66 123 15 73 97 41 55 
Rwanda 67 11 61 27 59 40 183 
Tunisia 69 47 87 73 118 77 34 
Zambia 90 94 30 73 36 87 83 
Ghana 92 135 113 41 79 47 106 
Kenya 95 124 4 93 164 126 79 
Egypt 106 24 71 73 140 148 132 
Ethiopia 107 93 127 119 42 57 77 
Seychelles 111 81 150 57 34 70 183 
Uganda 112 129 113 132 66 116 53 
                                                 
65 North (1990:110) argues that Third World countries are poor because the institutional constraints define a set of payoffs to 
political/economic activity that does not encourage productive activity. Such rules affect both individuals and organizations, defined as 
political organizations (city councils, regulatory agencies, political parties, tribal councils), economic organizations (firms, trade unions, 
family farms, cooperatives, rotating credit groups), educational bodies (schools, universities, vocational training centers), and social 
organizations (churches, clubs, civic associations). 
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Swaziland 115 158 43 180 54 130 68 
Nigeria 125 108 87 57 132 94 94 
Lesotho 130 131 113 147 63 105 72 
Tanzania 131 120 87 93 120 31 113 
Malawi 132 128 87 73 24 142 130 
Madagascar 134 12 167 57 74 155 183 
Mozambique 135 96 127 41 98 129 136 
Source: The World Bank (http://www.doingbusiness.org/) 
 
This prompts us to address the following question; does the institutional environment 
matter for MFI's profitability? Put differently, do MFIs perform better in the context of well-
developed institutions, or do good institutions crowd MFIs out? These are broad questions 
that do not find unambiguous answers in economic theory. This is the focus of this chapter.  
Our dataset enables us to shed light on these questions in a large cross country study. 
Beyond evaluation of MFI profitability, answers to these questions may provide indirect 
evidence on how microfinance fits into the process of development in line with Ahlin and 
Jiang (2008) theoretical postulations.  
This study makes contributions to policy and existing literature fivefold. First, it is 
timely in view of the broader issue of how governance may affect access to financial services, 
especially among the poor.  
Second, it is of policy interest to the regulators and the MFI management since any 
evaluation of microfinance performance would be incomplete if institutional environment is 
found to robustly predict profitability. MFIs may for instance require a lower risk contribution 
on their investment in economies with strong institutions. 
Third, although most MFIs use joint liability or informal mechanisms to secure high 
levels of repayment, MFIs that employ the standard individual lending contract might benefit 
from adherence to the rule of law. Well-functioning supporting institutions that help to 
enforce contracts such as courts may improve MFI profitability. While this proposition seems 
straightforward, no serious and rigorous empirical work has been carried out in microfinance 
to support it.  
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Fourth, microfinance has become attractive to foreign capital investment (CGAP, 
2009a) and foreign investors place a greater emphasis on institutional development when 
selecting an investment location (Bevan et al. 2004). 
Fifth, we employ a rigorous analysis that tackles endogeneity problem that has largely 
been ignored by the existing literature. Most of the literature makes use of a static linear panel 
framework with a few exceptions.  
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section we review the related 
literature. Section 6.3 describes data and the measurements of our variables of interest. 
Section 6.4 outlines the conceptual framework and the model specification. Section 6.5 
outlines econometric methodology. In section 6.6 we present the empirical results and explore 
a number of robustness checks. In section 6.7 we discuss the results while at the same time 
draw some policy implications and offers directions for future research.  
 
6.2 Previous evidence 
How does this study relate to the existing literature? The influential study of North (1990) 
raised awareness of the role of institutions in establishing incentives for economic activity in 
general and for investment in particular. Unfortunately, hardly any empirical evidence has 
been provided on this issue in the microfinance front.  
Most of the existing literature on MFI performance has focused on institutions’ success 
or otherwise with a view of arriving at best practices. These studies include Patten, et al 
(2001), Mosley and Rock (2004), Kaboski and Townsend (2005), Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Morduch (2007), Hartarska  and Nadolnyak (2008b), Caudill, et al (2009), Armendáriz and 
Morduch (2010) and Ahlin et al. (2011). This chapter however differs from previous studies 
in focusing on the institutional environment, rather than micro-institutional, or 
macroeconomic determinants of MFI success. Ahlin et al. (2011) in particular focus on 
macroeconomic environment and macro-institutional environment. But whereas their focal 
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MFI performance indicators are operational self-sufficiency (measured as the ratio of annual 
financial revenue to annual total expense) and extensive and intensive MFI growth; our focal 
outcome is profitability. Operational self-sufficiency as a measure of MFI performance can be 
misleading as it lumps together genuine operating net revenue with transfers and financial 
sustainability does not imply profitability (Armendáriz and Morduch 2010).  
Another study that has utilized institutional environment as a control variable is 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) but whose focus is on the impact of regulation on MFI 
sustainability. With regard to institutional environment, our paper makes a point related to 
Ahlin et al. (2011) and Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007), but differs from both mainly in our 
econometric methodology that tackles endogeneity besides using a richer set of MFI controls. 
We view the results as complementary and in agreement where they overlap. 
The law and finance theory shows that the different legal traditions that emerged in 
Europe over previous centuries and were spread internationally through conquest, 
colonization, and imitation help explain cross-country differences in investor protection, the 
contracting environment, and financial development today (La Porta et al 1998).  
Contrary to law and finance theory, Qian and Strahan (2007) investigate how financial 
contracts respond to the legal and institutional environment, and consistent with the law and 
finance theory (La Porta, et al  2000, 2002), they find that strong creditor rights seem to 
enhance loan availability as lenders are more willing to provide credit on favourable terms. In 
Africa and for countries with similar financial liberalization efforts, McDonald and 
Schumacher, (2007) find that those with stronger legal institutions and information sharing 
have deeper financial development. Using firm-level data from 52 countries Demirgüç-Kunt, 
et al (2006), similarly find evidence of higher growth of incorporated businesses in countries 
with good financial and legal institutions. 
While corruption in delivery of public goods and services is expected to have negative 
impact on bank credit, the role of corruption in bank lending is not straightforward. 
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Corruption may reduce the portfolio-assets ratio, but may nevertheless suppress asset and 
liability growth (Demetriades and Fielding 2011). On the contrary, bureaucratic corruption 
may not necessarily be bad for business (Pierre-Guillaume and Sekkat 2005). Corruption 
might serve to ‘‘grease the wheels of commerce’’, by reducing transaction cost and lowering 
the cost of capital.  Indeed, Cai, et al. (2011) shows that although bribery to government 
officials both as “grease money” and “protection money,” expenditures has a significantly 
negative effect on firm performance, its negative effect is much less pronounced for those 
firms located in cities with low quality government service, those who are subject to severe 
government expropriation, and those who do not have strong relationship with suppliers and 
clients. 
There is however large empirical literature suggesting that corruption undermines 
confidence in and the functioning of democratic institutions, (see Clausen, et al 2009) for a 
contributions and a thorough discussion of the identification problem in that context. Using 
controlled field experiment on corruption, Armantiera and Amadou (2011) concludes that 
monitoring and punishment can deter corruption, but they cannot reject that it may also 
crowd-out intrinsic motivations for honesty when intensified. Along the same vein, Weill 
(2010, 2011) shows that while the overall effect of corruption is to hamper bank lending, it 
can nevertheless alleviate firm’s financing obstacles which is consistent with theoretical 
postulations that corruption may greese wheels of commerce. Further evidence of corruption 
is discussed by Dreher and Schneider (2010) and on West Africa by Demetriades and Fielding 
(2011). Cross-country micro evidence on the role of corruption in bank lending to firms is 
documented by Bartha et al (2009) and in Sub-Sahara Africa by Bissessar, (2009). Evidence 
for a link between corruption and confidence in public institutions is discussed in Bianca, et al 
(2009) while that of corruption and competition in public administration is documented in 
Gioacchino and Franzini (2008). Direct evidence on the link between bribes and companies’ 
operating cost is documented by Ng, (2006). Their finding confirms Gelos and Wei (2006) 
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who finds lower country transparency to be associated with lower investment from 
international funds. Corruption also imposes substantial economic costs, particularly in less 
developed economies (Olken, 2007; Lambsdorff, 2007; Cho, et al 2007; Chang, et al 2006; Ito 
2006; Catterberg and Moreno 2005; Svensson, 2005; Beck et al. 2005). This provides some 
validation for firm-level theories of corruption which posits that corruption retards the 
development process to an even greater extent than taxation (Fisman and Svensson 2007).  
Efficient economic regulation reduces government and market failures while assuring 
that the markets function without distortions (Djankov, 2009; Barseghyan, 2008; Crafts, 2006; 
Klapper, et al 2006; Loayza et al. 2005). Moreover, the positive effect of deregulation is 
found to differ by the initial level of regulation. This is important for the development of 
private investments.  
Without a proper protection of intellectual property rights, firms fear expropriation of 
investment in intellectual property and intangible assets. This argument is consistent with 
numerous studies that show that at the country level, regulations and the quality of their 
enforcement impacts upon the protection of investor rights. Djankov, et al (2007) investigate 
credit institutions in 129 countries over 25 years and show that contract rights and 
enforcement institutions influence the development of financial markets. Their finding is 
consistent with Djankov et al. (2006) who evidence that secure property rights are a 
significant predictor of firm reinvestment. Acemouglu and Johnson (2005) unbundled 
institutions into “property rights institutions” and “contracting institutions.” Based on cross-
country evidence, they conclude that property rights institutions tend to be far more important 
than contracting institutions and that it is harder to avoid government expropriations. Using 
cross-country firm-level data, Claessens and Laeven (2003), finds that industrial sectors that 
use relatively more intangible assets develop faster in countries with better protection of 
property rights. Further cross-country evidence suggests that countries with worse property 
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rights tend to have lower aggregate investment and worse accesses to finance (Acemoglu et 
al. 2001). 
Further evidence of economic regulation has been documented by Ciccone and 
Papaioannou (2007) who shows that in countries where it takes less time to register new 
businesses, there has been more entry in industries that experienced expansionary global 
demand and technology shifts. Besley and Burgess (2004) show that the Indian states that 
amended the regulation of the labour market in favour of workers are those that experience a 
slow growth of investment in the formal manufacturing sector. Demirgüc-Kunt, et al (2004) 
finds that rigid regulations on bank entry and bank activities lead to an increase of the cost of 
financial intermediations. 
There also a few studies that have examined the role of political stability in the financial 
intermediation process. Roe and Siegel (2009) for instance, draws a link between political 
stability; economic growth and financial development, which is consistent with the argument 
advanced by Rajan and Zingales (2003) in exploring political economy as determinants of 
financial development. Evidence on the possible link between political stability and rule of 
law on the access to finance in many Africa economies is provided by Anayiotos and Toroyan 
(2009). Evidence of the impact of political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, 
and regulatory quality on financial development is documented by Gani and Ngassam (2008). 
The literature survey presented in this section underscores the importance of 
institutional reforms for financial intermediation. We posit that institutions matter for 
microfinance profitability because they influence the costs of transactions and the efficiency 
of microbanking. This may have an impact on MFIs profitability. In section 6.4, we review 
several a priori arguments that suggest a positive relationship between good institutional 
environment at the country level and MFI profitability, while controlling for the 
macroeconomic context and firm level factors. 
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6.3 Data set, description and measurement 
 
 
Data description 
 
Consistent with the previous chapter, our data sample contains 2,004 observations 
corresponding to 167 MFIs for the period 1997-2008. The dataset was assembled from four 
sources namely the MIX Market database, World Development Indicators (WDI) and World 
Bank―World Governance Indicators66 (WGI). We also used complementary institutional 
data from the Heritage Foundation.67 Our focal measurements of economic performance 
control variables are per capita GDP growth and private credit as a fraction of GDP. Auxiliary 
indicators, include inflation and rural population share (in 1990). These are all taken from 
WDI. We merge the MFI level dataset with country-level data from WDI on macroeconomic 
variables and institutional development indices from WGI, for each of the countries and years 
corresponding to MFI’s in the dataset.  
The WGI aggregate indicators for all periods, as well as virtually all of the underlying 
indicators, are described and discussed in Kaufmann et al. (2009) and available 
at www.govindicators.org. For some years (1999 and 2001) in our WGI sample, data is 
missing. Consistent with Lensink et al. (2008), we proxy values for the missing years by 
interpolating the data.  
                                                
A key advantage of the WGI is that the authors are explicit about the accompanying 
margins of error, whereas in most other cases they are often left implicit or ignored altogether. 
It is worth noting that over time the standard errors have been reduced due to the increase in 
the number of sources utilized. Indeed, while average standard errors in 1996 averaged 0.34 
across the 6 indicators; in 2005 this reduced to 0.21.  
 
66 Governance can be broadly defined as the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them (Kaufmann, et al  2009) 
67 http://www.heritage.org/index/) that capture the business environment 
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WGI are based exclusively on subjective or perceptions on governance reflecting the 
views of a diverse range of informed stakeholders, including tens of thousands of household 
and firm survey respondents, as well as thousands of experts working for the private sector, 
NGOs, and public sector agencies.  
 
Definition and measurement of the variables 
We explore the impacts of country specific institutional measures on MFI profitability using 
return on assets (ROA). It is important to demonstrate how institutional measures are 
categorized which is important when interpreting our results. Institutional variables in most 
African countries are correlated with financial stability, and therefore difficult to identify 
precisely (Demetriades and Fielding 2011). Dietsche (2007) observes that ‘good’ institutions 
can sometimes have ‘bad’ outcomes, and that very different institutional arrangements can 
lead to the same outcomes, making it very difficult to measure institutional quality. 
Researchers have used diverse measures (see Table 8 in Appendix B)68 to proxy institutional 
environment.  
Why do we use subjective measures as opposed to objective indicators? Kauffman et al 
(2009), show that perceptions matter because agents base their actions on their perceptions, 
impression, and views. If the courts are perceived as inefficient by the general population or 
the organs of state security are corrupt, people are unlikely to avail themselves for the services 
offered. Firms similarly base their investment decisions on their perceived view of the 
investment climate and the government's performance.  
One of the limitations of subjective measures provided by the risk-rating agencies and 
widely used in the literature is that these indexes may be subject to biases through herd effects 
(Aron 2000). This implies in the case of MFIs management, judgments maybe too optimistic 
 
68 There are variations in the measurement of governance in the literature. One is a subjective measurement in which people's opinions about 
institutions are evaluated through a survey and then aggregated into a quantitative index. The alternative is an objective measurement based 
on statistical facts on the effects of institutions. For example, the wait time for obtaining government approval to start a business can be 
observed and used as a measurement for institutions.  
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or too pessimistic for long periods. When there are many components, factor analysis—a 
technique that aggregates components with unknown weights—is a convenient and superior 
alternative (see Table 8 in the Appendix B).  
We analyze the impact of country specific institutional development on MFI 
profitability using WGI as compiled by Kaufmann, et al (2009) for the period 1997-2008. 
These include (i) Voice and Accountability (VA), (ii) Political Stability (PS), (iii) 
Government Effectiveness (GE), (iv) Regulatory Quality/ regulatory burden (RQ), (v) Rule of 
Law (RL)69 and (vi) Control of Corruption (COR). Studies that have used similar data 
include; Ahlin et al (2011), Demetriades and Fielding (2011), Cull et al (2011, 2009b), Arun 
and Annim (2010), Lensink et al (2008).  
Voice and Accountability measures the extent of a free media, free and fair elections, 
freedom of expression and freedom of association. Political Stability (PS) measures the 
possibility that a government will be overthrown by unconstitutional/violent means which 
includes domestic violence and terrorism. Government Effectiveness (GE) measures the 
quality of service delivery by the government which includes the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, independence from political pressures and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to stated policies. 
To promote private sector development, Regulatory Quality (RQ) measures the ability 
of government to formulate and implement policies and regulations. Rule of Law (RL) 
measures the agents’ confidence levels in abiding by the rules of society particularly the 
criminal and commercial justice system. 
Finally, our measure of the extent to which a country is corruption-free is the “control of 
corruption” (COR) index. For MFI i in year t, CORit indicates the value of the index for the 
 
69 These aspects include: enforceability of private contracts, assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, whether existing 
laws are actually implemented in a reliable and impartial fashion, quickness of court decisions, trust in police and courts, judicial 
independence from the state and other powerful groups, impact of crime on business, etc.  
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country in which the MFI operates. Apart from control of corruption, the rest of the 
governance indicators capture the ease of contract enforcement. 
Complementary business environment measures from Heritage foundation capture two 
aspects of institutional development. Business Freedom (BF) measures the ability to start, 
operate and close a business and represents the overall burden of regulation as well as the 
efficiency of government in the regulatory process. Business freedom is a composite index 
equivalent to the doing business indicators indices used by Ahlin et al (2011). Property rights 
(PR) is a composite Index ranging from 10 (Private property is rarely protected) to 100 
(Private property is guaranteed by the government). Freedom from Corruption is a 
quantitative measure that is derived from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI). This measures the level of corruption in 179 countries. Previous studies that have 
used this data set include Mersland and Strøm (2009), Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007).  
Consistent with the previous chapter, we use the MIX Market definitions of key MFI 
specific variables. In order to avoid duplication we shall not dwell into a detailed discussion 
of the same. Reference should be made to chapter three on a formal discussion of the data and 
measurement of the variables.  
The regressions also include an additional set of country-level controls. The impact of 
competition by conventional banks on MFI profitability is measured by the ratio of amount of 
domestic credit to the private sector, divided by GDP. It is arguably the most common 
measure of financial development in the finance and growth literature, and it is included to 
proxy the overall financial depth of the country in which the MFI operates (see e.g. Levine, 
2005).  
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6.4 Conceptual framework and empirical specifications 
6.4.1 Theoretical   predictions 
Economic governance is important because markets, economic activity and transactions 
cannot function optimally in its absence. Good governance is a prerequisite to secure property 
rights, enforcement of contracts and for the provision of adequate public goods and the 
control of public “bads” (Dixit, 2009).  Without this assurance, the public lose the incentive to 
save and invest. Overall political stability and the quality of contract enforcement in the 
country may affect the extent of moral hazard that MFIs face when advancing loans. 
Institutions promoting the rule of law may enhance MFIs' ability to enforce loan contracts, 
and hence increase MFIs growth (Messick, 1999). This has implications on profitability. 
The gains on MFIs profitability emanating from institutional environment come through 
various transmission channels. Institutions70affect performance of financial intermediaries 
because they influence the costs of transactions and the efficiency of production (Aron, 2000). 
The Voice and Accountability (VA) index defines the ability of citizens to hold politicians 
accountable, including freedom of press, association, and media. Conceptually, therefore VA 
and corruption (COR) are either related by definition or causally related. Higher transparency 
of government policymaking would especially benefit foreign MFIs operating in Africa. We 
predict a positive association between VA and MFI profitability. 
Political parties with a long time horizon (PS) will not support highly ineffective 
government (GE) and prefer the rule of law (RL) to the rule of the jungle. When government 
transitions are decided by well-defined and long-lived rules, rather than perennial coups, 
government officials are more likely to have a longer time horizon, and to seek investment for 
growth rather than corrupt transfers (COR). Thus, PS is related to COR, RL and GE either 
causally or by definition. Higher values of PS impacts positively on MFIs profitability 
 
70 In the empirical literature the term institutions encompass a wide range of indicators, including institutional quality (the enforcement of 
property rights and governance), political instability (riots, coups, civil wars), characteristics of political regimes (elections, constitutions, 
executive powers), social capital (the extent of civic activity and organizations), and social characteristics (differences in income and in 
ethnic, religious, and historical background).  
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especially if MFIs have relatively high loan loss provisions because of the inherent security 
costs associated with unstable political regimes71. We therefore postulate a positive 
relationship between PS and MFI profitability.  
Effective governments (GE) make transfers that are not hidden from the public (VA). 
Similarly, effective governments use public resources, often for public gain, so that the 
spending is not a deadweight loss (RQ). Effective governments charge for services provided 
to the citizens, implying again no or minimal deadweight loss. Indeed the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2009-2010 (see http://www.weforum.org/) points to government 
inefficiency as the most problematic for doing business in most Africa economies. Foreign 
MFIs are assumed to face more difficulty in dealing with the host economy bureaucracy. We 
therefore expect a positive association between government effectiveness and MFIs 
profitability. 
The impact of the rule of law (RL)72 is felt through the effectiveness and predictability 
of the judiciary. This is crucial when it comes to contract enforcement or costly state 
verification. Rule of law is intended to create a stable environment within which micro 
borrowers operate; but it may also make it harder for small and medium enterprises to operate 
thus avoiding regulations and tax (COR). Corrupt activities are typically illegal, indicating 
rule of law weaknesses. Thus, RL and COR are also related by definition or causality. When 
going to court is time consuming, particularly if it takes years to realize collateral on real 
estate, this translates to higher costs. As elucidated by Long (2010), firms tend to post a 
higher investment rate when most of the business disputes are resolved through the court 
system. The legal system helps firms grow by improving the trust needed for new transaction 
relationships (Johnson et al. 2002). Similarly Laeven and Woodruff (2008) find that firm size 
                                                 
71 This is particularly so if MFI is not domestic as domestic MFIs may be more willing to take on higher levels of risk because of moral 
hazard. Foreign MFIs may also run a higher risk of becoming a victim of violence. 
72 Rule of law implies an open and transparent market, where contracts are enforced by a ‘rule’ that is publicly known to parties outside the 
contract and applied equitably no matter who the enforcer or the contract parties are. 
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increases as a result of the quality of local legal system. We predict a positive relationship 
between effective rule of law and MFI profitability. 
Corrupt deals (COR) are typical of a black market, where contracts are enforced not by 
public law but by private players. Corruption is a costly, hidden (in the absence of VA) and 
usually illegal (absence of RL) transfer of revenues. Government officials often collect bribes 
as an ex-officio tax fee in exchange for a license or service (for example, utility connection), 
or for exemptions to rules or taxes (implicating GE). Additionally, corruption undermines the 
rule of law thereby damaging the legitimacy of the political process (Knox, 2009). Higher 
levels of corruption may also hinder small and medium enterprises ability to operate and grow 
(see e.g. Fisman and Svensson, 2007). On the contrary, when corruption does not hinder 
micro-enterprises directly, its main effect may be lowering wages (Ahlin, et al 2011) and 
pushing more households towards small-scale self-employment, allowing for faster MFI 
extensive growth. We therefore anticipate a positive relationship between effective control of 
corruption and MFIs profitability. 
When governments establish numerous barriers to conducting business (regulatory 
quality-RQ), it creates opportunities for public officials to collect bribes before delivering a 
service (COR). By definition, corrupt governments set up entry barriers so that public officials 
can act as gatekeepers and collect (hidden) bribes and pocket the transfer before opening the 
gate to the briber-client (in the absence of VA). High quality regulation implies there are no 
excessive rules, and that rules are efficiency enhancing. Burden of government regulation, 
inefficiency of legal framework in settling disputes and inefficiency of legal framework in 
challenging regulations will all translate to higher implicit costs on MFI profitability. We 
therefore predict a positive relationship between quality regulatory practices and MFIs 
profitability.  
Turning to further country level controls, the level of financial deepening can either 
complement MFI profitability or crowd them out. Although McIntosh, de Janvry, and 
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Sadoulet (2005) do not test whether entry into the MFIs activities by a conventional bank 
affects incumbents’ profitability, they do show that repayment rates declined in areas where 
entry was most pronounced, which should have a negative impact on MFI profitability. 
Competition should also depress MFI profits since they are likely to lose some of their better 
customers to commercial banks. We thus expect a negative relationship between financial 
deepening and MFI profitability. All of these factors are relevant to most African countries 
where the quality of institutions, is poor albeit with some disparities between the different 
economies (Creane et al, 2004).  
 
6.4.2 Interaction of variables 
 
Microbanking is heavily dependent on personal contact for programs execution. Political 
stability may make it more conducive for young MFIs to form relationships with reliable new 
borrowers. In this case, the impact of political stability on deposits mobilization or growth of 
portfolio-assets ratio will decline with MFI age. Put differently, If young MFIs face high costs 
in identifying reliable borrowers, then the growth in portfolio-assets following a rise in 
political stability may outstrip their capacity to make new loans, in which case their loans-
assets ratio may fall, even if that of older MFIs is rising. This leads to a decline in MFI 
profitability. To this end we interact age with political stability (AgxPS).  
The impact of corruption on MFI profitability may also vary with MFI age. Some older 
MFIs with ties to the political establishment may benefit from corruption, in so far as 
overcoming government bureaucracy is concerned. On this perspective, controlling corruption 
will raise older MFIs operational costs, but may benefit younger MFIs with weaker ties to the 
political establishment. Since new MFIs are likely to take away business from the more 
established MFIs, control of corruption may act as a deterrent to the growth of older MFIs. 
One would however expect that control of corruption would create a more level playing field 
which encourages the emergence and growth of new MFIs. We therefore interact corruption 
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with age (CORxAg). Portfolio-assets ratio may also depend on control of corruption. 
Controlling corruption should encourage all MFIs to lend a larger fraction of their assets. We 
thus interact corruption with portfolio-assets ratio (CORxPAsse).  
The impact of rule of law (RL) on MFI profitability may also depend on the age of 
MFIs. Mature or older MFIs may have established relationship lending particularly those that 
employ joint liability contracts. Costly state verification may be more of a problem on young 
MFIs, who has less information capital to overcome the adverse selection effect. We thus 
interact age with rule of law (AgxRL). The specific definition and source of all explanatory 
variables is presented in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: Summary of variables, measurement and predicted effect 
Variable Notation  Measure Predicted 
effect 
Source of data 
and period of 
availability 
Dependent variable 
Return on assets ROA  
 
Net profits after taxes/Assets   The MIX 
1997-2008 
Institutional environment  
Governance measures  
Voice and 
Accountability 
VA Measures the extent of political and 
civil rights 
Positive WGI-World Bank 
2008,2007,2006, 
2005,2004, 
2003,2002,2000, 
1998,1996 
Political 
Stability 
PS Measures the likelihood of violent 
threats or changes in government 
Positive 
Government 
Effectiveness 
GE An indicator of the competence and 
the quality of public service delivery 
Positive 
Regulatory 
Quality 
RQ Measures the incidence of market-
friendly policies 
Positive 
Rule of Law RL A proxy for the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police and the courts, 
as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence 
Positive 
Control of 
Corruption 
COR Measures the exercise of public power 
for private gain, including both soft 
and grand corruption and state capture 
Positive 
Other complementary business environment measures   
Business 
freedom 
BF The score is based on 10 factors, all 
weighted equally, using data from the 
World Bank’s Doing Business 
Indicators (2010) 
Positive  Heritage 
Foundation 
1997-2008 
Property rights PR  Composite Index ranging from 10 
(Private property is rarely protected) to 
100 (Private property is guaranteed by 
the government) 
Positive 
MFI-specific  
Capital  CAP Equity/Assets Positive  The MIX 
1997-2008 Debt to equity 
ratio (gearing) 
GR Debt/equity ratio Indeterminate  
Deposits to 
assets  
DepAsse Voluntary Deposits/Adjusted Gross 
Loan Portfolio 
Positive 
Portfolio to 
assets 
PAsset Adjusted Gross Loan 
Portfolio/Adjusted Total Assets 
 
Positive 
Age Ag  Log of age of the MFI in years  Indeterminate  
Log of total assets  in period t MFI Size  S  
 
Indeterminate 
Portfolio at Risk PAR-30 Outstanding balance, portfolio 
overdue> 30 Days + renegotiated 
portfolio/Adjusted Gross Loan 
Portfolio 
Negative  
Efficiency  Eff Adjusted Operating Expense/Adjusted 
Average Gross Loan Portfolio 
Negative  
Loan size LS Average Loan Balance per 
Borrower/GNI per Capita (outreach 
measure) 
Positive  
Share of lending 
to women 
WOM Share of MFI borrowers that are 
women 
Positive  
Country specific variables   
Inflation  
Expectations 
INF Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
in period t-1 
Indeterminate World Bank 
(WDI) 
1997-2008 Per capita 
Income growth  
GDP Gross Domestic Product (at current 
US$) divided by midyear population in 
period t-1 
Positive  
Domestic credit 
to private sector 
PCRED Domestic credit to the private sector, 
divided by GDP. 
Indeterminate 
Rural 
population (%) 
RPOP Rural population share (in 1990) Negative  
 
 
6.4.3 Design of the model  
 
Our empirical specification takes the following general form: 
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Where is the profitability of MFI i located in country c, at time t, with i=1, . . .,N, 
t=1, . . ., T; α is the regression constant, is a vector of MFI-specific characteristics (j) of 
MFI i in country c during the period t which varies across time and MFIs;  is a vector of 
institutions quality indicators (n) in country c during the period t; is a vector of country-
specific variables (m) in country c during the period t; and
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i itcitc μυε += is the disturbance, 
with iυ  the unobserved MFi-specific effect/heterogeneity across MFIs, which could be very 
large given the  differences in corporate governance and itcμ the idiosyncratic error. This is a 
one-way error component regression model73, where  and independent 
of . 
)~ 2υσIINi ,0(υ
),0 2μσ(μ IINit ~
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73 The work horse for unbalanced panel data applications is the one-way error component regression model (see Baltagi and Song 2006) 
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6.5 Empirical methodology 
 
6.5.1 Estimation and testing 
MFI profitability is predicted in linear regressions by the institutional context indicators, other 
country level and MFI-level control variables. Given the nature of the data, we focus on 
estimation approaches that are robust to outliers. When estimating equation (6.1), we are 
likely to encounter several econometric problems. First is endogeneity: If it is possible that 
good institutions drive MFI profitability, it is also possible that countries that experience 
sustained growth in microfinance profitability are also likely to offer well-developed 
institutions. We observe that due to this endogeneity, these regressors may be correlated with 
the error term.  
Second, because of the subjective nature of institutional quality measurement, one 
cannot exclude the possibility of measurement errors in the various indices which may bias 
our results. Third, countries equipped with good institutions can also have other factors 
favourable for microfinance profitability, the omission of which adds another potential layer 
of endogeneity. There may be other factors, such as geography, that affect both institutions 
and MFI profitability. If omitted factors determine both institutions development and MFI 
profitability, one could erroneously infer the existence of a relationship between them. 
Because of the endogeneity of institutions, the OLS estimate of the effect of institutional 
measures on MFI profitability is biased74. In order to obtain a consistent estimator, it is 
necessary to use an instrumental variable for country specific institutions. Since we use panel 
data and most instrumental variables for institutions are constant over time, we do not have 
suitable instruments to correct for endogeneity. We resolve these problems by moving beyond 
the methodology currently in use in the empirical literature of bank profitability (mainly fixed 
or random effects). Consistent with the previous chapter, we resort to the system GMM 
method of Blundell and Bond (1998) which allows us to use internal instruments; namely, 
 
74 The estimation methods based on the OLS principle are vulnerable to the omitted variable bias if some important determinants of MFI 
profitability are not included among the regressors. 
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lagged levels and lagged differences. Further estimation challenges are similar to those 
documented in chapter four. To avoid duplication, reference should be made to chapter four 
for a formal discussion of the same. In order to allow for comparison with previous studies, 
we conduct robustness tests with fixed effects and OLS.  
 
6.5.2 Univariate analysis 
Table 6.3 shows that governance indicators are normalised so that the mean of each is equal to 
zero across the worldwide sample. The minimum values are a clear indication that governance 
is highly negatively skewed, which may impede on MFIs performance. Negative means in our 
sample indicate that Africa economies perform below the worldwide average in terms of 
governance. It is a matter of considerable concern that governance institutions in Africa are on 
average quite weak. This is consistent with studies that have found strong positive effect of 
governance on development using governance indicators (See e.g. Ritzen et al., 2000; 
Kaufman and Kraay, 2002). 
Table 6.3: Descriptive and summary statistics 
Variable  Notation Obs  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  
Return on assets  ROA 946    -0.016 0.007 
 
0.121 -0.851 0.830 
Log Age  AG 945    2.180  2.197 
 
0.607   0 3.7 
Log Size  S 947     15.02 14.79 
 
1.821 7.86 20.71 
Efficiency  EFF 914     0.379 0.294 
 
0.285 0.025 1.92 
Portfolio at Risk PAR 937     0.066 0.037 
 
0.093 0 0.737 
Capital  CAP 945     0.369 0.307 
 
0.279 -0.983 1.000 
Debt to equity ratio 
(gearing) 
GR 844 0.257 1.602 
 
1.348 -6.215 3.218 
Deposits to assets 
ratio 
DepAsse 382 0.386 0.329 
 
0.255 0.000 0.960 
Portfolio to assets PAsset 805 0.659 0.673 
 
0.173 0.057 0.990 
Loan size  LS 847 0.790     
 
0.569 
 
0.709 
  
0.000  3.541 
Share of lending to 
women 
WOM 764 0.604 0.615 
 
0.260 0.000 1.000 
Rural population 
share 
RPOP 950 0.687 0.684 
 
0.132 0.390 0.910 
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GDP Per capita GDP 784     0.998 2.837 
 
0.845 -2.43 2.37 
Lagged Inflation 
rate 
INF 951     0.672 0.062 
 
0.063 -0.090 0.431 
Domestic credit to 
private sector 
PCRED 959 0.1347 0.1306 
 
0.0768 0.000 0.442 
Voice and 
Accountability 
VA 963     -0.454    -0.385 
 
 0.619      -1.766 0.846 
Political Stability  PS 963     -0.666    -0.408 
 
 0.823      -2.638 0.712 
Government 
Effectiveness 
GE 963     -0.649    -0.584 
 
 0.429     -1.893 0.951 
Regulatory Quality RQ 963     -0.539    -0.444 
 
 0.431     -2.369 0.635 
Rule of Law 
 
RL 963     -0.686    -0.616 
 
 0.424      -1.897 0.242 
Control of 
Corruption 
COR 963     -0.668    -0.717 
 
 0.406      -1.576 0.595 
Business freedom  BF 806 55.25 55.0 
 
5.33 32        67.1 
Property rights PR 806 37.78 30.0 11.28 10         70.0 
This Table presents the summary statistics. A detailed description of the definition and sources of the variables is 
given in Table 6.2. Data has been winsorized at 10% 
 
 
The Correlations 
 
Correlations among MFI specific variables are significant but the level of correlation is very 
low (see Table 6.4). The bi-variate relationships follow expectations based on the existing 
literature that uses this or similar data (See Cull et al 2009c). Of particular concern however 
are the correlations among the institutional factors. The six WGI variables show very high and 
significant bivariate correlations. This correlation may be due to a causal impact from one 
variable to another (in either direction) as discussed in the theoretical framework (see section 
6.4.1), or it may reflect the effect of some unobserved confounding factor such as “good 
government”. Intuitively, one might argue that absence of democratic accountability (VA) 
might foster corruption (COR). Licht et al. (2007), for instance show that some aspects of 
‘national culture’ affect COR, RL and VA. Roe and Siegel (2011), Damania et al. (2004) 
show that political instability impairs rule of law, in turn stimulating corruption. Alence 
(2004) finds that democratic contestation and executive restraints affect RQ, GE and COR. 
This perhaps explains the high correlations among the institutional variables and therefore 
good governance correlates with positive development outcomes. Panel regression analysis 
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allows us to investigate the strength of these correlations after controlling for other relevant 
covariates. The multicollinearity between these governance indicators precludes the inclusion 
of more than one of these variables in the regression equation, so we fit a series of 
regressions, each with a single variable of these governance indicators. The section that 
follows explains how we deal with the multicollinearity of the governance indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.4 Correlations  
ROA DepAsse PAsse GR CAP AG S EFF PAR LS WOM RPOP GDP INFPCRED VA PS GEF RQ RL COR BUSF PR
ROA 1.000
DepAsse .066 1.000
PAsse 0.65 -.012 1.000
GR .172** .339** .001 1.000
CAP -.101** -.541** -0.21 -.367** 1.000
AG .142** .254** -.002 .110** -.204** 1.000
S .111** .213** -.030 .124** -.142** .351 1.000
EFF -.524** -.189** -.075* -.130** .216** -.190** -.086** 1.000
PAR -.046 .209** -.004 .101** -.062 .056 .007 .019* 1.000
LS .178** .322** .102 .058 -.242 .052* .133** -.198** -.002** 1.000
WOM -.179** -.415** .112** -.154** .201** -.094 -.149 .273 -.084 -.309 1.000
RPOP -.072 -.156** .028 -.097** .099** -.094** -.011 .046 -.078* .063 -.081* 1.000
GDP -.035 -.266** .036 -.070* .132** -.090** -.003 .139** .088** -.016 .016 .254** 1.000
INF .011 -.119* .004 -.017 .130** -.052 -.052 .227** .102** -.120** .197** -.081** .294** 1.000
PCRED .050 .002 -.062 -.006 -.125** .112** .106** -.210** .023 -.027 -.012 .271** .003 -.148** 1.000
VA -.011 .098 -.052 -.012 -.018 .152** .116** .058 -.067* .006 .079* -.328* -.076* -.001 -.061 1.000
PS -.054 .077 .026 -.028 .003 .022 -.006 .019 -.085** .170** -.036 -.210** -.143** -.039 -.131** .683** 1.000
GEF .000 -.003 .029 -.038 .079** .033 .157** .090** -.145** -.014 -.020 -.092** .140** .038 -.196** .708** .535** 1.000
RQ .011 .184** -.015 .010 -.070* .175** .184** .063 -.124** .050 -.012 -.049 -.071** -.076** -.194** .706** .492** .771** 1.000
RL -.025 .020 .012 -.060 .019 -.015 .058 -.006 -.145** .086** -.067 -.038 .065** -.046 -.156** .707** .691** .815** .730** 1.000
COR -.026 .101** .045 -.020 .015 -.027 .063** -.007 -.095** .125** -.106** -.120** .022 -.071* -.210** .588** .615** .756** .627** .849** 1.000
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BUSF -.007 -.037 -.033 -.114* .167** -.050 .099** .120** -.019 .027 -.032 .149** .168** .034 -.006 .242** .050 .402** .299** .317** .245** 1.000
PR .000 .082 -.036 -.092** .115** .033 .078* .102** -.028 .027 .049 .107** -.027 .048 -.091** .369** .195** .496** .575** .477** .386** .510** 1.00
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Where ROA=Return on Assets; AG= Age of the MFI; S= Size; CAP= Capital; 
GR=Gearing;DepAsse=Deposit to Assets ratio; EFF= Efficiency; PAR=Portfolio at Risk; WOM=Share of lending to women; RPOP=Rural population share;  INF=Lagged Inflation; GDP= 
Growth of per capita income; PCRED=Domestic credit to private sector; VA=Voice and Accountability; PS=Political Stability; GE=Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; 
RL=Rule of Law; Control of Corruption; BF=Business freedom; PR=Property rights 
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6.6 Empirical results and discussion  
 
The main aim of this chapter was to determine the extent to which microfinance profitability 
depends on institutional environment of the host country. Since the governance indicators are 
highly and significantly correlated (perhaps for the reasons elucidated in section 6.4.1), we fit 
a series of regressions, each with a single of these governance indicators. We start by 
regressing profitability on the general model and report the results in the Appendix B (see 
Table 7). We then narrow down to the specific model and report the results in Table 6.5. It is 
important to note that the robustness of system GMM to omitted variable bias helps us in this 
setting, since exclusion of some insignificant variables does not affect the consistency of our 
results. The hypothesis of over identifying restrictions can’t be rejected based on the Sargan-
test. The Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals is not 
significant in all specifications supporting the appropriateness of our empirical specification. 
We comment on all regressions together. 
The results suggest that institutional environment matters for MFI profitability. Political 
stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality and corruption are 
quantitatively strong predictors of microfinance profitability. As predicted, the results indicate 
a positive and significant coefficient on political stability. On average, MFIs are more 
profitable when there is political stability. Perhaps in more stable environments there is higher 
demand for credit, which is channelled to higher-growth activities. Upon interaction with age, 
the results show that political stability may make it more conducive for young MFIs to form 
relationships with reliable new borrowers. In this case, the impact of political stability on 
MFIs profitability through deposits mobilization and/or growth of portfolio-assets ratio will 
decline with MFI age. This calls for by policies that would improve the informational capital 
of new MFIs. Our findings complements Anayiotos and Toroyan (2009), who finds that 
political stability determines access to finance in many Africa economies.  
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Our results show a statistically significant positive coefficient on the rule of law 
variable (RL) and a statistically significant negative coefficient on the interaction term 
AG·RL. Results are consistent with the conjecture that young MFIs face high costs in contract 
enforcement and costly state verification. Therefore, rule of law may create the stable 
environment micro-borrowers need to succeed. Profitability of young MFIs rises when the 
rule of law improves, while that of older MFIs falls. A key problem facing MFIs is the high 
degree of information asymmetry between them and the borrowers. Our results are consistent 
with the conjecture that young MFIs face high costs in identifying reliable borrowers, as 
opposed to the older MFIs who may have established relationship lending particularly those 
that employ group lending. Intuitively young MFIs may not have accumulated enough 
information capital to overcome the adverse selection effect. Consistent with this finding, 
Behr, Entzian and Güttler (2011) show that relationship intensity between MFIs and their 
borrowers helps to overcome existing information asymmetries. Access to credit improves 
and that the loan approval process takes less time. Additionally, borrowers benefit from a 
more intense relationship through lower guarantee requirements.  
Results also suggest that government effectiveness may reduce the costs of doing 
business for both MFIs and micro-borrowers. Indeed the Global Competitiveness Report 
2009-2010 points to government inefficiency as the most problematic for doing business in 
Africa economies.  
Table 6.5 provides strong evidence that growth of portfolio to assets ratio may be 
slower where there is more corruption which is consistent with corruption acting as a barrier 
to micro-enterprise activities, at least in start-up if not on subsequent growth. This has 
implications on profitability. Intuitively, high corruption taxes micro-enterprise operations 
and creates barriers to their expansion, reducing demand for and quality of microloans. 
Corruption may therefore reduce the probability that MFI will invest in a country. Upon 
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interaction with portfolio to assets ratio, the results suggest corruption may make it harder for 
MFIs to boost their asset base. 
The positive coefficient of regulatory quality is an indication that a lighter burden of 
government regulation, efficiency in settling commercial disputes and in challenging 
regulations may all translate to lower implicit costs on MFI operations with improved 
profitability.  
Voice and accountability is however not significant in explaining MFI profitability. The 
conjecture that a higher level of media independence would increase the quality of 
information on local developments and transparency of government policy making is not 
supported here. 
A plausible interpretation of our findings is that well-developed institutions and 
government may actually make it less costly for MFIs to operate in a fully compliant way 
which would be consistent with arguments that favour relaxed regulations for MFIs. Contrary 
to Hartarska and Nadolnyak, (2007), we do not find evidence that business environment 
measures as proxied by business freedom and property rights influence profitability perhaps 
due to low variability of data. Our findings are inconsistent with Ahlin et al (2011), who 
although their focus is not on profitability; they do not find MFI operational self-sufficiency 
(OSS) to be significantly influenced by governance measures. Our findings are also 
inconsistent with Arun and Annim (2010) who while investigating the effect of external 
governance structure and functioning on outreach and profitability of MFIs conclude 
governance does not cause changes in MFIs profitability. Similar inconsistent findings were 
arrived at by Cull et al (2009b) who while controlling for the same governance indicators for 
the period 1996-2006 arrive at inconsistent findings. One major shortcoming with these 
previous studies is that they do not attempt to control for endogeneity. Our findings are 
consistent with Hallward-Driemeier (2009) who using new panel data from 27 Eastern 
European and Central Asian countries test the importance of five areas of the business climate 
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on firm exit, and concludes that inefficiency of government services, endemic corruption, 
regulatory burdens, less developed financial and legal institutions all raise the probability that 
more productive firms exit. It is however, far from a fore-drawn conclusion that what holds 
true for the corporate firms as a whole will also hold true for MFI’s.  
Table 6.5: The impact of institutions of the host country on profitability (including Interaction terms) 
Variable Variant of model specifications 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Lagged ROA 0.2278*** 
(9.18)      
0.2086***  
(11.76)    
0.2133***    
(10.94) 
0.2039***    
(9.30) 
0.2124***    
(11.08)    
0.2109***  
(10.88)    
Log Age  -0.0072 
(-0.38)       
-0.0039  
(-1.35)    
-0.0033  
(-1.24)      
-0.0033 
(-1.27)     
-0.0036 
(-1.34)    
-0.005 
(-1.28) 
Log size  0.0353***    
(2.63)    
0.0096*** 
  (2.57)    
0.0036***  
(2.74)    
0.0033***   
(2.96)    
0.0049***  
(3.35)    
0.0048***   
(3.11) 
Capital  0.1332***    
(9.33) 
0.1412***    
(6.27) 
0.1391***   
(12.11) 
0.1410***  
(12.33) 
0.1492***    
(7.08)    
0.1415***   
(14.01)    
Gearing  0.0067*** 
(4.97) 
0.0062*** 
(3.13) 
0.0068*** 
(4.51) 
0.0069*** 
(4.07) 
0.0074*** 
(4.46) 
0.0071*** 
(4.04) 
Deposit/Asset 0.1630***   
(13.84)    
0.0797***    
(4.73) 
0.1457***   
(9.25)    
0.1318***  
(8.51) 
0.1539***   
(12.00)    
0.1366***   
(8.97)    
Portfolio/Asset 0.0610*** 
(3.22) 
 0.0330** 
(2.32) 
0.0342*** 
(3.09) 
0.0305** 
(2.40) 
0.0263** 
(2.23) 
0.0340***  
(2.67) 
Efficiency -0.2984*** 
(-15.17)       
-0.2863***   
(-10.55)    
-0.2890***    
(-12.50)    
-0.2865***   
(-14.02) 
-0.2875***   
(-14.12)    
-0.3039***   
(-14.56)    
Portfolio at risk -0.2347*** 
(-8.28)       
-0.1549***   
(-4.23) 
-0.2607***  
(-8.93)    
-0.2364***   
(-8.18)    
-0.2509***  
(-9.62)    
-0.2208***    
(-8.89)    
Voice and 
Accountability 
0.0053       
(0.14)    
     
Political Stability   0.0277*** 
(3.02)    
    
StabilityXAge  -0.0005*** 
(-4.03) 
    
Government 
Effectiveness 
  0.0643**    
(3.24)    
   
Regulatory 
Quality 
   0.0332***  
(4.95)    
  
Rule of Law 
 
    0.0463*** 
 (5.68 )    
 
Rule of lawXAge     -0.0136*** 
(-4.55) 
 
Control of 
Corruption 
     -0.0254*** 
 (-3.28)    
CorruptionXAge      0.0038 
(1.53) 
CorruptionXPortf
olio-assets 
     0.0387*** 
(4.39) 
Business 
Freedom 
-0.0004   
(-0.45)    
-0.0001    
(-0.18)    
-0.0008    
(-1.00)    
-0.0002    
(-0.22)    
-0.0004  
(-0.52)    
-0.0002    
(-0.21)    
Property Rights -0.0008   
(-0.65)    
-0.0009   
(-0.77)    
-0.0007   
(-0.61)    
-0.0011   
(-0.88)    
-0.0008     
(-0.64)    
-0.0012   
(-1.03)    
Wald-test    χ2(12)= 
313.01 
Prob>chi2= 
0.000 
χ2(13)= 
321.80 
Prob>chi2= 
0.000 
χ2(12=    
316.29 
Prob>chi2= 
0.000 
χ2(12)= 
304.55 
Prob>chi2= 
0.000 
χ2(13)= 
315.45 
Prob>chi2= 
0.000 
χ2(14)= 
323.44 
Prob>chi2= 
0.000 
Sargan-testa   χ2(45)= 
38.29 
Prob>chi2= 
χ2(45)=32.55 
Prob>chi2= 
0.92 
χ2(45)= 40.9 
Prob>chi2= 
0.89 
χ2(45)=37.54 
Prob>chi2=    
0.92 
χ2(45)= 
33.29 
Prob>chi2= 
χ2(45)=36.40 
Prob>chi2=    
0.89 
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0.86 0.90 
AR(1)b    Z=-1.6665     
p-
value=0.00
9  
z= -2.020  
p-
value=0.004 
z =--1.6067   
p-
value=0.000 
z =-1.88    
p-
value=0.006 
z =-1.93   
p-
value=0.005 
z =-1.7884   
p-
value=0.007 
AR(2)c      
 
z=1.1036   
P-value = 
0.2698 
z=1.1161   
P-value = 
0.2644 
z =0.98211   
p-value = 
0.3260 
z = 1.44 
p-value =  
0.3402 
z =1.09    
p-value = 
0.2236 
z =1.245 
p-value = 
0.2131 
Number of 
instruments  
55 56 55 55 56 57 
Observations  303 336 303 303 303 341 
This Table presents estimations performed using Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step system robust GMM 
estimator. For the definition of the variables see Table 6.2. Robust z values are in parentheses and significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is noted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 The Wald test is a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the given equation are all zero (Greene, 
2008). A low value indicates null hypothesis rejection.  
a Test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. 
b Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0  
           (H0: no autocorrelation). 
c Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 
(H0: no autocorrelation). 
 
 
The basic estimation results from the control variables do not change even when 
external factors are incorporated into the variant model specifications. We do not find 
evidence that the size and development of the financial sector affects microfinance 
profitability. Our hypothesis that competition from banks reduces the profits of microfinance 
institutions is not supported here. It is plausible that a well-developed financial sector 
complements microfinance by perhaps providing incentives to maintain good credit histories. 
This finding is consistent with Ahlin et al (2011), who do not find any empirical support to 
the effect that financial deepening impact on MFI's self-sufficiency. Cull et al (2009b), 
similarly finds no significant evidence that greater bank penetration in the overall economy is 
associated with lower microfinance profitability75. This suggests that banks’ decisions to 
expand their branch networks are perhaps made independent of the presence and activities of 
microfinance institutions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
75 Their findings indicate that the standard measures of financial development (private credit/GDP), are statistically significant in only one 
of twelve possible cases. 
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6.6.1 Robustness check 
In order to test the robustness of our results, we carry out some alternative regressions. We 
estimate fixed effect regressions as a robustness test for the results with the GMM system 
method, at least for the sign of the coefficients and report the results in Table 6.6. Using fixed 
effect regressions does not fundamentally change the picture. The significance and the 
direction of influence of the governance variables shown in the estimations are preserved. 
Since the proxies for institutional difference are highly correlated, and qualitatively yield the 
same result, we present only results for one of the proxies. 
Table 6.6: Robustness results (dependent variable: ROA) 
Variable Notation Fixed effects model 
Intercept  1.0475    
(1.14)    
Log Age  AG -0.0021 
(-0.82) 
Log size  S 0.0164***  
(2.77) 
Capital  CAP 0.2466***    
(5.37)    
Gearing  GR 0.0058***   
(2.39)    
Deposits to assets  DepAsse 0.1530* 
(1.75)    
Efficiency EFF -0.3512*** 
(-7.58)    
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.1391*** 
(-2.82) 
Loan size LS -0.0122 
(-0.70) 
Share of lending to women  Wom 0.0508  
(1.14)    
Control of Corruption COR -0.1410*** 
(-2.91) 
Business Freedom BF -0.0003  
(-0.43)    
Property Rights PR -0.0003  
(-0.24)    
Share of rural population  RURALPOP -0.0164*    
(-1.81)    
Inflation expectations INF 0.1235  
(0.98)    
GDP Per capita GDP 0.0022     
 (1.16)    
Domestic credit to private sector PCRED -0.2147    
(-1.64)    
R2  0.6287                          
Hausman specification test 
 
 chi2(16) = 88.32  
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Ho: difference in coefficients not 
systematic 
Number of obs               228 
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This table presents the results from regressions conducted to determine the determinants of profitability for 
Africa MFIs. Estimations were performed using fixed effects OLS estimation. t-statistics are in parentheses and 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is noted by *,** and *** respectively. For the notation of the 
variables see Table 6.2 
 
 
6.7 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
This chapter has taken a first empirical step to examine the role of institutional context on 
influencing microfinance profitability especially in Africa economies. At the outset, we 
sought to address the research question; does the institutional environment matter for MFI's 
profitability? This question highlights an important, but relatively under-examined channel 
through which well developed institutions may influence MFI profitability. This study is 
pioneering in using dynamic GMM estimators and two-step estimation method, in analyzing 
the impact of host countries institutional environment on MFI profitability. Our contribution 
relative to the existing literature is our treatment of potential endogeneity biases. We provide 
the first empirical justification for the hypothesis that microfinance profitability is non-
negligibly driven by the surrounding institutional environment.  
Our results show that the positive effect political stability has on profitability of young 
MFIs is mitigated by the reduction in profitability of older MFIs. This finding highlights the 
critical importance of information capital in both developing microfinance industry and 
reducing excess liquidity. Thus the quality of contract enforcement and overall political 
stability in the country could affect the extent of moral hazard that MFIs face when making 
loans. 
Perhaps our most interesting result is that corruption makes it harder for MFIs to realize 
profits, irrespective of MFI age. Results also indicate that growth of portfolio to assets ratio 
may be slower where there is more corruption which is consistent with corruption acting as a 
barrier to micro-enterprise activities, at least in start-up if not on subsequent growth.  
While the usual caveats about drawing strong policy conclusions from cross-country 
analysis applies, the evidence presented in this paper has clear implications for MFIs and 
policy makers. Well developed institutions and government may actually make it less costly 
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for MFIs to operate in a fully compliant way which would be consistent with arguments that 
favour relaxed regulations for MFIs. At the macro level, control of corruption will not have 
beneficial effects on microfinance profitability, unless it is also accompanied by policies that 
improve the informational capital of new MFIs. 
This evidence may help guide the sequencing of institutional reforms to promote 
microfinance development. However, due to limited resources and cultural factors, 
institutions can only be reformed slowly. It is therefore prudent that policymakers prioritize 
the institutional reforms that would steer microfinance development. A policy prescription 
tailored towards MFI specific factors and institutional environment may invigorate the 
industry and subsequently profitability. 
Given the crucial role that the microfinance industry plays in the financial 
intermediation, there is scope for further work which should be country-specific inorder to 
provide country-level policy conclusions. For example, one could explore whether the impact 
of institutions is approximately the same within a country as the effects are unlikely to be 
universal for all countries. A similar analysis could be done for regions or for all developing 
economies to draw country, inter and intra regional comparisons. We also contend that further 
research should carry out an analysis by lending technology and the type of contract. For 
instance are MFIs employing standard lending contract affected in the same way as those 
employing joint liability contracts? These are important considerations for microfinance 
development in Africa. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the thesis by a way of summarizing the main findings, policy 
implications and the emerging ideas for extending this research. While to date many academic 
and policy studies in microfinance present arguments on outreach-sustainability trade off (see 
Hermes and Lensink 2011 for a recent review), there has been relatively little discussion 
within the academia and almost no empirical analysis on what explains microfinance 
profitability. This thesis is therefore a first attempt and a response to the need for more 
understanding on constraints to microfinance profitability. To address these issues, we utilized 
data for 210 MFIs in Africa from the Mix Market database, thereby presenting the first 
evidence on the link between microfinance profitability, firm-specific, industry-specific, 
macroeconomic and institutional context within Africa economies.  
In spite of the data limitations highlighted in section 1.4, we believe we have made an 
important contribution to the scant academic work on microfinance profitability discussion. 
First, we use information of MFIs over a longer period of time than any of the previous 
studies in this field. Secondly, we employ a rigorous analysis that tackles endogeneity 
problem that has largely been ignored by the existing literature.  
This chapter is organized as follows. In what follows, we present the summary of the 
main findings based on the empirical analysis. Here we relate the innovations and empirical 
evidence to theoretical postulations then compare and contrast our findings with those of 
previous studies in order to clearly identify areas of controversy/disagreements. We also 
evaluate inconsistencies or otherwise with theoretical predictions while focusing on the point 
of departure and convergence. This is important in identifying emerging gaps and formulating 
questions that need further research. In section three, we present policy implications based on 
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the emerging evidence while the final section identifies promising research ideas (PRIs) on 
areas that deserve further research. 
 
7.2 Main findings 
Broadly, the main goal of this thesis was to carry out an empirical investigation of the 
potential determinants of microfinance profitability. We approached the issue by first carrying 
out a comprehensive literature review with a view of addressing both existing and emerging 
theoretical and empirical evidence and other important questions related to the main theme of 
this thesis. We then synthesized results into a summary of what is known and what is not 
and/or what is contestable from what is not, while at the same time identifying the emerging 
gaps.  
Using panel data for 210 MFIs, from 1997 to 2007, across 31 countries in Africa, 
chapter three investigates the impact of MFI-specific, institutions development and 
macroeconomic environment on microfinance profitability. Using the same data set and a 
simple dynamic model, chapter four extends the previous chapter by examining persistence of 
MFIs profits while controlling for MFI specific, time invariant industry-specific and country 
level determinants of MFI profitability. All the estimated models or results are robust across 
various specifications while the results obtained in the chapter three are confirmed in chapter 
four. In chapter five, we examined the impact of financing choice on MFIs profitability using 
system GMM estimator and a new data set. We extend the same empirical framework to 
investigate the impact of institutional environment in chapter six. The main results of the four 
empirical chapters may be summarized as follows.  
The broad conclusion that emerges from this thesis is that MFI profitability is mainly 
driven by firm level specific factors and the institutional environment of the host country. 
More specifically, we find that MFIs that are efficient in the management of operational 
expenses are more profitable across the four studies. Although this finding corroborates 
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Sufian and Habibullah (2009), Kosmidou (2008), Athanasoglou, et al (2008) among the retail 
profit seeking banks, comparable evidence in microfinance is lacking. This finding suggests 
that high repayments as reported by a vast majority of the MFIs may not necessarily translate 
to profitability, if MFIs are also not efficient (Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters 2011). Could 
failures in corporate governance in microfinance institutions explain our finding? Mersland 
and Strøm (2009), shows that the characteristics of MFIs’ top management have an 
implication on both operational costs and the ensuing ROA. Guided by stakeholder and 
agency theories, Mersland (2009a) similarly draws a historical parallel found in savings banks 
to present corporate governance lessons for MFIs. Further empirical work is needed to 
investigate this issue more carefully. 
We also observe that capital adequacy is significant in explaining MFI profitability. 
This suggests that well capitalized MFIs are not only more flexible in dealing with problems 
arising from unexpected losses but have also a lower cost of funding. It may also suggest that 
MFIs are capital constrained (Lafourcade, et al 2006) which perhaps explains the low MFI 
profitability in Africa. MFIs are however much less capitalized, since it’s more difficult to 
leverage the risky microfinance loan portfolios (Conning, 1999). Though Cull, Demirgüc-
Kunt, and Morduch (2007) attempt to address MFI capitalization and performance, the 
empirical specification which they employ does not address the question of whether capital 
adequacy matters in microfinance profitability. This is clearly a question on which further 
theoretical and empirical research would be useful. 
Consistent with theory (see Cooper et al., 2003), our findings shows that loan defaults 
represent a serious obstacle to MFIs profitability. Although theoretical literature motivates 
collateral as a mechanism that mitigates adverse selection (Berger, et al 2011), MFIs are able 
to reach the poor or groups who need to harness resources to finance small scale investments 
by easing collateral requirements. Our findings suggest that MFIs may have insufficient 
information capital to overcome the adverse selection effect which leads to negative effect of 
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high default rate. The greater the information capital, the more MFIs would be willing to lend 
ceteris paribus. To the extent that increased financial intermediation is expected to come from 
the emergence and growth of new MFIs, this problem can be addressed through the 
development of credit bureaus and other mechanisms that help improve information on 
prospective borrowers (McIntosh and Wydick 2005). There is therefore a need to strengthen 
institution-client relationships in order to overcome informational asymmetries. This should 
however not necessarily be done through group lending as there is evidence that this approach 
may increase costs (Mersland and Strøm 2009). The case for more flexibility in lending 
technologies and contracts used in microfinance has been made by Collins, et al (2009). Our 
finding also suggests also that under some circumstances, self-financing could be used to 
mitigate adverse selection related problems (Amitrajeet and Beladi, 2010). 
One of the most important questions underlying microfinance development policy is 
whether MFI size optimizes profitability. All empirical chapters provide support for the 
economies of scale hypothesis in the financial intermediation process and the relationship is 
linear. It can therefore be construed that failure to become profitable in microfinance is due to 
lack of scale economies among other factors. Our finding suggests that MFIs may have to 
institute a dual objective of profit maximization while presumably pursuing a managerial goal 
of firm size maximisation. Intuitively MFIs may be more profitable with lower repayment and 
a larger clientele base. These findings confirm Mersland and Strøm, (2009) and Cull, 
Demirgüc-Kunt, and Morduch (2007).  
Another interesting finding is that financing choice matters in explaining MFI 
profitability. A proportionally larger deposit base will typically lead to an overall lower cost 
of funds for the MFIs with an implication of improved profitability―assuming that the 
deposits program is efficient. More specifically, we find this influence increases with MFI 
age; older MFIs that mobilize deposits are more profitable. Although comparable studies in 
microfinance are lacking, this finding suggests that MFIs may be able to effectively use local 
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depositors as in the case of Irish loan funds (see Hollis, and Sweetman, 2007) to lower the 
cost of funding with an implication on profitability. Savings mobilization may lead to greater 
profitability since it provides MFIs with inexpensive and sustainable source of funds for 
lending. But to mobilize deposits, MFIs require license which calls for transition to 
regulation. But evidence so far shows that regulation does not turn MFIs into profitable 
institutions (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua 2011, Cull et al 2011; Hartarska 2005). Clearly this issue 
remains unresolved. 
Our results show that highly leveraged microfinance institutions are more profitable. 
Although comparative evidence in microfinance is lacking, this finding is consistent with the 
agency costs hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling 1976) where higher leverage or a lower equity 
capital ratio is associated with higher profitability over the entire range of the observed data. 
Consistent with theoretical underpinnings (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Williams 1987; Jensen, 
1986) a higher level of leverage may be used as a governance mechanism to reduce 
managerial cash flow waste. Beyond internal resources, debt may therefore be preferred to 
equity because the issuing costs are usually lower and because debt reduces verification costs 
(e.g., Townsend 1979).  This is likely to be the scenario with MFIs which typically face very 
high transactions costs in issuing new equity due to their average small size. 
We also find that portfolio-assets ratio is significant in explaining profitability and the 
impact rises with MFI age. Lending specialization may provide informational advantages, 
which may lower intermediation costs and improve profitability (Freixas, 2005). Banking 
literature shows that highly diversified banks are more profitable. Banks can diversify their 
sources of revenue through investment banking, securitization, and fee-generating activities, 
which do not necessarily divert assets away from the loans portfolio (Goddard, et al 2010). 
MFI production function however differs significantly to that of traditional banks. It is far 
from a foredawn conclusion that what holds true for traditional banks as a whole will also 
hold true for MFI’s. 
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Turning to the role of institutions, our results suggest that older MFIs suffer less from 
political instability and weak enhancement of the rule of law, which is consistent with 
accumulation of information capital and relationship lending all other things equal. Our 
findings are inconsistent with Arun and Annim (2010). Contrary to Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 
(2007), we do not find evidence that business environment proxied by business freedom and 
property rights influence profitability perhaps due to low variability of data. One major 
shortcoming with previous studies is that they do not attempt to control for endogeneity. Well 
developed institutions and government may therefore make it less costly for MFIs to operate 
in a fully compliant way which would be consistent with arguments that favour relaxed 
regulations for MFIs. This evidence may help guide the sequencing of institutional reforms to 
promote microfinance development.  
Our findings of a moderate persistence in MFI profitability shows that microfinance 
industry in Africa is not competitive. This is consistent with literature that considers the 
persistence of profitability as a signal of barriers to competition reflecting either impediments 
to market competition or informational asymmetry (Berger et al., 2000). It may also indicate 
the existence of market power in the industry (Goddard and Wilson, 2009). Stronger 
competition among MFIs should therefore be encouraged. Increased competition may lead to 
well functioning markets and stimulate MFIs to reduce costs by improving on the quality of 
their services in order to retain clients with implications on profitability.  
At the outset, the four empirical studies, sought to address several research questions. A 
comparison of our results with existing studies however suggests that the significance and 
magnitude of the factors under consideration may not apply to the conventional banking 
system in which most of the existing literature is drawn from. In view of these findings, this 
thesis underlines the importance of an appropriate policy framework to support profitable 
delivery of diversified microfinance services in Africa.  
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Although some answers in microfinance profitability have been found, more questions 
remain. We find it puzzling that loan size is insignificant in all our regressions. This is in spite 
of Cull, Demirgüc-Kunt and Morduch (2007), concluding that MFIs that mainly provide 
individual loans also advance larger loan sizes with an implication of improved profitability. 
We also find it puzzling that our estimation results do not confirm the hypothesis of a positive 
link between regulation and MFI profitability. The issue of microfinance regulation has 
become increasingly important since several of the largest MFIs raise increasing amounts of 
deposits from the public (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007). What are the driving forces behind 
policy advocates' call for the overall regulation of MFIs? Mersland and Strøm, (2009), find 
that individual lending contract is not related to improved financial results, so why are MFIs 
shifting in their lending technology towards the standard individual loan contract? The 
puzzles are still many in the much celebrated microfinance industry. While this may be 
explained by the relative youthfulness of the research agenda and the programs themselves, 
we hope that this thesis will motivate researchers in microfinance development and pave the 
way towards more rigorous study of this so far under-researched field. 
 
7.3 Policy implications and prescription  
The empirical evidence confirms that firm level specific factors and the institutional 
environment of the host country should be taken into consideration when evaluating MFIs 
profitability. With respect to efficiency, more emphasis should be directed towards 
governance of MFIs. MFIs should effectively use local depositors and lower operational 
costs, as in the case of Irish loan funds because of the important discipline these depositors 
can impose on expenses management. This thesis sheds light on an important question: 
“Should MFI clients be allowed on the board?” Advocates have argued that clients are 
stakeholders because their welfare is affected by the performance of the organization, and 
therefore clients should be represented on the board. 
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MFIs may also embrace technology to minimize transaction costs. Using efficient 
management information software as well as other innovative banking technologies such as 
mobile phone banking, credit scoring technology, smart card operations and internet banking 
can lead to a decline in administrative costs, an increase in staff productivity and 
improvement in the reliability of financial accounts. Rather than build expensive branch 
infrastructure, MFIs could share local institutions infrastructure in line with Yoris and 
Kauffman (2008) arguments. However adopting new technology introduces additional costs, 
which can impact negatively on MFI profitability. Use of new technology requires capacity 
building on staff. The new technologies such as mobile banking and branchless micro-
banking may also pose a major threat to the data privacy of MFI consumers. Thus it is the 
MFIs’ responsibility to identify the best practices as well as the most cost-effective ways to 
use new technology which can improve profitability in an increasing competitive 
microfinance sector.  
The evidence of financing choice variables on MFIs profitability calls for the 
development of appropriate regulatory policies that enable MFIs to have access to long-term 
debt to enhance their performance. This may include relaxation of their listing requirements in 
the capital market. Additionally, MFIs should mobilize deposits to lower operational costs. 
This is because it provides MFIs with inexpensive and sustainable source of funds for lending, 
assuming that the deposits program is cost efficient. But for MFIs to collect deposits, they 
require license for taking public deposits which calls for transition to regulation. Larger share 
of loans to total assets may also translate to more interest revenue and therefore profitability 
but portfolio to assets ratio is very much influenced by regulation.  
With regard to capitalization, this thesis calls for a policy that advocates for better 
access to capital sources. MFIs should establish strong partnerships with commercial banks in 
order to source additional financial resources for lending and negotiate long-term funds for 
lending with local and external partners. There may however be a distortion arising out of the 
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fact that the NGO MFI is a motivated agent, and its interest may diverge from that of the 
social welfare maximizer (Roy and Chowdhury, 2009). Moreover, microfinance rating 
agencies may be able to impose market discipline and assist MFIs raise funds (Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak 2008a). Public policy should be designed in such a way that it facilitates the entry 
of private actors without abandoning the markets that may not work without the public 
support.  
Evidence of scale economies implies that MFIs may have to institute a dual objective of 
profit maximization while presumably pursuing a managerial goal of firm size maximisation 
if they have to remain profitable. If failure to become profitable is due to the lack of scale 
economies, the consequences may be declining financial intermediation, which would imply 
some degree of inefficiency in the provision of financial services. In this regard, low 
profitability should prompt policymakers to introduce measures to remove MFI entry barriers 
as well as other obstacles to competition and lower regulatory costs.  
We have established that the main source of MFI-specific risk is credit risk. We observe 
that serious loan default may have arisen from the failure of MFIs to recognise impaired 
assets and create adequate reserves for writing-off these assets which calls for enhanced credit 
risk management and more effective supervision. The policy focus should therefore be geared 
not on the volume but on the quality of loans made as well as the establishment of credit 
reference bureaus or internet based central risk-management systems, tailored towards the 
microfinance sector in Africa and which identify outstanding debt in addition to cases of 
default.  
This piece of work has established that institutions matter for MFIs profitability. This 
evidence may help guide the sequencing of institutional reforms to promote microfinance 
development. Due to limited resources and cultural factors, institutions can only be reformed 
slowly. It is therefore prudent that policymakers prioritize the institutional reforms that would 
steer microfinance development.  
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7.4 Ideas for extending this research 
The importance placed on microfinance as a policy instrument for development coupled with 
the increasing inflow of capital to the industry, indicates a need to better understand 
microfinance profitability. This research has brought to the fore numerous PRIs, that emanate 
from the literature reviewed and the empirical studies. We conclude this thesis by presenting 
the PRIs and giving some concluding remarks. 
This thesis has uncovered that inefficiency in the management of operational expenses 
is associated with declining MFI profitability. Future research may consider how technology 
can optimally be used to enhance operational efficiency, and what partnerships are required to 
scale up technological solutions. To what extent can for example adoption of mobile banking 
such as the M-pesa which is widely used in Kenya lead to a decline in operation costs and 
therefore higher profits when most MFIs in Africa lack adequate back office systems? In 
order to improve the efficiency of MFIs there is need for further research perhaps using non 
parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) in line with Flückiger and Vassiliev (2007). 
This may be achieved by considering both inputs oriented and output oriented methods while 
assuming constant returns to scale and variable returns to scale technologies using cross-
country data and based on multivariate analysis. The results may have an important policy 
implication on whether there would be need to enhance the managerial skills and improve on 
technology. It is also often argued that high MFI transaction costs are partly driven by the cost 
of frequent payment collection (Shankar 2006), which keeps MFI interest rates high and limit 
their ability to scale up operations and reach new clients in more remote locations 
(Armendáriz and Morduch 2010). This issue therefore deserves further empirical study to 
determine the impact of this lending technology on MFI profitability. 
With regard to financing choice, future research could address the impact of (i) grants 
(ii) retained earnings, (iii) share capital, (iv) debt relative to assets and (v) commercial 
funding liabilities ratio on microfinance profitability in addition to the variables we have 
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covered in this research. A focus on country-specific studies that will provide country-level 
policy conclusions would also be relevant. Recently available data could be used to clarify 
important issues that could affect the direction of microfinance. For example economies of 
scope in deposits mobilization are yet to be estimated for various environments. Other issues 
that could be covered in future research include the impact of financing choice on MFIs 
profitability based on contract design and the organization type.  
Since profit may be a source of finance for expansion, future research on the persistence 
of MFI profits should focus on country-specific studies that will provide country-level policy 
conclusions. The model put forward in this thesis can easily be extended to account for 
asymmetric profits and regime shifts in the autoregressive parameter governing the 
autocorrelation in profit rates. Additionally, competitive forces do not seem to affect all firms 
equally. Some evidence shows that industry effects, like concentration, may explain some of 
the observed differences in long-run projected profit rates. There is therefore need for long-
run study of profits and its relation to endogenous and exogenous factors of market 
competition. Is the competitive process far more localized? Put differently, future research 
may seek to answer research questions such as; to what extent is the estimated speed of 
adjustment for MFIs reporting negative profits different from that of positive profits and the 
impact of contract design such as lending methodologies on profit persistence.  
Market power can keep MFI profitability persistently high. The market-power 
hypothesis, which is sometimes referred to as the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis, 
asserts that increased market power yields monopoly profits (Athanasoglou et al 2008). Using 
disaggregated data on MFIs, this study can be extended further by testing for the existence of 
concentration and its impact on MFI profitability using  measures of concentration that are 
standard in the industrial organization literature, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) or the three-firm-concentration ratio.  
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The patterns of profitability vary considerably with lending technology. The shift from 
joint liability to individual liability loans has for instance accelerated as the microfinance 
stakeholders learn about some of the demerits of group lending mechanism. Should MFIs 
pursue individual, group or a combination of both lending mechanisms in order to enhance 
profitability? This issue remains contestable and deserves further study with disaggregated 
data. 
We have also established that MFI profitability is significantly influenced by the 
institutional environment in which an MFI is located. Future research should explore whether 
the impact of institutional context is approximately the same within a country as the effects 
are unlikely to be universal for all countries. A similar analysis could be done for regions or 
for all developing economies to draw country, inter and intra regional comparisons. These are 
important considerations for microfinance development in Africa.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
Microfinance landscape in sub-Sahara Africa 
Africa economies are very diverse. While some major economies like Ethiopia are still 
predominantly based on agriculture, at the opposite end of the spectrum, agriculture 
represents less than 10 per cent of GDP in Botswana, Seychelles, South Africa, Mauritius, 
Angola, Gabon and Namibia. Heavy dependence on primary commodities remains a common 
feature of production, exports and growth in all the regions which exposes the continent to 
external shocks and makes economic diversification a top priority for growth policies on the 
continent (World Bank, 2007). 
After a decade of decline (1975-1985) and another of stagnation (1985-1995), many 
African economies are moving towards a path of faster and steadier economic growth. 
Between 2000 and 2006 the average GDP per capita growth in Africa was 2.0%, up from -
0.7% in 1990-1999. In the same period, entire Africa GDP was US$744 billion, which was 
equivalent to 28% of China’s GDP, 69% of Brazil’s, 74% of Russia’s, and 80% of India’s. 
Chart 1 show that more than half of the wealth in Africa is concentrated within two countries; 
South Africa and Nigeria who jointly constitute up 56% of Africa’s GDP (World Bank 2008). 
Figure 1: Main contributors to Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP
Angola
4% Kenya
4% Sudan
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Nigeria
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South Africa
37%
Other Sub-saharan countries
37%
 
Source: African development indicators (2008) 
 
Equatorial Guinea has the highest GDP per capita ($7,470) while the Democratic 
Republic of Congo has the lowest ($91) (World Bank, 2008). Although twenty eight of the 
fifty three countries accelerated their growth in 2006, compared to 2005, growth in Africa is 
projected to decline from under 5.4% in 2008 to 1.5% in 2009 (see Table 1) before recovering 
to about 3.8% in 2010 which is still below its pre-global financial crisis level (African 
Development Bank 2008; IMF 2009).  
Table 1: Selected Indicators, 2005–2010 (Percent change) 
 Actual  Estimate  Projections  
2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Real GDP  6.2  6.4  6.8  5.4  1.5  3.8 
Per capita GDP  4.1  4.2  4.6  3.1  -0.6  1.6 
Percentage of  GDP 
Exports of goods and 
services 
36.5  37.9  38.9  40.8  32.1  33.1 
Imports of goods and 
services 
33.6  34.4  37.3  38.5  38.0  37.6 
Gross domestic 
saving 
22.8  24.7  23.6  24.5  17.6  18.7 
Gross domestic 
investment 
19.9  21.3  22.2  22.4  23.7  23.3 
Fiscal balance 
(including grants) 
1.9  4.9  1.0  2.1  -4.8  -3.1 
Current account 
(including grants)  
0.3  1.4  -1.6  -1.3  -7.5  -5.5 
Terms of trade 9.9  9.6  5.0  12.2  -15.3  6.8 
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(percent change)  
Reserves (months of 
imports)  
4.7  5.6  5.8  5.4  5.5  5.2 
Source: IMF (2009) 
Financial systems and the level of development vary significantly across sub-Saharan 
African economies and therefore the nature and degree of risk transmission also differs. Three 
groups of countries can be identified on the basis of financial depth indicators ranging from 0 
for the least developed, to 4 for the most developed (see Table 2). Frontier market economies 
have a financial depth ratio of 30 percent or higher and a degree of financial market 
development of at least 2; or a degree of financial market development of 4 and financial 
depth of at least 15%. South Africa is the only emerging market in the region with a well-
developed financial system and a full continuum of market segments that are interconnected 
and integrated with global markets. Frontier market countries include five middle-income 
countries (Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, and Seychelles) and seven low-
income countries (Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). 
The linkages between financial segments with global markets are fewer in this category than 
in emerging markets although the countries vary in their degree of financial development. 
Financially developing economies are the other 31 sub-Saharan African countries that have 
narrow financial sectors, in which most segments are underdeveloped with few financial 
instruments. Additionally, access to global financial markets has been nonexistent or severely 
limited. Systemic and institutional constraints have also contributed to a low level of financial 
intermediation and limited availability of financing for productive investments (IMF, 2009). 
Table 2: Indicators of financial development, 1990–2008 
 Sub-Saharan Africa South Africa Frontier Markets    Financially Developing 
 1990-
1999 
2000-
2004 
2005-
2008 
1990-
1999 
2000- 
2004 
2005-
2008 
1990-
1999 
2000- 
2004 
2005-
2008 
1990-
1999 
2000- 
2004 
2005- 
2008 
Bank 
deposits
/GDP 
26.7  29.2  31.8 46.6  50.5  58.1 16.0  20.5  22.2 13.7  15.8  16.4 
Private 
sector 
credit/G
DP 
27.4  29.4  33.8 55.6  63.5  72.1 11.1  14.0  18.4 10.9  9.8  10.5 
M2/GD
P 
30.7  32.5  36.4 49.4  52.8  61.3 20.0  22.7  25.8 19.5  21.5  21.0 
Liquid 
liabilitie
s/GDP 
16.1  18.1  22.4  28.7  33.0  43.5  10.2  12.4  14.2  6.9  8.4  8.5 
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Source: IMF (2009) 
Unlike in Eastern and Central Asia (ECA) and Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), 
population density in Africa is low, making service delivery in rural areas costly. The GDP 
per capita is also low, which implies small banking transactions. Low bank penetration has 
given MFIs an impetus to thrive. This is reflected in the wide variety of financial service 
providers operating in lower income market segments on the continent, employing a broad 
range of lending methodologies in spite of the demanding macroeconomic environment.  
Countries with higher levels of financial depth experience higher GDP per capita 
growth. African economies have lagged behind. Whereas private credit to GDP was 173.7% 
in the United States in 2005, it was only 2% in Mozambique (Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2007). Access to banking services remains stark in Africa. It costs over $700, to open 
a checking account in Cameroon, while fees to maintain the same exceed 25 percent of GDP 
per capita in Sierra Leone (Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Peria 2008). The breadth and depth of 
financial systems remain weak in most of Africa economies where recent data suggests that 
not more than 20 per cent of adults have an account at a formal or semi-formal financial 
institution. In Ethiopia for example, there is less than one branch per 100,000 people and the 
role of different classes of institution savings such as banks, cooperatives, NGO-sponsored 
MFIs varies widely (Honohan and Beck, 2007).  
Turning to deposit mobilization, African MFIs lead other MFIs in other global regions 
perhaps because savings culture is deeply engrained in most African societies. More than 70 
percent of reporting MFIs mobilize voluntary deposits (Lafourcade, et al 2006). The large 
Micro banks have been able to refine their lending methodologies, and have become among 
the most productive in terms of both borrowers and savers per staff member.  
Of the 3,552 microfinance institutions that have reported to Microcredit Summit 
Campaign Report (2009), 935 are in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1,727 are in Asia and the Pacific 
and 613 are in Latin America and the Caribbean (see Table 3). Africa has registered the 
slowest growth in the number of clients. It has also registered the lowest growth in the number 
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of poor clients (3%) and poorest women (-1%) and therefore has the lowest depth of outreach 
relative to other regions. 
Table 3: Regional breakdown of microfinance  
Region MFIs  Total clients 
 in 2006 
Total clients  
in 2007 
No. of 
poorest 
clients in 
2006 
No. of 
poorest 
clients in 
2007 
No. of 
poorest 
women 
clients in 
2006 
No. 
of poorest 
women 
clients in 
2007 
Sub Saharan 
Africa 
935 8,411,416 9,189,825 6,182,812 6,379,707 4,036,017 3,992,752 
Asia and the 
Pacific 
1,727 112,714,909 129,438,919 83,755,659 96,514,127 72,934,477 82,186,663 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
613 6,755,569 7,772,769 1,978,145 2,206,718 1,384,338 1,450,669 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
85 1,722,274 3,310,477 755,682 1,140,999 621,111 890,418 
Developing 
world totals 
3,360 129,604,168 149,711,990 92,672,298 106,241,551 78,975,943 88,520,502 
North America 
and Western 
Europe 
127 54,466 176,958 25,265 109,318 11,765 72,576 
Eastern Europe 
and Central 
Asia 
65 3,372,280 4,936,877 225,011 233,810 142,873 133,815 
Industrialized 
World totals 
192 3,426,746 5,133,835 250,276 343,128 154,638 206,391 
Global totals 3,552 133,030,914 154,825,825 92,922,574 106,584,679 79,130,581 88,726,893 
Source: State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2009 
Globally, MFIs expanded their outreach in 2005-2007 at the same pace as the previous 
years (see Table 4). As the total number of clients rose by an average of 26 percent over the 
same period, the median growth rate rose by 30 percent per annum. Africa recorded lower 
growth rate than the global average while the source of growth was remarkably from the 
smaller MFIs. Within the continent Kenya recoded the fastest growth in the number of clients.  
Table 4: Growth in borrowers served, 2005-2007 
Country/Region Growth in 
Total 
Borrowers (%) 
Growth in 
Median 
Borrowers (%) 
Higher Growth 
Rates from 
Larger or 
Smaller MFIs? 
Change in 
Growth 
Pace (total) 
Faster or 
Slower? 
Total 
Borrowers 
(2007) 
Globe 26 30 even even 49,176,522 
Asia 26  54  smaller  even  32,078,101 
ECA 38  55  smaller  slower  2,146,133 
LAC 23  24  even  even  9,002,012 
MENA 41  42  even  slower  1,774,038 
Africa 24 32 smaller even 4,176,238 
Cameroon  8  93  smaller  slower  112,225 
Ethiopia  15  50  smaller  even  1,390,877 
Ghana  33  27  larger  slower  227,251 
Kenya  65  45  larger  slower  757,979 
Mali  -2  12  smaller  slower  121,091 
Mozambique  22  35  smaller  even  49,077 
Tanzania  3  -3  larger  slower  153,416 
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Uganda  4  -3  larger  faster  176,919 
Source: MIX Trend Lines Benchmarks 2005 – 2007. Microbanking Bulletin 2009, Issue 18 
Table 5 outlines some of the largest financial service providers to low-income 
households in Africa comprising of banks, post office savings banks (POSB) credit unions 
(CUs), non-banking financial institutions (NBFIs), and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). By 2006, 16 countries in Africa had a microfinance sector outreach of more than 
500,000 customers (World Bank, 2008). This excludes post office savings banks that tend to 
have low minimum required balances, making them accessible to low income groups, though 
the percentage is not known. Depth and breadth of outreach significantly varies by region. 
Inspite of the highest number of MFIs reporting to the MIX being located in West Africa, 
outreach is higher in East Africa with 52 percent of all savers and 45 percent of all borrowers. 
The top 20 MFIs as measured by Gross Loan Portfolio represent a staggering 79 percent of 
the total portfolio of all reporting MFIs (Lafourcade, et al 2006). Recent growth trends exhibit 
unprecedented rates of acceleration, particularly in Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal and South Africa 
(African Development Bank 2008, OECD, 2008).  
Table 5: Largest MFIs in Africa (2007) 
Country  Name  Type  Outreach  
Kenya  Equity bank  Bank  1,840,000 savers  
Kenya  KPOSB POSB 1,280,000 savers  
South Africa  Capitec Bank  783,000 savers  
Rwanda  UBPR CU 656,000 savers 
Ethiopia  ACSI NBFI 597,000 borrowers  
Uganda  Centenary  Bank  559,000 savers  
Burkina Faso RCPB CU 513,000 savers  
Morocco Al Amana NGO 481,000 borrowers  
Morocco Zakoura  NGO 473,000 borrowers 
Source: MIX Market (www.mixmarket.org accessed on December 2008). 
Table 6 shows comparative performance benchmarks among microfinance institutions. 
It indicates that microfinance profitability is negative in Africa compared to other regions. 
One explanation for lower profitability is that Africa MFIs earn lower average financial 
revenues, which do not cover the high operating expenses in the region. However, in some 
markets MFIs have shaken up banking sectors that typically serve a small group of large 
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corporate clients. For instance, Equity Bank in Kenya managed to transform from building 
society into a bank and now ranks top in Africa in terms of market share and profitability. 
 Table 6 also shows that the main source of MFI-specific risk in Africa is credit risk 
perhaps due to poor enforcement of property rights, weak legal environment, and insufficient 
information on borrowers all of which expose these institutions to high credit risk. Loan 
default rates have risen in some economies. In Kenyan for instance, microfinance sector faced 
this problem at a greater magnitude, amplified by socio-political unrest at the 2007 year end.  
 Table 6: Selected performance benchmarks, July 2008 (per cent, unless otherwise indicated)  
 Africa Asia  ECA LAC MENA 
Institutional characteristics 
Age (years) 10 11 8 12 8 
Average assets (Million US $) 11.1 11.8 20.6 15.3 12.4 
Institutions (number) 69 117 98 179 24 
Offices (number) 16 27 13 12 15 
Financing structure 
Capital/asset ratio 23 16 23.6 22.9 48.6 
Commercial funding liabilities ratio 62.3 90.3 70.9 78.6 60.7 
Gross loan portfolio to total assets 66 70.8 86 82.6 78.1 
Outreach indicators 
Active borrowers (number) 23,787 41,483 10,34
1 
16,497 26,093 
Women borrowers (%) 62.9 99.4 45.1 61.4 67.9 
Average loan balance per borrower (US $) 339 175 2,030 879 360 
Average loan balance per borrower/GNP per capita 71.0 19.1 72.8 34.6 14.1 
Financial indicators 
Return on assets -0.6 0.6 1.1 2.1 2.0 
Return on equity 0.5 5.0 6.0 9.3 7.9 
Profit margin76 -0.7 7.1 10.0 10.8 8.1 
Operating expense/loan portfolio 28.6 15 15.3 18.2 19.9 
NPLs (overdue>30 days) to gross loans 4.0 2.1 1.0 3.2 1.4 
NPLs (overdue>90 days) to gross loans 1.7 1.4 0.5 1.7 0.6 
Source: Micro Banking Bulletin Issue 18, Spring 2009 
Africa bureaucracy remains significantly burdensome. Based on doing business 
indicators77Table 9 identify the bureaucratic and legal hurdles that MFI must overcome to 
incorporate and register in Africa. It shows that although the average time spent during each 
procedure is higher in Latin America and Caribbean relative to Africa, the costs involved in 
                                                 
76 Net operating income/financial revenue 
77 Doing Business ranks economies based on 10 indicators of business regulation that record the time and cost to meet government 
requirements in starting and operating a business, trading across borders, paying taxes, and closing a business. The rankings do not reflect 
such areas as macroeconomic policy, quality of infrastructure, currency volatility, investor perceptions, or crime rates 
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launching a commercial or industrial firm with up to 50 employees is far much higher in 
Africa. 
Table 7: Starting a business 
Region  Number of 
procedures 
Duration 
(days) 
Cost (% GNI per 
Capita) 
Paid in Min. Capital 
(% of GNI per capita) 
East Asia & Pacific 8.6 44.2 32.3 37.3 
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia 
7.7 22.6 8.6 36 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
9.7 64.5 39.1 3.4 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
8.4 23.5 41 331.4 
OECD 5.8 13.4 4.9 19.7 
South Asia 7.4 32.5 31.9 0.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa 10.2 47.8 111.2 173.4 
Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2009 
Figure 2 shows that one of the main impediments to the provision of financial services 
in Africa is the high cost of operating environment and the scarcity of skilled manpower at all 
levels (Aschcroft, 2008). Poor condition of the infrastructure, including decaying roads, 
unreliable and irregular provision of electricity and fixed line telephones, inhibits investments 
in microfinance. High communication costs makes it difficult to control production processes 
over long distances by computer-aided control systems and online communication, which 
subsequently reduce the need to co-locate management and technical staff with unskilled 
workers (World Bank, 2008).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2: Performance indicators from Africa MFIs 2004-2007 
 
 
Source: compiled by the MIX but adapted from microfinance insights Vol 9, Nov/Dec 200878  
While much is made of Africa’s distance from world markets, the primary problem is 
domestic-long distances within countries. Africa has one of the lowest road densities in the 
world (see Table 8). The bulk of the landlocked countries must rely on efficient or lack of 
investment of neighbours for access to ports and markets (World Bank, 2009). Physical 
factors, such as the relative absence of navigable rivers and natural harbours, have been 
serious barriers to trade. The average population density on the continent which stands at 77 
                                                 
78 www.microfinnaceinsights.com 
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people per square kilometre is among the lowest in the world (World Bank, 2009). With such 
high unit costs, it is hard for MFIs to make small loans without relying on explicit or implicit 
subsidies. That notwithstanding, more MFIs are now reporting profits and, with funders 
shifting to loans and equity and donor grants are not as common (Honohan and Beck, 2007). 
Table 8: Trading and transport costs 
Region Trading time 
across borders 
for exports 
(days) 
Average transport 
costs 
($ per container to 
Baltimore) 
Population in 
landlocked 
Countries (%) 
Road density 
(km2 of road 
per 
surface area) 
(1999) 
Estimated 
number of 
civil 
conflicts, 
(1940–2000) 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
24 3900 0.42 0.72 8 
Europe & 
Central Asia 
29 Na  23 Na  13 
Latin America 
& Caribbean 
22 4600 2.77 0.12 15 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
27 2100 0 0.33 17 
South Asia 34 3900 3.78 0.85 24 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
40 7600 40.2 0.13 34 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 2009 
Weak capitalisation has also been typical to Africa MFIs, which has hampered outreach 
and sustainability. With loan portfolios increasing by over a billion dollars a year (see Figure 
3), the provision of enough funding to the institutions remains a major challenge. MFIs 
finance their activities with funds from both debt and equity. A growing amount of 
commercial funding, such as bank lending and private equity, is supplementing funding from 
the donors. For example, Faulu-Kenya managed to tap private equity when it raised funds 
through the capital market after successfully floating a corporate bond worth 0.5 billion 
Kenya shillings in 2005 (the Mix Market; African Development Bank, OECD 2008). Whereas 
MFIs around the world (except in the LAC region) rely heavily on donations and retained 
earnings to fund their activities, Africa MFIs fund only 25 percent of their assets with equity. 
These institutions mobilize deposits as their main source of liabilities (at 72 percent), 
significantly more than MFIs in other regions (Lafourcade, et al 2006). 
Figure 3: Growth in Portfolio of the 10 Large MFIs
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Source: MIX Market (www.mixmarket.org) accessed on December 2008. 
Revenues from other sources beyond lending are a key component of the revenue 
stream of most MFIs. The average MFI allocates only three-quarters of its assets as loan 
portfolio, and this creates the need to maximize the return of almost one-quarter of its assets 
in alternative activities beyond lending. On the regional level, Africa followed by South Asia 
has the lowest percentage of financial revenue being generated from loan portfolio in 2007 
(see Table 9). For these two regions, the other revenues are equally distributed between other 
assets and other services. Similarly, Africa represents the lowest share of assets as a ratio of 
gross loan portfolio relative to other regions. 
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Table 9: Financial structure 
Region  Sources of Revenue  
as Percentage of 
Financial Revenue 
Asset Structure as  
Percentage of 
Total Assets 
Average Returns 
by Asset Type 
Loan 
Portfolio 
Other 
Assets 
Other 
Services 
Gross 
Loan 
Portfolio 
Other 
Assets 
Net 
Fixed 
Assets 
Gross Loan 
Portfolio 
Other 
Assets 
Africa 83  8   9 61 34 8 39 4 
EAP 92 3 5 72 26 4 35 3 
ECA 93 2 5 82 16 5 32 2 
LAC 91 2 7 79 20 5 37 3 
MENA 94 4 2 72 29 4 30 2 
S Asia 87 7 6 72 27 3 24 3 
Average 90 4 6 74 24 5 34 3 
Source: the Micro Banking Bulletin, Issue 17, autumn 2008, the MIX market.  
Financial structure does not vary significantly by region although it does vary by MFI 
type. Most unregulated MFIs rely on equity for financing. NGOs and unregulated MFIs often 
face challenges in attracting funding from banks and other potential investors because they 
have no corporate ownership structures and unclear legal status. Moreover, they are poorly 
leveraged because they are unable to mobilize savings. Cooperatives equally find it difficult 
to attract equity investment given their non-corporate ownership structure. MFIs in some 
economies face interest rate ceilings, such as the West African Monetary Union usury law that 
caps MFI and cooperative interest rates at 27 percent and bank interest rates at 18 percent. 
Although unregulated MFIs earn the highest financial revenues, they also report the highest 
expenses compared with other type of MFIs; their operating expenses represent 25 percent of 
assets.  Cooperatives report the lowest ratio of financial revenue to total assets, just high 
enough to cover total expenses. Asset allocation varies by MFI type and understandably 
affects profitability. Gross Loan Portfolio represents more than 70 percent of assets for 
unregulated MFIs compared with 55 percent for cooperatives and 45 percent for regulated 
MFIs (Lafourcade, et al 2006). 
Turning to commercialization of microfinance, Africa MFIs have not yet reaped the 
benefits of international and commercial funding. Only about 10% of the total Microfinance 
Investment Vehicle (MIV) portfolio is in Africa (see Table 12).  
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Table 10: Microfinance fund exposure to Africa  
Fund  Total MFI investments 
(US$ million) 
Percentage in Africa  Derive investment  
(US$ million) 
Africap  13.3 100 13.3 
CORDAID 63.5 18 11.4 
Dexia  125.9 2 2.5 
DOEN 79.1 15 11.9 
Gray Ghost 75.0 7 5.3 
HIVOS-Triodos 28.8 36 10.4 
I&P 12.7 22 2.8 
Impulse  23.8 5 1.2 
Oikocredit  304.2 15 45.6 
Procredit  110.9 6 6.7 
ResponseAbility  96.2 4 3.9 
Triodos Fair Share 18.6 12 2.3 
Triodos Doen 45.2 15 6.8 
Unitus 9.5 15 1.4 
Source: www.microcapital.org accessed on April 2007 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table 1: Definition of core terminologies 
Gross Loan Portfolio (in US$)  All outstanding principal for all outstanding client loans, including 
current, delinquent and restructured loans, but not loans that have 
been written off. It does not include interest receivable. It does not 
include employee loans. 
Total Assets (in US$) Total Assets, adjusted for Inflation and standardized provisioning for 
loan impairment and write-offs 
Total Equity (in US$)  Total of all equity accounts 
Capital / Asset Ratio  Adjusted Total Equity/Adjusted Total Assets 
Debt / Equity Ratio  Adjusted Total Liabilities/Adjusted Total Equity 
Deposits to Loans  Voluntary Deposits/Adjusted Gross Loan Portfolio 
Deposits to Total Assets  Voluntary Deposits/Adjusted Total Assets 
Gross Loan Portfolio / Total Assets  Adjusted Gross Loan Portfolio/Adjusted Total Assets 
Return on Assets (%)  (Adjusted Net Operating Income - Taxes)/Adjusted Average Total 
Assets 
Return on Equity (%)  (Adjusted Net Operating Income - Taxes)/Adjusted Average Total 
Equity 
Operational Self-Sufficiency (%)  Financial Revenue/(Financial Expense + Impairment Losses on Loans 
+ Operating Expense) 
Financial Revenue Ratio  Adjusted Financial Revenue/Adjusted Average Total Assets 
Profit Margin (%)  Adjusted Net Operating Income/Adjusted Financial Revenue 
Total Expense Ratio (%)  Adjusted (Financial Expense + Net Loan Loss Provision Expense + 
Operating Expense)/Adjusted Average 
Total Assets 
Financial Expense Ratio (%)  Total of financial expense on liabilities, net inflation adjustment, cost-
of-funds adjustment and other expenses from financial services 
Loan Loss Provision Expense Ratio 
(%)  
Adjusted Net Loan Loss Provision Expense/Adjusted Average Total 
Assets 
Operating Expense/Assets Ratio (%)  Adjusted Operating Expense/Adjusted Average Total Assets 
Operating Expense / Loan Portfolio 
(%)  
Adjusted Operating Expense/Adjusted Average Gross Loan Portfolio 
Cost per Borrower  Adjusted Operating Expense/Adjusted Average Number of Active 
Borrowers 
Portfolio at Risk > 30 days Ratio (%)  Outstanding balance, portfolio overdue> 30 Days + renegotiated 
portfolio/Adjusted Gross Loan Portfolio 
Loan Loss Reserve Ratio (%)  Loan loss reserve/Value of loans outstanding 
Risk Coverage Ratio (%)  Adjusted Impairment Loss Allowance/PAR > 30 Days 
Write Off Ratio (%) Value of loans written-off/Adjusted Average Gross Loan Portfolio 
Number of Personnel  Total number of staff members 
Loan Number of Active Borrowers  Number of borrowers with loans outstanding, adjusted for 
standardized write-offs 
Average Loan Balance per Borrower 
(US$)  
Adjusted Gross Loan Portfolio/Adjusted Number of Active Borrowers 
Woman Borrowers (%)  Number of active women borrowers/Adjusted Number of Active 
Borrowers 
Average Loan Balance per Borrower/ 
GNI per Capita (%)  
Adjusted Average Loan Balance per Borrower/GNI per Capita 
Deposits to Loans Deposits/ Adjusted Gross Loan Portfolio 
Deposits to Total Assets Deposits/ Adjusted Total Assets 
Portfolio to Assets Adjusted Gross Loan Portfolio/ Adjusted Total Assets 
Source: Microbanking Bulletin, Issue 17, autumn 2008- www.mixmarket.org/ 
 
Table 2: Tests for time and country-specific effects 
Model                                                   LM test                                       P-value 
0........32 === CDDD   χ2 (30) = 126.20  0.8200 
χ2 (11) = 4.19  0.7990 
Tγγγ .........32 ==   
0........ 3232 ====== tCDDD γγγ   χ2 (41) = 35.44  0.8910 
Where represent country dummies and cD tγ time dummies. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Sargan test for alternative model with all variables strictly exogenous 
Sargan test of over identifying restrictions 
chi2(27)=33.69 
Prob >=chi2 0.18 
H0: Over identifying restrictions are valid 
 
 
 
Table 4: Granger-Causality test between Return on Asset and Capital without control variables 
 ROA Capital 
Intercept 0.0041 
(0.92) 
-0.0258 
(-1.38) 
ROA(-1)  
 
0.1662 
(1.25) 
0.1663 
(0.31) 
ROA(-2)  
 
0.0268 
(0.30) 
-0.5262 
(-1.63) 
ROA(-3)  
 
0.0601 
(0.76)   
-0.5523 
(-1.53) 
Capital(-1)  
 
-0.0085 
(-0.61) 
0.4292*** 
(2.85) 
Capital(-2)  
 
0.0098 
(0.49  ) 
-0.0791 
(-1.13)   
Capital(-3)  
 
-0.0001 
(-0.02)   
0.0856** 
(2.04)   
AR(1)a    z =-2.52 
p-value = 0.01 
z =-2.60 
p-value = 0.01 
AR(2)b      z =0.13 z =-0.71 
P-value = 0.89 P-value = 0.47  
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is noted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
Figures in the parenthesis are the z-values 
a Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0  
   (H0: no autocorrelation). 
b Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 
(H0: no autocorrelation). 
 
Table 5: Estimation results using FE (dependent variable: ROE) 
 Variant model specifications 
Variables 7 8 
Intercept 0.5817 
(1.34) 
0.5817 
(1.34) 
Log Size  -0.0474 
(-1.29) 
 
Log Size2  -0.0237 
(-1.29) 
Log Age  0.1577* 
(1.84) 
 
Log Age2  0.0788 
(1.84) 
Capital  -0.2010** 
(-2.07) 
-0.2010** 
(-2.07) 
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Gearing  -0.0285 
(-1.60) 
-0.0285 
(-1.60) 
Efficiency  -0.3203*** 
(-6.14) 
-0.3203*** 
(-6.14) 
Portfolio at risk -0.1405 
(-0.75) 
-0.1405 
(-0.75) 
Risk coverage ratio   
Loan Loss Reserve Ratio   
Average Loan Size to GNP per 
capita 
0.4832*** 
(3.38) 
0.4832*** 
(3.38) 
Inflation 0.0962 
(1.39) 
0.0962 
(1.39) 
GDP per capita growth 0.0240 
(0.62) 
0.0240 
(0.62) 
R2 0.11 0.11 
No of obs. 728 728 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Figures in the parenthesis are the t-Statistic 
 
 
Table 6: Estimation Results Using Fixed Effects-within (Robustness-dependent variable: ROA) 
                                           Variant model specifications with robust standard errors    
Variable Notation 2 3 
Intercept  -0.4079*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.5156*** 
(-3.54) 
Log Size  S 0.0200* 
(1.86) 
0.0183* 
(1.73) 
Log Size2 S2 0.0100                                      
(1.86)    
 
Log Age  AG  -0.0154 
(-0.56) 
-0.0061 
(-0.23) 
Log Age2 AG2 -0.00 
(-0.56) 
 
Capital  CAP  0.0637*** 
(2.88) 
0.0589*** 
(2.49)   
Gearing  GR  0.0148 
(1.49) 
0.0130 
(1.20) 
Efficiency EFF -0.1335*** 
(-8.74) 
-0.1379*** 
(-11.52) 
Portfolio at risk PAR -0.0095 
(-1.84) 
-0.0100** 
(-2.19) 
Inflation 
expectations 
INF 0.0438 
(0.63)   
0.0293 
(0.43)    
Per capita 
incomes 
GNI -0.0043 
(-0.10) 
-0.0002 
(-0.01) 
Property rights PR  0.0014** 
(1.86) 
Freedom from 
corruption 
COR  0.0020*** 
(2.61)   
R2  0.83 0.83 
No of obs.  441 432 
This table presents regression with robust standard errors results conducted to determine the determinants of 
profitability for Africa MFIs. Estimations were performed using fixed effects estimation. T-Statistics are in 
parentheses and significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is noted by *, ** and *** respectively. A detailed 
description of the definition and sources of the variables is given in Table 3.2 
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Table 7: The impact of governance on MFI profitability (including Interaction terms) 
Variable Variant of model specifications 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Lagged ROA 0.2300*** 
  (2.49)    
0.2050**   
 (2.22)    
0.2089*** 
   (2.59)    
0.1972** 
(2.11)     
0.1798** 
  (2.04)    
0.1711** 
 (1.99)    
Log Age  -0.0036 
(-1.38)     
-0.0039  
 (-1.35)    
-0.0033  
(-1.24)      
-0.0033 
(-1.27)     
-0.0036 
   (-1.34)    
-0.0035 
 (-1.28)    
Log size  0.0354*** 
 (2.64 )    
0.0304***   
(2.32)    
0.0394*** 
  (3.04)    
0.0342*** 
(2.61)    
0.0364***    
(2.84)    
0.0390***  
(2.99 )    
Capital  0.2404***   
(5.53)    
0.2171*** 
 (5.00)    
0.2365*** 
(5.63  )    
0.2443*** 
(5.75)    
0.2262*** 
(5.35)    
0.2309*** 
(5.38)    
Gearing  0.0076***  
 (3.72)    
0.0058*** 
(3.89)       
0.0074***   
(3.53)    
0.0078***   
(3.70) 
0.0072*** 
(3.40)    
0.0079***  
(3.69)    
Deposit/Asset 0.3168***  
(3.91) 
0.2580***   
(3.29)    
0.2876***    
(3.86)    
0.2788***    
(3.56)    
0.2497***    
(3.22) 
0.2931***    
(3.89)    
Portfolio/Asset 0.0642*** 
(3.41) 
0.0611*** 
(3.34) 
0.0634*** 
(3.17) 
0.0642*** 
(3.25) 
0.0624*** 
(3.31) 
0.0671*** 
(3.14) 
Efficiency -0.3003*** 
 (-3.95)    
-0.3475*** 
   (-5.41)    
-0.3145*** 
  (-5.24)    
-0.3098*** 
 (-5.06)    
-0.3166*** 
(-5.28)    
-0.3103*** 
(-5.10)    
Portfolio at risk -0.2404*** 
 (-2.42)      
-0.2386*** 
  (-2.47)   
-0.1918** 
 (-1.93)    
-0.2356*** 
(-2.41)    
-0.1865** 
 (-1.88)    
-0.1905**  
 (1.87)   
Loan Size  -0.0182    
(-0.85)    
-0.0234    
(-1.11)    
-0.0218    
(-1.04)    
-0.0228    
(-1.07)    
-0.0180    
(-0.86)    
-0.0241   
(-1.13)    
Women  -0.0211   
(-0.44)    
-0.0023    
-0.05)    
-0.0103    
(-0.22)    
-0.0111   
(-0.23)    
-0.0061   
(-0.13)    
-0.0096    
(-0.20)    
Voice and 
Accountability 
0.0053       
(0.14)    
     
Political Stability   0.0550*** 
(2.27)    
    
StabilityXAge  -0.0009*** 
(-5.14) 
    
Government 
Effectiveness 
  0.0746**    
(2.22)    
   
Regulatory 
Quality 
   0.0601*     
(1.81)    
  
Rule of Law 
 
    0.0821*** 
  (2.35)    
 
Rule of lawXAge     -0.0159*** 
(-5.29) 
 
Control of 
Corruption 
     -0.0290** 
   (-2.29)    
CorruptionXAge      0.0044 
(1.51) 
CorruptionXPortf
olio-assets 
     -0.0424*** 
(2.83) 
Business 
Freedom 
-0.0002   
(-0.27)    
-0.00002    
(-0.03)    
-0.0005   
(-0.66)    
0.00001    
(0.02)    
-0.0003   
(-0.35)    
0.0001 
(0.06)    
Property Rights 0.0006    
(0.45)    
0.0004     
(0.31)    
0.0005    
(0.41)    
0.0004   
(0.31)    
0.0006   
(0.48)    
0.0003    
(0.22)    
Share of rural 
population  
-0.0055 
 (-0.52) 
-0.0047  
(-0.63) 
-0.0048  
(-0.61) 
-0.0040  
(-0.62)     
-0.0036  
(-0.69)    
-0.0044  
(-0.66)    
Inflation 
expectations 
0.0741 
 (0.78)    
0.1040 
(1.15)    
0.0591   
(0.66)   
0.1285 
 (1.32)    
0.1786 
 ( 1.68)   
0.1173 
 (1.24)    
GDP Per capita 0.0013   
(0.69)    
0.0003    
(0.14)    
0.0008    
(0.45)    
0.0006 
(0.32 )    
-0.0016 
   (-0.82)    
0.0009     
(0.48)    
Domestic credit 
to private sector 
-0.1377      
(-1.06)    
-0.1258   
(-0.98)    
-0.0960   
(-0.74)    
-0.1209 
 (-0.93)    
-0.1125    
(-0.88)    
-0.1509   
(-1.18)    
Wald-test    χ2(18)= 
333.03 
Prob>chi2= 
0.000 
χ2(18)= 
344.80 
Prob>chi2= 
0.000 
χ2(18)=    
346.39 
Prob>chi2= 
0.000 
χ2(18)= 
334.74 
Prob>chi2= 
0.000 
χ2(18)= 
350.45 
Prob>chi2= 
0.000 
χ2(18)= 
336.69 
Prob>chi2= 
0.000 
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Sargan-testa   χ2(30)= 
32.22 
Prob>chi2= 
0.75 
χ2(30)= 
29.01 
Prob>chi2= 
0.86 
χ2(30)= 
31.47 
Prob>chi2= 
0.77 
χ2(30)= 
34.74 
Prob>chi2=    
0.92 
χ2(30)= 
33.48 
Prob>chi2= 
0.59 
χ2(30)= 
36.40 
Prob>chi2=    
0.89 
AR(1)b    z=-3.8406   
p-
value=0.00
0  
z=-3.8406   
p-
value=0.000  
z =-3.6658   
p-
value=0.000 
z =-3.7941   
p-
value=0.000 
z =-3.7252   
p-
value=0.000 
z =-3.8153   
p-
value=0.000 
AR(2)c      
 
z=0.5776 
P-value = 
0.5635 
z=0.5003    
P-value = 
0.6168  
z =0.3409   
p-value = 
0.7332 
z =0.5478   
p-value = 
0.5838  
z =0.3861    
p-value = 
0.6994  
z =0.4658   
p-value = 
0.6413  
Observations  179 179 179 179 179 179 
This table presents estimations performed using Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step system robust GMM 
estimator. For the definition of the variables see Table 4.1. Robust z values are in parentheses and significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is noted by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 The Wald test is a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients in the given equation are all zero (Greene, 
2008). A low value indicates null hypothesis rejection.  
a Test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. 
b Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0  
           (H0: no autocorrelation). 
c Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 
(H0: no autocorrelation). 
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Table 8: Various measures of institutional development 
Institutional measure Source Period, country 
 
Components of index References using the 
measures 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Maztruzzi (2009),  
Broad institutional 
development indicators: 
Subjective 
World Bank Annual, from 1996-
2008; 212 countries 
Governance Indicators  
Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence; Government Effectiveness; 
Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; Control of 
Corruption 
Ahlin et al. (2011), Lesink et 
al (2008), Cull et al (2009b), 
Cull et al (2009b), 
Heritage Foundation index 
of economic 
freedom: partly 
subjective (but not 
from risk-rating 
agencies) 
Heritage  Foundation, 
Washington, D.C. 
Annual, from 1996; 
161 
Countries 
Dimensions of market efficiency  
Economic freedom; Corruption; Trade policy; taxation; 
government intervention; monetary policy; capital 
flows and foreign investment regulations; banking 
regulations; wage or price controls; protection of 
property rights; efficiency of regulation; extent of 
parallel market 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak 
(2007)  
 
Gallup World Poll (GWP): 
subjective 
Gallup World Poll  Annually or bi-
annually in over 150 
countries since 2006. 
Cross-country household survey 
Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence; Government Effectiveness; 
Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; Control of 
Corruption 
Clausen, Kraay and Nyiri 
(2009) 
Doing Business (DB) 
Indicators: subjective 
(ranked by case studies and 
consultation with experts) 
World Bank Annual, from 2004-
2009; 183 economies 
Ease of doing business  
10 topics covered. Starting a business; Employing 
workers; Registering property; Getting credit; 
Protecting investors; Paying taxes ; Trading across 
borders; Enforcing contracts; Closing a business 
Ahlin et al. (2011) 
Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) composite index: 
objective 
World Bank Annual-publicly 
disclosed from 2006; 
78 countries. 
Governance 
16 criteria clustered in four groups: (i) economic 
management, (ii) structural policies, (iii) policies for 
social inclusion and equity, and (iv) public sector 
management and institutions. 
Dalgaard et al (2004) 
 
BERI disaggregated 
business 
risk indicators: subjective 
(ranked by a “permanent” 
panel of experts 
Knack and Keefer (1995), 
Data from business 
Environmental Risk 
Intelligence (BERI) 
Annual from 1972; 
about 47 countries (7 
African countries 
Security of contract and property rights 
Bureaucratic delay; nationalization 
potential; contract enforceability; 
infrastructure quality 
Knack and Keefer  
1995,1997); Barro (1996); 
 
ICRG disaggregated  
business risk indicators: 
indicators: 
subjective (ranked by 
staff of political risk 
service 
Knack and Keefer (1995), 
data from International 
Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG): private firm for 
potential foreign investors 
Annual from 1982; 
135 countries (34 
African 
countries); not all 
countries start in 
1982 
Security of contract and property rights 
Rule of law; corruption in government; quality of the 
bureaucracy; repudiation of contracts by government; 
expropriation risk of private investment 
Knack and Keefer (1995, 
1997); Barro (1996); Jeffrey 
D., and Warner, A. (1997). 
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Business International 
disaggregated risk 
indicators: subjective 
(ranked by local 
observers) 
Mauro (1995), data from  
Business International (BI): 
private firm for potential 
foreign investors, now 
incorporated into the 
Economist Intelligence unit 
1971–79, annual; 57 
countries 
1980–83, annual; 68 
countries (10 African 
countries) 
Institutional quality 
Corruption index; bureaucratic efficiency: sum of three 
measures (efficiency of judicial system, absence of 
red tape and absence of corruption); political stability: 
sum of six measures (institutional change, social 
change, opposition takeover, stability of labour, 
relationship with neighbouring countries, terrorism); 
institutional efficiency sums all nine 
Mauro (1995); Clague and 
others (1996) 
Borner, Brunetti, and 
Weder’s political 
credibility index: 
subjective (ranked by 
local entrepreneurs) 
Borner, Brunetti and 
Weder (1995), based on 
own 1992–93 survey of 
entrepreneurs in 28 
countries 
1981–90; 28 
countries (8 African 
countries) 
Political credibility  
Unexpected changes in laws and policies regularly 
affecting business; expectation that government sticks 
to major announced policies; changes in uncertainties 
over lawmaking in the last decade 
Borner, Brunetti, and Weder 
(1995);  
Measure of  contract 
intensive money: 
objective 
Clague and others (1995) International 
Financial 
Statistics (IMF) 
Poor enforcement of contracts or property  rights 
M2 – C/M2; M2 is broad money, and C is currency 
outside banks (increases with efficiency) 
Clague et al (1995,1996) 
Gastil’s political rights 
index (Freedom House 
index): subjective 
(ranked, but not by 
local observers) 
Gastil (1989, 1991), based  
on published and 
unpublished information 
about individual countries 
Annual, from 1973; 
165 
Countries 
Political rights measure (sometimes called 
“democracy”) 
Meaningful election of chief authority; meaningful 
election of legislature; fair campaigning; fair reflection 
of voter preference; multiple political parties; no 
military control; decentralized political power; 
informal consensus; significant opposition vote; recent 
shift in power through elections; no denial of self-
determination of major groups “ 
Barro (1996); Isham, 
Kaufmann, and Pritchett 
(1997) 
Institutional Investor rating  
of risk of default on 
sovereign debt: 
subjective (ranked by 
international panel of 
bankers) 
Institutional Investor 
semi-annual publication 
March and 
September, 
from 1979; more 
than 100 
countries (25 African 
countries) 
Property and contracts rights 
Credit rating 
Clague et al (1996) 
Political characteristics 
Clague, Keefer, Knack and 
Olsen’s political regime 
indicators: objective 
Clague and others (1996), 
constructed from Banks 
(1979), Gurr (1990) to 
1986 and extrapolated to 
1990 with Europa 
Yearbook 
1969–90 Type and duration of political regime  
Dictatorship, almost dictatorship, intermediate 
category, almost democracy, and democracy; type of 
regime based on rankings from summing outcomes 
from Gurr’s and Banks’s measures of executive 
competitiveness, selection, and legislative 
effectiveness; duration variables refer to numbers of 
consecutive years spent in regimes, resetting variables 
when status changes 
Clague et al (1996) 
De Vanssay and Spindler’s  De Vanssay and Spindler OECD plus non- 19 constitutional variables De Vanssay and Spindler 
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constitutional rights 
indicators: objective 
(1992) OECD 
Countries 
Bill of rights; right to privacy; right to unionize; 
political attributes, such as whether supreme court has 
final constitutional authority 
(1992) 
Bates and others’ measures 
of political transition: 
objective 
Bollen’s democracy 
measure: objective 
Bates and others (1996),  
work in progress 
Bollen (1990), drawing on 
Banks (1979) and Taylor 
and Hudson (1972) 
1970–91; 49 
countries  all 
African)  
1960, 1965; more 
than 110 countries 
Measures of political transition 
Executive scale; legislative scale (further scales in 
progress) 
Political components (“democracy”) 
Three concerning political liberties, three concerning 
political rights 
None yet 
 
 
Helliwell (1994); Barro 
(1996) 
 Political instability 
Taylor and Jodice’s and 
Banks’s political 
instability indicators: 
objective 
Persson and Tabellini 
(1994), using Taylor and 
Jodice (1983, 1988) and 
Banks (various issues) 
Annual, from 1960; 
136 countries 
Political instability and characteristics 
Number of revolutions, successful coups, unsuccessful 
coups, and political assassinations; number of changes 
in the composition of the executive; number of riots 
and demonstrations; number of regular and irregular 
government transfers 
Alesina and Rodrik  (1994); 
Persson and Tabellini 
(1994); Isham, Kaufmann, 
and Pritchett (1997) 
Barro’s political instability 
measures: objective 
Barro and Wolf (1989),  
using Banks (various 
issues); and Barro and Lee 
(1994) for wars measure 
Average 1960–85, or 
sub samples 
Political instability 
Counts of revolutions; coups and revolutions per year; 
assassinations per million population a year; strikes 
Wars 
Barro (1991); Jeffrey D., 
and Warner, A. (1995); 
Caselli, Esquivel, 
and Lefort (1996) 
This Table differentiates subjective measures, based on surveys and personal assessments, and objective measures, based on factual observations and economic data. Risk 
indicators typically comprise a weighted mix of both types of measures (for example, Euromoney issues of the 1990s). The table also tries to assess the coverage of Africa for 
these indexes, although in most cases data on Africa are very limited 
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Table 9: Type of MFIs used in the study and their regional distribution 1997-2008 
MFI Name  Country Region Year of 
inception 
MFI 
type 
Regulated Accepts 
deposits 
ACEP Senegal  WA 1987 CU  Y Y 
ACFB Benin WA 2004 CU  Y Y 
ACODE Chad CA 1996 NGO  Y Y 
ACSI   Ethiopia EA 1995 NBF  Y Y 
ADCSI  (Addis Credit & Savings 
Institution) 
Ethiopia EA 2000 NBF  Y Y 
ADEFI  Madagascar SA 1995 CU  Y N 
AE&I  (Afrique Emergence & 
Investissements) 
Ivory Coast WA 2003 NBF  Y N 
Akiba  (Akiba Commercial Bank Ltd)  Tanzania EA 1997 BK  Na Y 
Alidé  Benin WA 2001 NGO  N N 
Alliance MFB  (Alliance Microfinance 
Bank Limited) 
Nigeria WA 2005 NBF  Y Y 
APED  Ghana WA 2001 NGO  N Y 
AVFS  (Africa Village Financial 
Services) 
Ethiopia EA 1998 NBF  Y Y 
BG  (Buusaa Gonofaa Ethiopia EA 1999 NBF  Y Y 
BIMAS  Kenya EA 1997 NGO  Y Y 
BOM  (Banco Oportunidade de 
Moçambique) 
Mozambique SA 2004 BK  Y Y 
CACOEC SUDUDIAWDI Mali WA 1998 CU Y N 
CamCCUL  (Cameroon CUerative 
Credit Union League Limited) 
Cameroon CA 1968 CU  Y N 
CAPEC Dahra  Senegal  WA 1994 NGO  Y N 
Capitec Bank  South Africa SA 2001 BK  Y Y 
CBDIBA/RENACA  Benin WA 1990 NGO  Y N 
CDS  Cameroon CA 1997 CU  Y Y 
CECA Togo WA 1990 CU  Y Y 
CECIC S.A  South Africa SA 1995 NBF  Y N 
CEDA   Sierra Leone WA 2002 NGO  N N 
Centenary Bank (Centenary Rural 
Development Bank Ltd.) 
Uganda EA 1983 BK  Y Y 
CETZAM  (CETZAM Opportunity) Zambia SA 1998 NBF  N Y 
CFE   Rwanda EA 2003 NBF  Y Y 
CFF  (Cedi Finance Foundation) Ghana WA 1999 NGO  Y Y 
CMCA  (Crédit Mutuel de 
Centrafrique) 
Central 
Africa 
Republic 
CA 1994 CU  Y Y 
CML Uganda EA 2000 NBF Y N 
CMMB  Benin WA 1997 CU  Y Y 
CMS  (Crédit Mutuel du Sénégal)  Senegal  WA 1988 CU  Y Y 
CODES  Benin WA 1997 CU  Y N 
CUEC CAMEC MN  Democratic 
Republic Of 
Congo 
CA 1988 CU  Y N 
CUEC HINFANI DOSSO Niger WA 2005 CU  Y N 
CUec Nyawera   Democratic 
Republic Of 
Congo 
CA 1972 CU  Y N 
 264
CUEDU Kigali CA 1998 CU  Y N 
COSPEC Burundi EA 2001 CU  Y N 
CRAN   Ghana WA 1994 NGO  N Y 
CRG  (Credit Rural de Guinée) Guinea WA 1989 NBF  Y Y 
CUMO Malawi SA 2003 NGO  N Y 
CVECA Kita/Bafoulabé  Burkina Faso WA 1991 CU  Y Y 
DEC   Nigeria WA 1987 NGO  Y Y 
DECSI  (Dedebit Credit and Savings 
Institution) 
Ethiopia EA 1997 NBFI  Y Y 
DJOMEC   Senegal  WA 1999 CU  Y Y 
Duterimbere  Rwanda EA 2005 NBF  Y Y 
Equity Bank  (Equity Bank) Kenya EA 1984 BK  Y Y 
Equity Bank  (Equity Bank) Uganda EA 19997 BK  Y Y 
Eshet  (Eshet) Ethiopia EA 2000 NBFI  Y Y 
FADU  (Farmers Development 
Union)  
Nigeria WA 1989 NBF  N Y 
FAM  (Fonds d'Actions Mutuelles) Congo CA 1998 CU  Y N 
FASL Ghana WA 1996 NBF  N Y 
Faulu - KEN Kenya EA 1992 NBF  Y Y 
Faulu - TZA  (Faulu - Tanzania) Tanzania EA 2002 NBF  N Y 
Faulu - UGA  Uganda EA 1995 NBF Y Y 
FCC  (Fundo de Credito Comunitario Mozambique SA 1994 NGO  N Y 
FDM  (Fundo de Desenvolvimento da 
Mulher) 
Mozambique SA 1996 NGO  Y Y 
FECECAM  (Fédération des caisses 
d'épargne et de crédit agricole mutuel) 
Benin WA 1977 CU  Y Y 
FIDEVIE  Benin WA 2002 NGO  Y N 
FINADEV Guinée  Guinea WA 2005 NGO  N N 
FINCA - DRC  Democratic 
Republic Of 
Congo 
CA 2003 NGO  N Y 
FINCA - MWI Malawi SA 1994 NGO  N Y 
FINCA - TZA  Democratic 
Republic Of 
Congo 
EA 1998 NGO  N N 
FINCA - UG Uganda EA 1992 NBF  Y Y 
FINCA - ZMB Zimbabwe SA 2001 NBF  Y Y 
FINCORP Swaziland SA 1996 NBF  N N 
FUCEC Togo Togo WA 1983 CU  Y Y 
Gasha  Ethiopia EA 1998 NBFI  Y Y 
GRAINE sarl   Burkina Faso WA 2006 NBF  Y Y 
Hluvuku   Mozambique SA 2001 NGO  Y N 
HOFOKAM Uganda EA 2003 NGO  N Y 
Hope Micro Sierra Leone WA 2002 NGO  N N 
ID-Ghana Ghana WA 1998 NGO  N Y 
IMF HOPE RDC  Democratic 
Republic Of 
Congo 
CA 2004 NBF  Y N 
Jemeni   Mali WA 1995 CU  Y N 
KADET Kenya EA 2002 NBF  Y Y 
Kafo  (Kafo Jiginew) Mali WA 1987 CU  Y Y 
KixiCredito   Angola SA 1999 NGO  N Y 
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KOKARI  (KOKARI)  Niger WA 1994 CU  Y Y 
Kondo Jigima  (Kondo Jigima) Mali WA 1991 CU  Y Y 
KPOSB  Kenya EA 1978 BK  Y Y 
K-Rep  (K-Rep Bank) Kenya EA 2000 BK  Y Y 
KSF  (Kraban Support Foundation) Ghana WA 1996 NGO  N Y 
KWFT  (Kenya Women Finance 
Trust) 
Kenya EA 1982 NBF  Y Y 
KYAPS  Uganda EA 1999 CU  N N 
LAPO  (Lift Above Poverty 
Organisation) 
Nigeria WA 1987 NGO  Na Y 
Maata-N-Tudu  Ghana WA 1993 NGO  Y Y 
MAL  (Micro Africa Limited) Kenya EA 2000 NBF  Y N 
MBT  (MicroBankers Trust) Zambia SA 1996 NBF  Y N 
MC²  (Réseau MC²) Cameroon CA 1992 CU  Y N 
MDB  Benin WA 1995 CU  Y N 
MDSL Kenya EA 1999 NBF  Y N 
MEC Bosangani  Democratic 
Republic Of 
Congo 
CA 2002 CU  Y Y 
MEC FEPRODES Senegal  WA 1997 CU  Y Y 
MECBAS  Senegal  WA 2001 CU  Y Y 
MECREF  Nigeria WA 1996 CU  Y Y 
MED-Net Uganda EA 1997 NGO  Y Y 
Meklit  (Meklit) Ethiopia EA 2000 NBF  Y Y 
Metemamen  Ethiopia EA 2002 NBF  Y Y 
MFSC  Uganda EA 2001 CU  N Y 
MGPCC dekawowo Togo WA 2000 CU  Y Y 
MICROFUND  Togo WA 1998 CU  Y Y 
Microloan Foundation - MWI Malawi SA 2002 CU  Y N 
Miselini  (Miselini)  Mali WA 1994 NGO  Y Y 
MRFC   Malawi SA 1993 NBF  Y N 
Mutual Alliance S&L  Nigeria WA 1992 NBF  Y N 
NovoBanco Mozambique SA 2004 BK  Y Y 
NovoBanco - MOZ  Mozambique SA 2000 BK  Y Y 
Nyesigiso  Mali WA 1990 CU  Y N 
OCSSC  Ethiopia EA 1999 NBF  Y N 
OIBM Malawi SA 2002 BK  Y N 
OISL  Ghana WA 2004 NBF  Y N 
OMO  Ethiopia EA 1997 NBF  Y Y 
OPIC-TOGO  Togo WA 1997 NGO  Y N 
Otiv Alaotra   Madagascar SA 1996 CU Y N 
Otiv Sambava  Madagascar SA 1998 CU Y N 
Otiv Tana  Madagascar SA 1996 CU Y N 
Otiv Toamasina  Madagascar SA 1995 CU  Y N 
PADME  Benin WA 1993 NGO  Y Y 
PAIDEK Democratic 
Republic Of 
Congo 
CA 1996 NGO  Y N 
PAMECAS  Senegal  WA 1995 CU  Y Y 
PAPME Benin WA 1993 NGO  Y Y 
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PASED Sudan EA 2001 NGO  N N 
PEACE Ethiopia EA 1999 NBF  Y Y 
Pharma-crédit  Congo CA 2002 NBF  N N 
PRIDE - TZA   Tanzania EA 1994 NGO  N Y 
PRIDE- ZMB Zimbabwe SA 2000 NGO  N N 
ProCredit - GHA  Ghana WA 2002 NBF  Y Y 
ProCredit Bank-DRC Democratic 
Republic Of 
Congo 
CA 2005 BK  Y Y 
PTF  (Presidential Trust Fund) Tanzania EA 1984 NGO  N N 
Pulse Zambia SA 2001 NBF  N N 
RCMEC Ivory Coast WA 1997 CU  Y N 
RCPB  Burkina Faso WA 1992 CU  Y Y 
RECEC-FD Senegal  WA 2001 CU  Y N 
RENAPROV Finance SA  Cameroon CA 1996 NBF  N N 
Réseau KARABARA  Mali WA 1997 CU  Y N 
RML  (Rwanda Microfinance SARL) Rwanda EA 2004 NBF  Y N 
SAILD  (SAILD Microfinance)  Cameroon CA 2000 NGO  Y N 
SAT  Ghana WA 1994 NGO  Y N 
SEAP Nigeria WA 1998 NGO  Y Y 
SEDA (Small Enterprise Development 
Agency) 
Tanzania EA 1996 NGO  N Y 
SEF-TZ Tanzania EA 2000 NGO  N N 
SEF-ZAF  (Small Enterprise 
Foundation)  
 South Africa SA 1991 NGO  Y N 
SEM Fund Senegal  WA 2004 NGO  Y N 
SFPI  (Specialized Financial and 
Promotional Institution) 
 Ethiopia  EA 1998 NBF  Y Y 
Sidama  (Sidama)  Ethiopia EA 1998 NBF  Y N 
SIPEM Madagascar SA 1990 NBF  Y N 
SMEP  Kenya EA 1975 NBF  Y N 
SOCREMO  (SOCREMO - Banco de 
Microfinanças de Moçambique) 
 Mozambique SA 1998 BK  Y Y 
SOFINA  Cameroon CA 1996 NBF  Y N 
Soro Yiriwaso  (Soro Yiriwaso) Mali WA 2000 NGO  N Y 
Tchuma   Mozambique SA 1998 NBF  Y N 
TEBA  (Teba Bank) South Africa SA 1976 BK  Y N 
TIAVO  Madagascar SA 1997 CU  Y Y 
Turame Community Finance Burundi EA 2004 NBF  Y N 
UCEC/MK  Chad CA 1993 CU  Y N 
U-IMCEC  Senegal  WA 2001 CU  Y N 
UMECTO  Togo WA 2001 CU  Y N 
UNICECAM  Madagascar SA 2000 CU  Y N 
Union des CUECs Umutanguha   Rwanda EA 2005 CU  Y N 
UOMB  Rwanda EA 1997 BK  N N 
U-Trust / UWFT  Uganda EA 1984 NBF  Y Y 
Vital Finance  (Vital Finance) Benin WA 1998 NGO  Y Y 
WAGES  Togo WA 1994 NGO  N N 
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Wasasa  Ethiopia EA 2000 NBF  Y Y 
Wisdom Ethiopia EA 1999 NBF  Y Y 
Yehu  (Yehu Microfinance Trust) Kenya EA 2000 NGO  N N 
 
Source: complied by the author from the MIX Market 
Note: EA-East Africa; WA-West Africa; CA-Central Africa; SA-South Africa 
Y-Yes; N-No 
BK-Bank; COOP-Cooperative/credit unions; NBF-Non-bank financial institutions; NGO-Non-governmental 
Organizations (NGO’s). There are 211 total MFI’s, of which 10 are banks, 9 are cooperative/credit unions, 39 
are non-bank financial institutions, and 54 are non-profits (NGO’s). These are from 31 countries 
 
 
 
Table 10: Description of the panel (MFIs per year) 
1997 10 
1998 19 
1999 30 
2000 42 
2001 90 
2002 125 
2003 146 
2004 159 
2005 186 
2006 178 
2007 155 
2008 167 
 
